Portugal: What lies behind and ahead

Despite its high-profiled nature,
Pepe's ill-tempered reaction was not
the root of all evil for Portugal.
Photo by o.canada.com

Up until 5pm on June 16, 2014, everything seemed to be tip-top in Portugal. The sun was (finally) shining, summer was in bloom and the TV, press and Internet were littered with motivational jingles and clichés. The national team was just about to kick-off their World Cup in the fraternal soil of their "país irmão" and the side boasted Cristiano Ronaldo, the world's best player and figurehead of recent Champions League victors Real Madrid.

By 7pm, everything was a mess. The football team that used to unite all Portuguese people (or some thought or wished) had become a joke, its players a cluster of pampered professionals who did not deserve the money they got nor the pride their fellow country men had invested in them. In short: same ol', same ol' back in Portugal. Love and embrace 'em when they win, crush 'em when they lose.

Rather than discussing the result and what it all means - or may mean - at length, we will be looking at the process, namely where some of the problems lay and how/if they can be sorted out in time.

• The formation

The formation of any given team is of little importance in the grand scheme of all things football. As the saying goes, tactics stand for nothing on paper - meaning that it's rather the dynamics that are implemented within said tactical framework that are relevant, not the theoretical representations of a 4x3x3 or 3x5x2.

In the case of the Portuguese national team, there seems to be little to no collective thinking, not in terms of group cohesion, but rather in terms of what to do in the game's different phases. The centre-backs seem to have the ball or their direct opponent as their sole responsibility, regardless of where it ends up taking them. The midfielders do not provide the necessary coverage for each other, let alone for their defence. The poor attackers are left to their own devices, with a game plan that essentially boils down to "get the ball to Ronaldo now!"

Therefore, it results utterly pointless to dissect the formation, since none will work if there is no tactical blueprint and if the players' features do not fit into it (when in doubt, please see Spain's case during the current World Cup). Whether in 4x4x2, 4x3x3 or 4x2x3x1, without an underlying collective understanding of the game, few teams will prosper.

• The Ronaldo conundrum

Cristiano Ronaldo is by far the team's most gifted player. He is the captain, the man everyone turns to for guidance. That much was clearly on display when Nani (for instance), presented with a clear-cut opportunity, kept looking over his shoulder to give the ball to Ronaldo. However, it's become painfully clear that Ronaldo's numerous shots, sprints and goals come at a defensive cost.

The chances created by the German team and the absence
of defensive input down Portugal's left paint an explanatory picture.

It is no surprise then that Real Madrid managed to grab their Décima by pairing him with Benzema up front, thus efficiently covering both wings. Most opponents had identified Portugal and Real Madrid's left wing as their main gateway. If Portugal coach Paulo Bento is to insist on this formation based on the same principles, the left wing - now without Fábio Coentrão, no less - will be a primary target for upcoming opponents.

On the attacking front, Ronaldo actually suffered from being offered little service down his side, despite the scare Portugal gave Germany in the match's initial period, where Hugo Almeida ended up squandering a good opportunity presented by his captain.

Despite his limited playing time at Manchester United, Nani was often called upon to carry the ball forward.

In fact, it was Manchester United's once super-sub Nani that saw the ball more often, while also contributing a little more defensively. All this seems to confirm that Ronaldo might just be better off stationed up front - playing off a proper, designated no. 9 such as Éder - than parading all his abilities down the left.

Portugal ended up favouring their right side both offensively and defensively.

• Miguel Veloso

When Miguel Veloso first burst onto the scene of Portuguese football, it was a breath of fresh air. It seemed Portugal would have a gifted ball-playing holding midfielder for years to come. Unfortunately for him, it did not pan out that way and Veloso now finds himself plying his trade for Dynamo Kiev after being considered for greater heights. He has become slow and apparently lost even the ability to put himself in the right spots according to his position, often jeopardising the team's defensive solidity.

Miguel Veloso contributed precious little defensively against Germany.

If William Carvalho is to replace him against the United States (a possibility formulated elsewhere), the defensive dashboard of Portugal's defensive midfielder might be a tad busier than the above one.

• Éder

During his early years, Hugo Almeida was thought to be the answer to many Portuguese supporters: A tall, strong, robust, left-footed striker. The long-standing issue of "good football but the balls never goes in the net" that harassed the Portuguese national team (and clubs to a lesser extent) seemed to be all but over.

However, like Veloso, Almeida's evolution stagnated. A good four-year spell at Werder Bremen earned him a move to Turkish side Besiktas, all of which did not grant him an extension of his somewhat limited bag of tricks. Despite his physical presence, Almeida does not offer the link-up play the maligned Hélder Postiga provides and he's not exactly the most mobile of players.

Éder replaced the injured Hugo Almeida and immediately improved Portugal's incisiveness.

When Almeida was forced to limp off the pitch, on came Braga's Éder, a forward who, despite his long-term injury, seems to combine most features of his two fellow strikers: On one hand, he is able to hold the ball up and allow his team to progress up the pitch. On the other hand, he's fast enough to create problems, as Germany's Mats Hummels can attest.

• Conclusion

All in all, there seems to be a glaring beckoning for greater collective organsiation within the Portuguese team. In a tournament where most teams have fared apparently under no detailed instructions from their managers and relied hugely on their top performers, the only way to improve the side's odds is to offer them a map they can follow, rather than leaving them to their own devices. In a competition that has been so dominated by individual displays, Portugal must make use of a clear plan if they are to stop the progressively decaying talent pool from drying out altogether.

Portugal 0-4 Germany: Where to go from here?

Portugal certainly had a nightmare of a start to their World Cup in Brazil, but all is certainly not lost. You can check out why here.

History repeating itself

Starting elevens

Portugal and German offered us the first chess match of the Euros. The three games up to this point had drifted a bit from what was widely expected - cagey contests with few goals. The Portuguese line-up had no surprises, with Hélder Postiga and João Pereira getting the nod ahead of Hugo Almeida and Miguel Lopes, but Germany manager Joachim Löw went with Mats Hummels instead of Per Mertesacker, most likely to in order to offer quicker defensive coverage for Ronaldo's charges.

Portugal were happy to acknowledge Germany's superiority and played cautiously. Resisting the temptation to drop their lines too much, Paulo Bento's men had a clear game plan: to keep the ball from getting to their opponent's final third. For that, they tried to stifle Germany's first build-up stage, with Moutinho and Meireles picking up Schweinsteiger and Khedira, respectively. However, the presence of Hummels meant that Germany were able to bypass that obstacle rather easily, especially because Hélder Postiga did not seem to know whom to mark.

Hummels offered the Mannschaft better circulation of the ball.

20 minutes into the game, the Selecção kept finding it harder and harder to discover routes for their breakaways. Incapable of playing through the right, the main alternative lay with Fábio Coentrão's long passes towards Cristiano Ronaldo or Postiga, which seldom worked out. Furthermore, despite being vocal with their concerns about Ronaldo, Löw had clearly done his homework, as Miguel Veloso was always closely marked by either Özil or Gómez. This, in turn, meant that Portugal's routes were rather predictable and unsuccessful.

Portugal kept trying to stifle Germany's midfield.

With both teams seeming more afraid to lose than willing to win, the second half was not that different. Neither eleven was being able to do what they do best. Whilst Germany were more proactive, they still could not find space through the middle and started to look more for Gómez's aerial threat. On the other hand, Portugal's transitions were not reaching their destination due to numerous wayward (simple) passes and out of sync movement.

Löw tried to change that by asking Schweinsteiger to play higher up so that Özil could exploit the free space in front of the Portuguese defense. The strategy partially worked, with the German maestro easily overloading the wings (Ronaldo and Nani had clear instructions not to track back and provide the out-ball), but it did not deliver the end product. As for Portugal, without someone in the Rui Costa or Deco mould, it was hard to shake things up from midfield, with both wingers too static.

A deadlock seemed to be in the cards up until the 72nd minute, when Mário Gómez proved that, while he lacks Klose's link-up play, he possesses a rare ability to transform a loose ball into a goal in a glimpse. From that moment on, Portugal had to chase the result and Bento threw Varela on the pitch for Meireles (Nélson Oliveira had already taken Postiga's position on the 69th minute) for one final push. After conceding the goal, the Selecção showed just how much more they have to offer when they are not just waiting for their opponent and, on the contrary, are willing to make use of all their strengths going forward.

Even though the Portuguese players, coach and fans will most likely complain about bad luck and mention the two shots that hit the woodwork, the truth of it all is that Portugal can only blame themselves. While a team's organisation is paramount, that alone must not be their only game plan, if they want to achieve success. Bento will rally his troops by stating that Portugal had the better chances, but he would be better off  asking his players not to shy away from what they do best.


This article will also be available at PortuGOAL.net.