Goal's Anatomy: Gegenpressing

Ever since Jürgen Klopp arrived at Borussia Dortmund the word "Gegenpressing" started to make its way around the media and specifically tactical websites (such as this one). Klopp's arrival at Liverpool, in particular, fanned the flames even further, but it's sometimes hard to define just what the term comprises.

Gegenpressing can be translated literally as counterpressing and it is basically a method that some coaches think to be a very efficient approach to hurt your opponents. Usually, a team either relied on numbers at the back when they gave the ball away and immediately retreated into their own half or they would press high when they didn't have the ball. The gegenpressing's innovation is that one's opponents are most likely to get hurt when they have just won the ball back and are therefore still looking for the right way to turn it into attack - which can sometimes lead to confusion and the unexpected opening of spaces.

A few weeks ago Barcelona and Villareal met at Camp Nou and showed just how useful and effective this weapon can be. This edition of Goal's Anatomy will focus on it in some more detail.

• 1. Normal defensive organisation.

This is in no way a surprising picture. Barcelona have the ball (Andrés Iniesta does, to be more accurate) and Villareal defend in numbers with everyone behind the ball apart from Roberto Soldado, in a not that atypical 4x4x1x1. There is quite some distance between Villareal's right back Mário Gaspar and the centre-backs and also a lack of coverage in between the lines, but that will be covered elsewhere.

• 2. Dynamic shifts

Numbers and layouts are, of course, nothing in football, because it's how dynamics work that make or break the lovely ideas one might have drawn on the board. In this case, Iniesta tries to connect with Luís Suárez via a long ball while Munir El Haddadi tries to make an inside run, as so often is the case. Notice the shaded circle where Sergi Roberto is almost by himself in one of the most important areas of the pitch.

• 3. Villareal win the ball back

Iniesta's hopeful long ball doesn't yield much as Víctor Ruiz heads it clear and the Yellow Submarine win the ball back. Villareal midfielders do a poor job of patrolling their midfield, as indicated by the shaded circle. Now would be the time where Villareal should start deciding how to turn this ball recovery into an attack of their own. Also, notice that there aren't that many Barcelona players around where the ball is lost at the moment.

• 4. Barcelona pounce while Villareal dillydally

While the Villareal players try to keep the ball down from Ruíz's header, Barcelona react extremely fast and immediately swarm around their opponents in the area of the ball, robbing Villlareal of the necessary time to decide on their next move. Roberto and Sergio Busquets get closer to Iniesta and, together with Dani Alves, force Villareal's mistakes.

Because Villareal were already thinking about transitioning into attack, most of their players abandoned their defensive (body) positioning and most of them even took a step or two forward. Compare, for instance, how almost every Villareal player had his feet facing their own goal in the previous picture and how, on this one, their midfielders are almost in line with the ball, rather than behind it.

Because most players were considering opening up the pitch (namely the right-back), spaces opened up all of a sudden where, in Barcelona's normal attacking phase, there weren't many.

• Conclusion

Therein lies the beauty of the gegenpressing: By surrendering control of the ball for a few seconds, one can actually befuddle their opponents (sometimes) more easily than when having supreme control of the ball. By allowing the opposing team to win the ball back, one also allows them to lose their balance as they turn their inner chip into attacking mode, ergo making them less prepared to defend in case they give the ball away.

If used wisely, the gegenpressing can have devastating effects and provide a very useful way to tear more defensively solid teams apart in just a few seconds. You can see the whole play just below.

The indivisibility of football

For years football was thought to be a simple issue - a matter of individual duels whose winners would end up deciding the outcome of any given match. That difference could admittedly be suppressed by "wanting it more" than one's opponents or "getting stuck into them".

Some years later the sport became the subject matter of theses and studies in universities - and thus rife with analytic, intellectual analyses, much to several coaches' chagrin. It was then that the sport was further dissected and the theory of football's four (tactical) moments first emerged: attacking organisation, transition into defence, defensive organisation and transition into attack (set-pieces would later become some sort of fifth moment to some).

Some top-level coaches have been honest enough in sharing their drilling mistakes over the past few years that may have led them to unsatisfactory results. One of the most common faux-pas consisted on working on one specific moment of the game (let's go with attacking organisation, for example, i.e. the time when a team has the ball and the other team is positioned in their preferred defensive positions) and dismissing the fact that football is in itself a fluid entity, where it's often quite hard to tell the four moments apart (is a breakaway a transition into attack or the way a specific team choose to attack?).

Overlooking that fact is usually detrimental to teams, because the instant the moment they've been drilled ends, they suddenly find themselves in uncharted territory, unaware of what to do when the next moment presents itself - a reaction that costs precious seconds and could represent the difference between a goal and winning the ball back.

• Attacking is not only about scoring goals

Instead of rambling on about theoretical concepts, it might be easier to speak about specific situations. Most of us often see commentators and pundits taking part in some sort of reverse-engineering of results: for instance, Barcelona lost 3-2 against Valencia last Saturday and it would be rather easy to blame the Catalans' defence - after all, they shipped three goals. On the other hand, it might be equally recommended to praise the visitors' counter-attacking capabilities - after all, their finish was so clinical they didn't even need that many opportunities to score the three goals.

However, it's probably much better to analyse what gave way to that specific outcome - the process. If we focus on the process(es), it will be much easier to pick up on what could be the team's vulnerabilities, even when they're winning. In Barcelona's case, it wasn't exactly hard to see such an upset coming, and that's where the tactical discussions bears importance.

Pep Guardiola's Barcelona created a blueprint for possession-based football that is now being copied all around, including at this beloved former club. However, it is not a particular brand that is easily imitated, because the risk of exposing your back line is extremely high. To be able to implement it successfully, one must think about the game as a whole - what do we do with the ball, where are we willing to give it away, what shall we do when we do give it away?

Guardiola used to say he wanted Barcelona to have the ball because they were rubbish at defending. Even though some of it was poetic liberty and an attempt to shed some responsibility off his players' backs, it was mostly true. Only by controlling the match in almost every way were they able to play Mascherano or Adriano or Abidal at centre-back, where their deficiencies were not laid bare.

Even though most of the praised lavished on Guardiola's Barcelona focussed on the free-scoring Leo Messi or Xavi and Iniesta's quasi-hypnotic passing, one of the side's most important features was their reaction to when the ball was lost - namely the 5-second rule that demanded the team to immediately close up on the opponent when they lost the ball. More often than not, they got the ball back and went about their business once again.

Nowadays, even though Tata Martino tried to adhere to some of his predecessors' guidelines, the side looks completely transformed, even though most of the players are the same. Instead of dictating the play, Barcelona's players assume that tiki-taka will be enough to impose themselves on opponents. The major problem happens because they do not abide by the same canons and therefore are more willing to play into other teams' hands. For instance, they cross a lot more frequently and, when the opposing side wins the aerial duel (as they often do, given Barcelona players' small stature), most of the team is too committed forward and unprepared for what is coming after the aerial duel.

Also, without the 5-second rule or some similar mechanism, Barcelona do not force other teams to make mistakes as soon as they win the ball back, which allows them to easily circumvent Xavi - not the quickest player around -, for instance, and exposes the team's centre-backs. Not only are the full-backs usually way high up the pitch, but there does not seem to be too much drilling in defensive even-numbers or numbers-down situation, which only worsens the situation.

In other words, even though Barcelona surely work on one specific moment of the game - attacking organisation - and may even be quite good at it, Tata Martino seems to be forgetting that the game is a continuum where one's strongest suit could quickly devolve into their own nightmare if they are not willing to work on what comes after it. By attacking on one's own terms, one should be able to control not only how the team goes about scoring goals, but how and where the team gives the ball away - and what ensues when they actually give it away.

Barcelona vs Bayern Munich: The chalkboards

In a week where the once seemingly unassailable Barcelona conceded their first defeat in four years on their own turf and where Real Madrid were a goal shy from getting through to the final, there were some interesting aspects to pay attention to (please find the key to all the images at the bottom of the post). Let's move on to Barcelona vs Bayern Munich.

The world will be (in fact, it already is) talking about the end of a cycle - which may or may not prove accurate, particularly given that Messi is still only 25. There is however another aspect that may not come across as critical, but which may turn out to be as important - to wit, the active role of the wingers in the defensive side of the game.

Both Robben and Ribéry impressed with their work rate, with the French player effectively shutting down Dani Alves, one of Barça's main threats, over the two matches. With the previous day's example of Reus, Götze or Grosskreutz, the old adage according to which an attacker could not be bothered to defend, lest he became too tired to be decisive, could be on its way out.

However, their decisiveness did not seem to affected at all, as the take-on chalkboard demonstrates. Barcelona were oddly at a loss when it came to dribble past opponents (largely because they were facing a very organised team), while Bayern's forwards often found pockets of space to sprint past their markers - chiefly the aforementioned Robben and Ribéry.

Müller proved once again why he dubs himself the "engineer of space", not excelling in any particular aspect of the game, but always surfacing when and where the team need him. At Camp Nou, he was once again all over the pitch, tackling, overloading and helping control.

Despite a more economical approach from the German team, Bayern were still able to create numerous chances, most of them following quick breaks in response to Barcelona's poorly coordinated attempt to press up front. Notice how Bayern's chances in the second leg were the result of longer passes - unlike the previous leg, where their intensity allowed them to buzz around the box.

As for Barça, despite all their efforts, this was not the display of a team of champions. While the number of interceptions may look high, it's actually more important to notice the absence of interceptions in the most important part of the pitch. Barcelona were forced to several last-ditch tackles and interceptions, precisely because the midfield could not provide the proper screening. Bayern's chalkboard implies a more cohesive team, with a clear plan laid out.

Barça's attacking play was not brilliant either, with Bayern forcing them to play square and backward passes and keeping them from playing their favourite diagonal balls through to Pedro or David Villa. Furthermore, giving the ball away cheaply meant that Bayern didn't even need to play a lot of passes in their attacking third to create all those chances.

Therefore, it was hardly surprising to watch Barcelona struggle to muster a shot on target.

The chalkboards of David Villa and Iniesta offer interesting evidence of Barcelona's difficulties. In the striker's case, notice how many backward passes he made throughout the match, apparently unable to get himself in decent positions. As for Iniesta, Javi Martínez's pressure was enough to smother the Spanish wizard's magic, forcing him to short square or backward passes as well, unable to dribble past opponents or find team-mates with through balls.

Champions League - the chalkboards

Another week, another set of wonderful displays and exciting, close-fought contests in the Champions League. Let's take a look at some of the most significant chalkboards.

• 1. Borussia Dortmund vs Málaga

While Málaga creating less chances in the first leg, they managed to create them in more dangerous areas.

The pressure exerted by Málaga's forwards kept Gündogan from being as decisive as he had been in the first leg.

Borussia Dortmund's final push meant they managed to get the same number of chances as the first leg.

Oddly enough, Málaga actually made less interceptions than in the first leg,
undoubtedly due to their forwards' impressive work rate.
Notice how the Spaniards made a lot less interceptions in the centre-back area.

• 2. Barcelona vs Paris Saint-Germain

Barcelona's passing in their attacking third before and after Messi coming on.

Barcelona's chances before and after Messi coming on. Not a huge difference in numbers.

Barcelona's interceptions before and after Messi coming on.
Oddly enough, this was the area where Barcelona improved most dramatically.

Ibrahimovic put in a circumspect yet decisive all-round display against his former employers.

A comparison between the overall contribution provided by Verratti (first leg) and Beckham (second leg).
The Italian midfielder was instrumental for Paris Saint-Germain's solid display.

Chances created throughout both legs. Paris Saint-Germain actually managed to look more dangerous in Camp Nou,
with several chances created down the middle.

• 3. Bayern Munich vs Juventus

In an unexpectedly one-sided contest, Bayern were far superior to Juventus,
which translated in their almost identical number of shots home and away (albeit more dangerous in the first leg).

Bayern were even more proactive and successful as far as their defensive approach was concerned.
Once again, notice far up many of their interceptions took place, preventing Juventus from threatening their back line.

• 4. Galatasaray vs Real Madrid

Facing an uphill battle, Galatasaray chose to take the game to Real Madrid, despite their early goal.
In the second leg, Galatasaray defended higher up the field, as it's easily noticeable in the first chalkboard.

Real Madrid's three-goal cushion, in turn, allowed them to work less hard defensively further upfield.

Champions League - the chalkboards

This week's matches for the Champions League quarter-finals offered wonderful, action-packed matches. Below you will find a few interesting chalkboards.

Mandzukic was critical to Bayern's constant pressing and his work rate cannot be overstated.

Borussia Dortmund have only themselves to blame for not emerging victors from this match.
In the second half, Jürgen Klopp's team were more incisive in their pressing and took control.

Bayern Munich's unrelenting pressing brought out the technical limitations of Barzagli, Bonucci and Chiellini.
Notice how most of the interceptions and tackles are not made in central-defence areas.

David Beckham was the surprise Carlo Ancelotti decided to spring on Barcelona.
Even though the English midfielder was not to blame for anything, his contribution was rather limited.

Zlatan Ibrahimovic had a quiet match, by his standards, but still managed to grab an all too important goal.

Barcelona 0-0 Benfica - Eagles out of Champions League

After failing to score against Barcelona and following Celtic's narrow win against Spartak Moscow, Benfica are out of the Champions League. The Eagles' were penalised by their profligacy and will have to keep fighting for an European trophy in the Europa League.

On the wrong side of the odds and faced with an uphill battle, Benfica had to at least get the same result as Celtic against Spartak Moscow. Their task was made a bit easier by Tito Vilanova, who rested several key players (including Messi, Xavi, Iniesta, Busquets, Dani Alves and Piqué) and instead gave his second string valuable minutes in the Champions League without the inherent pressure of a result.

The feeling that that would play right into Benfica's hands was confirmed as soon as the match started. Unlike what they did in their own turf (oddly enough), the Portuguese team came with a intense pressing approach out of the gate, pinning Barcelona back. With Pinto in goal instead of Vítor Valdés and with a makeshift back four, Barcelona found it hard to play out from the back, particularly under the pressure of Rodrigo, Lima, Ola John and Nolito. Even the young tyro André Almeida was pushing high up, tracking Alex Song when he (or another midfielder) dropped back to try and provide an out-ball.

Benfica pressured Barcelona intensely for the entire first half.

Benfica were solid and defensively aggressive, managing to win numerous balls back, due to their intensity. The Catalans B team are clearly not as good or used to playing together and often misplaced passes. On top of that, Benfica were quite cleverly exploiting the space behind the centre-backs, who, according to the team's principles, remained deployed in a high defensive line - but often with little pressure from their midfield.

Benfica's first clear-cut scoring chance came on the 11th minute, with Rodrigo getting behind the defence and then selfishly choosing to shoot instead of playing the ball to Nolito, who was furious at his team-mate. The same Nolito provided a lovely cross for Lima to head wide ten minutes later. Barcelona started showing their teeth shortly afterwards when they successfully found their way out of Jorge Jesus' defensive maze: Matic would stick to the highest midfielder, André Gomes would track the one dropping back, but the third one (usually Sergi Roberto) was always free to collect the ball and break past Benfica's midfield, as proven by their opportunities on 23 and 24 minutes.

Barcelona were often able to break free
with a simple triangle-shaped move,
particularly during the second half.

Barcelona found acres of space behind Matic and André Gomes.

Benfica, however, kept their foot on the throttle and remained adamant at pushing forward - and almost got the reward for it, with Lima hitting the post on 31 minutes, after Adriano's well-timed tackle fortuitously found the Brazilian forward's foot. A few minutes later, Lima would become the provider of a beautifully placed long ball towards Ola John, who turned his opponent inside out, but allowed Pinto another good save. Whenever Jesus' men got the ball out wide, their opponents' knees buckled.

• Second half

The second half was a whole different game. Benfica started to tire out and their pressing was not as effective. Therefore, Barcelona found it easier to get into their usual passing rhythm and find chinks in Benfica's armour. With Ola John and Nolito offering less and less protection to their full-backs, Tello ran riot against Máxi Pereira, who seemed to lose his temper once or twice, but managed to keep it together. Also, Lima and Rodrigo remained high up, which meant that the trio of Song, Sergi Robert and Thiago Alcântara had the necessary space and time to pick their passes. Fortunately for Benfica, this group of players' timing for the through-ball was not as accurate as it usually is, allowing Benfica to successfully deploy the offside trap.

Messi came in after 58 minutes (with Villa going right) and immediately drew several fouls just outside the box - and he was also more dangerous at providing key passes for Villa or Tello. Messi himself would get into an excellent position to score, but Artur's brave save avoided the worst for Benfica, with the Argentinean being stretchered off after that duel. By then, Benfica had already changed into a 4x3x3 shape, with Matic behind André Almeida and André Gomes, and Bruno César and Ola John on the wings supporting Cardozo.

Benfica wasted a very good chance not only to win at Nou Camp, but to progress into the next stage. They benefitted from a perfect storm, with Barcelona fielding a team comprised of youngsters and second-string players. The Eagles have only themselves to blame for not scoring on (at least) one of the several opportunities they had to lock the score. The Europa League awaits - and with it another shot at an European trophy.

Barcelona - a different concept

This post may be a bit late, but its pertinence remains valid, since we will be analysing consolidated (defensive) processes. Tito Vilanova was appointed as Pep Guardiola's successor in order to maintain a certain philosophy, one that has proved fruitful over the past few years. While it's true that most of the major guidelines subsist, it's also true that Vilanova has virtually given up on the three-man defence (except when his team are trailing) and that the defensive pressure is not as intense and effective. Let's take a quick look at the match versus Real Madrid from October 7.

• Real Madrid goal #1

Real Madrid were being successful in shifting the ball from side to side, namely through Xabi Alonso's accurate long balls. The ball had just traveled from left to right, with Özil moving it back to the centre. With a far less intense defensive pressure, Barcelona's wingers seem unsure of what to do without the ball and often forget about defending. In this particular case, there are five Real Madrid players in the box against an equal number of defenders. Notice how Ronaldo (blue) is left one on one against Dani Alves with a huge space for his trickery (shaded area).

When the ball gets to Benzema, one of the centre-backs comes out to meet him, as he is supposed to, and Dani Alves (orange) hesitates between covering for this team-mate or worrying about Ronaldo. Again, the right winger is nowhere to be found and neither Xavi or Fàbregas (the midfielders in this particular match) help out near the box.

That simple hesitation is enough for Ronaldo to get past Dani Alves (orange) and bury the ball in the net with a powerful left-footed shot.

• Real Madrid goal #2

For Real Madrid's second goal, there was another pressing issue. Barcelona have been less precise and giving the ball away more cheaply recently, especially in tougher matches. Here Barcelona have once again lost the ball and the team take longer than expected to get back into (defensive) shape. The middle is completely unprotected (shaded area) and Dani Alves is not between the goal and his man, as he should. Furthermore, there is no one goalside of Özil (inside the shaded area).

With none of the defenders coming out to meet Özil, Ronaldo sprints past Barcelona right-back. With no pressure from midfield (the two shuttlers are very far from the action), the German international can pick his pass and the offside trap is no obstacle for Ronaldo's speed and intelligent movement.

• Conclusion

Despite their perfect start to the season up to that moment, Barcelona's displays have been far from perfect. Their possession has been sloppier at times, but most importantly, their defensive approach seems to be changing, voluntarily or not. The immediate pressure they used to exert after giving the ball away is nowhere near what it used to be, but their defensive approach and positioning have not changed accordingly, which partly explains the sudden hike in conceded goals.