Champions League - Bayern breakdown

Bayern expected line-up and typical movement

Even though it wasn't exactly the people's choice, next Saturday's Champions League final promises to be a very entertaining match, especially because the two teams couldn't be more different. Because Chelsea has been thoroughly analysed here, here, here and here, today's article will focus primarily on the German team.

While Chelsea have turned into a cohesive defensive unit with a safety-first approach under interim manager Roberto Di Matteo, Bayern Munich's stance is attacking and, as a consequence, their line-up has a clear imbalance in favour of the offense. In fact, it's hard to envision another team that would seem more appropriate (on paper, at least) to Chelsea's newfound defensive solidity.

• Positive

Make no mistake about it: Bayern are a world class team; otherwise, they wouldn't have beaten Real Madrid, Manchester City and Napoli - among others - on their way to the final. As previously mentioned, their strength lies clearly up front, with the likes of Mario Gómez, Franck Ribéry, Arjen Robben and Bastian Schweinsteiger.

There are two key aspects to Bayern usual play. First off, Mario Gómez. It's only fair that any analysis kicks off with this unbelievably great poacher. The striker has had an amazing couple of seasons and, were it not for  Messi's outwardly feats, would be the competition's top scorer. The other aspect are the two wingers, Ribéry and Robben. Both of them are very good on 1v1 situations and can wreak havoc at any given time.

Despite their similar nominal position, their movement is very different. Whereas Robben hugs the touchline and tends to drift inward, Ribéry is more keen on dropping back and collecting the ball further back towards the goal line.

Bayern are excellent at focussing attention on one wing and exploring the blind side.
When Robben drifts inward, Gómez tends to meet him for the one-two, freeing up Ribéry.

• Negative

Similarly to Chelsea, the Germans will line up without key players, such as Alaba, Gustavo and Badstuber - which is to say almost their whole left side. Bayern have been consistently and frighteningly weak down the left wing. For starters, Ribéry has a troublesome tendency to turn off his defensive chip and both Alaba and Gustavo are not the greatest positional masters of defense, opening up the gates repeatedly. 

Any team facing Bayern know that the left is usually the best way to go.

As it turns out, all of these absences might not be that unlucky for Jupp Heynckes, since Lahm will probably have to deputise on the left, with Rafinha taking the right, and Kroos will get back to his natural position beside Schweinsteiger. With Kroos getting pulled back, Müller will probably have to step in as the player in the hole. The thing about Müller is that he has a Jekyll-and-hide football persona, which is not exactly the sort of thing you want for a Champions League final.

Apart from that, Bayern's overall defensive positioning leaves much to be desired. Perhaps the presence of Van Buyten is able to bring some much-needed stability to the back four, since Heynckes' men repeat mistakes that every grassroots team is weary of making, such as no defensive coverage and one of the midfielders wandering off. For instance, the German Cup final laid bare their frailties against a simple player partnership such as Kagawa and Lewandowski, which is to say that Mata and Drogba will feel right at home.

It's odd that a simple route-one strategy is able to create so many goal-scoring opportunities.

• Conclusion

All in all, it should be an evenly balanced match, given the Champions League tradition that both teams will be too wary of conceding a goal. Nevertheless, it's this blog's opinion that Chelsea's sober, defensive-minded approach will trump Bayern's attitude of throwing caution to the wind and attacking in numbers - even though it is important to bear in mind that both teams will be missing important players, which may mean that one (or both) of them will find themselves a bit off balance.

A rough year for tiki-taka

Starting elevens

Bilbao and Atlético Madrid met yesterday for an all-Spanish Europa League final. Even though Falcao stole the show and eliminated all doubt (if any) surrounding his worth by offering his team the cup on a silver platter, there is a broader issue to take into consideration: could this be the end of an era of passing football and the rebirth of catenaccio?

The match started off in a very lively fashion. It wasn't hard to envisage Bilbao playing and pressing high, but Atlético were by no means shyer and tried to stifle Bilbao in their build-up phase (something that Bilbao were clearly not expecting and for which they didn't seem to have a proper solution). With both wingers high up and just the back four and Iturraspe near the ball, the Basques were finding it very hard to bring the ball out from the back and, indeed, Atlético often managed to get the ball back in very dangerous positions with little defensive coverage from Marcelo Bielsa's men.

Up to Falcao's first goal, Atlético pressed high up, keeping Bilbao from playing out the back.

Atlético consistently forced Bilbao backwards and always had a player on Javi Martínez.

As seen here, Bilbao were a broken team, with acres between their lines,
repeatedly exposing themselves to risk.

After the first goal, the rojiblancos dropped back mainly for strategic reasons. First of all, it would be virtually impossible to keep up the initial pace and they were actually in front. Secondly, if there is one thing Bielsa's team is not so good at, it's pressing after giving the ball away, opening up numerous pockets of space for their opponent. With Diego, Turan and Adrián, Atlético were right where they wanted.

Atlético chose to sit back after the first goal, trying to break quickly after getting the ball back.

After the first goal, the match fell into a repetitive pattern, with Bilbao insisting on being (too) vertical and having little patience to open up their adversary, and Atlético retreating, attracting their opponent into the trap and then suddenly counter-attacking. Despite Falcao's goals, the man of the match award should go to Diego. The Brazilian, usually not very adept at defending, was brilliant in the way he was able to take up two defensive positions, effectively blocking Javi Martínez and Iturraspe, Bilbao's two engines.

When the ball got to Javi Martínez, Diego would get high up to meet him.

Five seconds later, Diego was marking Iturraspe.

In fact, Diego's display makes us wonder whether this is 1994 all over again. Back then, Barcelona was known as the Dream Team, led by Guardiola (on the field), on the back of their European Champions' Cup triumph in 1992. In 1994, they played Milan in the final and there were no doubts that the Italians would be crushed, except Fabio Capello's (yes, that Capello) men played a brilliant positional game and picked up the Spaniards' pockets by conceding them the majority of ball possession - setting the tone for almost a decade of sitting back, quick transitions and fast breakaways.

In this year, we have seen several teams that favour an intricate passing style being outfoxed by teams in a defensive 4x4x1x1; the examples of Barcelona, Bilbao, Manchester City, et al, immediately spring to mind. Are we witnessing the end of a cycle? Will this year's Euro confirm the tendency and see Spain going out in flames to a defensive-minded team with two banks of four?

The ultimate clash of styles

Starting elevens

Last Monday, Newcastle and Manchester City played for their highest hopes - City aiming for the title, of course, after defeating Manchester United a week ago, and Newcastle still holding on to the dream of Champions League football. Even though it was an interesting match, we will focus on specific aspects and how they translate a different vision of football.

Indeed, this was one of the best examples of how English and continental football fare against each other. Just like Roberto Mancini, Newcastle manager Alan Pardew chose to keep the team that won at Stamford Bridge a few days ago intact, which meant the Magpies were something of a hybrid 4x4x2, because Gutiérrez plays much narrower and helps out more defensively than Ben Arfa. Additionally, Ba played just off Cissé, drifting to the left.

Manchester City, in turn, also maintained their starting eleven and their approach, even though Yaya Touré was a bit more restrained than usual - that is, up until when he was moved forward. With Nasri, Tévez and Silva, they were extremely mobile and, due to their forwards' size, kept charging down the wing.

• Attack

As explained, the two teams were very different in their approach. Newcastle resembled a typical 90's British team. With Ba and Cissé, they were unafraid to hit the ball long and stick to route one (especially the goalkeeper Tim Krull), usually with Ba trying to flick the ball towards Cissé. Whenever that didn't work, they turned to Ben Arfa in hope of a more individual option.

On the other hand, Mancini's men stuck to their favourite intricate passing. As mentioned, Touré was concerned with his defensive duties, but the Citizens kept motoring down their right wing. Unlike their opponent, they overloaded the wings, especially when Tévez drifted towards that side, along with nominal right-winger Nasri. With Cabaye further up, Tioté had to decide whether to slide over and leave the middle open or leave it to Santon and Gutiérrez. More often than not, he went with the second option.

• Defence

This was a perfect example of how the strategy of two banks of four can be outwitted. Newcastle used this rediscovered approach and were made to pay for it. By affording to leave at least two men high up (Ba and Cissé, and sometimes Ben Arfa), Newcastle were constantly overrun and outpassed with simple triangle movements, even though they are a very well-drilled team defensively. Nevertheless, it was odd not to see a perfectionist such as Pardew make the necessary adjustments at half-time.

It was clear that Mancini studied his opponent and he deployed Touré on the right of the central partnership with Barry to help Kompany and Zabaleta on the aerial duels against Ba and Cissé. By doing that, his men were able to keep Newcastle at a distance, since their favourite out-ball was smothered. Here, Mancini proved once again that he prefers a cerebral approach (the continental way) over a emotional one (the British way). City's only mistake throughout this match was the freedom they conceded to Ben Arfa, who could have proved decisive, but their manager was wise enough to introduce Nigel de Jong so that Barry could keep an eye on Ben Arfa.

• Transitions

Another important difference was how both teams reacted when they gave the ball away. With their 4x4x2-ish shape, Newcastle were often caught off-guard either because they couldn't get back into shape quickly enough or because Cabaye couldn't find find the legs to track back. On the contrary, Barry and Touré kept their ground and both centre-backs (especially Kompany) showed no hesitation in moving high up to break Newcastle's moves.

With two physical imposing forwards as they have in Ba and Cissé, it's odd that the side they choose to attack down - the left - is filled with two players who cannot cross a ball with their left foot and who both have the tendency to drift inwards. When both teams started to lose their shape (Silva rarely tracks back during second halves), the Magpies could have hurt City, but neither Santon nor Gutiérrez were able to deliver the cross.

• Conclusion

All in all, it was an interesting and evident clash of styles between two very distinct football philosophies. City were closer to their full potential, while Newcastle's frailties and lack of a plan B were there for everyone to see, even though there are some real gems in their team - Cabaye immediately springs to mind, along with Cissé, of course.

...And the FA Cup goes to Chelsea

Starting elevens

After a long, doctor-ordered break, Combination Play is back - and with a report on Chelsea vs. Liverpool, no less. Last Saturday, the two teams played the first of two matches between them in four days' time. This time, Chelsea got the better of Liverpool, but barely.

Roberto Di Matteo's men started off brimming with confidence, surely a direct result of their last feats. With Di Matteo's favourite eleven for the most challenging games, Chelsea were cohesive, intense (both offensively and defensively) and willing to attack. On the other hand, the team coached by Kenny Dalglish were clearly waiting for what the contest might bring and chose to sit back.

With Gerrard and Mata instructed to play close to their midfield, the middle of the park was packed, as expected. However, Chelsea's goal ten minutes into the game shook things up and served as proof of the Blues' attacking intent. The play that led to the first goal was also useful to assess the importance of offensive and defensive coverage, as well as Luis Enrique's approach when facing Ramires.

The importance of offensive coverage cannot be overstated.
Spearing (blue) has just misplaced a pass.
Henderson is higher up the field and Gerrard is nowhere to be seen.

Realising the danger to his team, Gerrard (red) rushes back, while Henderson just trots
toward his area. Mata has all the time in the world to pick his pass.

As if it were not enough, Luís Enrique made the wrong choice of going for the tackle,
instead of trying to delay Ramires and wait for backup, which allowed Ramires through.

In fact, the Liverpool midfield was one of their bigger problems. With Gerrard close to Suárez and Henderson straying up field, Spearing was easy prey for Mata, who was thriving in the pockets behind his opponent's midfield and dragging Spearing all over the place. With Chelsea faithful to their now usual 4x4x1x1, the transitions into attack were directed at Drogba, who was finding it very easy to knock the ball down for the Spaniard wizard to play his team-mates into play.

Unlike previous matches, Lampard played higher than Mikel and was allowed to make runs into the box, further worsening the Reds' situation. Liverpool, in turn, were rather slow on the ball and clearly lacked a creative spark. In fact, Gerrard would often drop back to pick up the ball, leaving Suárez even more isolated up front. Given the opponent's lower threat, Ivanovic was happy to meet the Uruguayan high up, keeping Liverpool from getting enough quality time on the ball.

Notice how poorly Liverpool's back four was shielded throughout the match.

Dalglish had to change something for the second half and he decided to shift to a more traditional 4x4x2, with Henderson playing as right-midfielder, Gerrard beside Spearing and Bellamy just off Suárez. Somewhat predictably, the Liverpool midfield was constantly overrun, namely for Chelsea's second goal, scored by Drogba.

With a little flick, Lampard was able to find himself loads of space to run into and assist Drogba.

The match seemed to be pretty much wrapped up, but three minutes later, Dalglish replaced Spearing for Carroll. Henderson went back to his more natural central-midfield role, Bellamy went back to his right-winger spot and Suárez dropped to play off Carroll. As it turned out, Carroll proved a pivotal presence to get Liverpool back into the game. Not only did he take full advantage of a defensive mistake from Chelsea for the first goal, but he also provided an attacking outlet for his team, particularly because both Terry and Ivanovic had a hard time dealing with the Geordie's physique and approach.

After clawing their way back into the game, Liverpool kept on piling up the pressure over the Blues', whose coach was a bit late in reacting to his team's obvious increasing fatigue. It was then that Carroll was even more valuable, by not allowing Chelsea's back four any resting time, giving them a taste of their own poison - actually, Carroll was very unfortunate not to see a second goal stand near the end of the match.

All in all, the best team won. Liverpool were seldom aggressive, had huge problems getting the ball out from the back, were slow on the ball and weren't exactly ambitious in their approach. On the contrary, Chelsea were always keen on controlling the game and its tempo and, were it not for Carroll's somewhat fortuitous goal, would probably see out the match at ease.

Benfica - how to improve for next season?

It's always hard, risky and perhaps unfair to analyse how to improve a team that were without any of their centre-backs and were two goals down (on aggregate) when one of their best players was sent off. Nevertheless, even though the Eagles left Stamford Bridge with their heads held high, that's exactly what we're going to do - because there are some specific areas that could - and should - be improved, despite Benfica's valiant attitude.

Chelsea and Benfica offered an enthralling battle last Wednesday to see which team would go on to meet Barcelona in the Champions League semi-finals. Similarly to what had happened against Braga, Benfica were willing to break the game in two and take advantage of their dynamic attacking movement. Therefore, it was hardly surprising that, like the match versus Braga, the game was packed with goal-scoring chances, great saves by the goalkeepers and a jittery home crowd.

Today we will be considering 3 particular issues: defensive positioning, defensive set pieces and defensive transitions. It's true that Benfica were unfortunate on both matches, but it's also true that Champions League powerhouses tend to make underdogs pay on those apparently minor "details". If the Eagles are to build on this season, they must be humble enough to acknowledge that there is a sizable gap between Portuguese football and this particular European competition - the sooner they own to it, the faster they will become powerhouses in their own right.

1. Defensive positioning. Benfica are often admired for their relentless attacking football, an approach that almost paid off last Wednesday. However, good defensive positioning and coverage are a foundation that any team that aspires to greatness must have. Regardless of how much damage both Bruno César and Maxi Pereira can inflict on their opponent's half, it's just as important that they master their defensive duties - something at which they have failed over and over throughout the season.

Maxi Pereira pushes high up to meet Kalou, ending up side by side with Bruno César.
Notice the space behind both Benfica players, with little coverage from Javi García.

With a simple one-two, Kalou gets into space and García is already late to cover for his team-mates.

2. Defensive set pieces. It's a well-known fact that Benfica can wreak havoc with their attacking set pieces, but it is less known that they seem to be very vulnerable on defensive ones. Lately they have conceded against FC Porto and Braga (just to mention bigger games) through this sort of play and here they were fortunate not to allow Chelsea to score from corners, in particular. Despite the recent changes Jorge Jesus made to their zonal approach, there are still tweaks to make if they are to overcome stronger sides.

Benfica insisted on concentrating a large of number of players at the near post.
As a result, David Luiz ends up alone and unmarked. Notice the space at the far post.

After a bad clearance, Luiz gets the ball unmarked and with very little coverage.
Capdevila managed to avoid disaster here.

3. Defensive transitions. Probably the single most important issue in modern football. Most teams are aware that they should take the ball away from where they won it back, because their opponent is less likely to have as many players on the blind side. They are also more and more aware that the ball should be shifted from side to side - preferably in a quick fashion - in order to find space between the lines. The thing that tends to set teams apart nowadays is their reaction to the moment they give the ball away. Sure, this is nothing that gets noticed on highlights, but take a closer look and see for yourselves. It can't be just a coincidence that the better teams are usually the ones that are better at defensive transitions - or do you really think Barcelona (for instance) is all about attack?

Both Bruno César and Maxi are caught high up. None of the makes a foul to stop the breakaway.
Benfica is about to have seven players in front of the ball.

Javi García (the team's fulcrum with his fist clenched) makes the interception seconds later
and tells his team-mates they should have "killed the play" when they could.

Notice the difference the other way around. Artur has just released the ball for a quick breakaway.
Realising how many men Chelsea had in front of the ball, Lampard quickly made the foul to stop the play.

Conclusion. All of this can be dismissed as nothing more than tactical hooey, but more often than not, these are decisive moments for the outcome of any given match. Even though Benfica can get away with defensive carelessness on most matches in the Portuguese championship, the Champions League is much more competitive - and the big sharks don't mind taking their time.

Why the best player of this season's Portuguese championship won't start at the Euro

Lately there have been numerous opinion-makers about how ludicrous it is that Hugo Viana won't start at next summer's Euro (or at least be called up to the Selecção).Indeed, the Braga midfielder has most likely been the best player in the whole league and it only makes sense that the question of his absence is posed.

In football, as in so many other areas in life, context is everything. Whether (s)he's a club manager or the coach of a national team, it's absolutely critical that the players hired/called up are chosen according to the manager's ideas, and not just because they excelled at their (previous) club. Otherwise, (s)he would be left with a bunch of players with little or nothing in common, creating chaotic scenarios that we see in football far too often (Gian Piero Gasperini's case at Inter immediately springs to mind*), in which the manager has the ungrateful task of being forced to try to concoct some game plan that accommodates everyone. In case you're wondering, that's the ideal way to ruin a team and their manager - just look at how Real Madrid, Liverpool, Chelsea or Manchester City ended up spending so much money in unsuccessful newcomers (from Wayne Bridge to Shevchenko or Torres, from Robinho to Sahin, from Carroll to Charlie Adam), most of which they couldn't get rid of. As for national teams, just think of why the performances from Messi, Ronaldo, Lampard or Gerrard (to name but a few) draw so much criticism from their own fans.

As decisive as Viana has been in Braga's exhilarating season, it's important to analyse if his traits, tendencies and overall game are suitable to Paulo Bento's ideas. Regardless of how much you may or may not agree with Bento's ideas, it's still up to him to make the decision in the team's best interest and, therefore, there will be no discussion of his perspectives.

1. Braga's tactics. Leonardo Jardim's Braga usually play a 4x2x3x1, with Custódio as the holding midfielder and Viana alongside him. Additionally, Lima is a fast, mobile forward and Mossoró provides the link-up between midfield and attack. Viana's precise passing offers an alternate route to Mossoró, allowing Braga to quickly break away by bypassing Mossoró with long passes to Lima or Alan. Defensively, Braga tend to be quite conservative, dropping back and usually creating two banks of four. There are numerous players around Viana to cover for him when he strays for an attack, for instance.

2. Portugal's tactics. Again, this issue does not revolve around whether this is the best option for Portugal, rather if Hugo Viana is a suitable pick. The Portuguese eleven has traditionally lined up in a 4x3x3 for quite some time now. Paulo Bento has kept João Moutinho and Raúl Meireles, with Miguel Veloso lately getting the nod ahead of Carlos Martins. It seems clear that Bento favours a team that is capable of exerting pressure higher up when necessary, a job for which Hugo Viana does not seem fit. Unlike Braga, Portugal does not have a typical regista, which means both midfielders (ahead of Veloso) must defend and attack - if we take a closer look, Bento has been calling up players capable of doing just that, such as Meireles, Moutinho, Ruben Micael or Ruben Amorim. Even Castro or André Santos have been called up precisely because they fit the bill. With so many offensive-minded players at the back (João Pereira and Fábio Coentrão, for instance) and wingers who rarely help out defensively (Nani, Ronaldo, Quaresma), it's up to the midfielders to provide coverage, and not the other way around.

3. Portugal's approach. It only seems logical to infer from Bento's stint so far that he will be going for a different approach from Carlos Queiroz. Instead of sitting and waiting for opponents, the Selecção will be looking to stifle opponents and play with a high(er) defensive line. Again, unfortunately this does not bode well for Hugo Viana, who is particularly prone to tiring out mid-game and does not usually do well in such sides. Besides, Viana is vulnerable to being muscled out of the park (the Besiktas tie is proof enough), a threat he will face on most matches of the European Championship.

Conclusion. All in all, I don't believe that this is a case where a stubborn coach does not want to admit he got it wrong at first, rather a case where the player does not go well with the team's tactics and approach. To put things in perspective, even though they are very important at their current clubs, it would be nonsensical for Barcelona to hire Luisão, Milan to hire James Rodríguez or Manchester City to hire Matías Fernández - the teams' principles and the players' features simply do not add up. Personally, I do believe that Hugo Viana could be a valuable asset (particularly for matches where Portugal may not be the clearly superior side), but I also think that his playing time would be limited.

*Gian Piero Gasperini was hired by Inter at the start of the current season, only to be fired after five (winless) matches. The oddness of it all was that he was dismissed precisely for implementing his game plan (known to everyone for being a high-pressure and very intense one), one that didn't fit the players he had at his disposal - mostly players on the wrong side of thirty.

In a wide open contest, Benfica win it very, very late

Starting line-ups

Last Saturday, Benfica and Braga played one of three crucial matches to decide the next Portuguese champions. Aware that FC Porto had won their match a few minutes earlier, both teams knew a win here was crucial. Therefore, we were presented not with a cagey match, rather with an unbelievably open match that either side could have won.

Last night was the ultimate example of what either team did best. On one hand, Benfica kept their proverbial foot on the throttle (perhaps overcompensating last Tuesday's blander performance against Chelsea) and played relentless attacking football from the get-go. On the other hand, Braga were their usual composed selves and defended bravely and were masters at taking advantage of breakaways.

As usual, Braga's defensive approach was an almost perfect 4x4x2

The Eagles tried to smother their opponent right from the start, with Rodrigo taking the place of the suspended Aimar. The Spaniard was actually one of the reasons why Benfica had such a good start to the match. Indeed, not only did he drop off Cardozo, but he kept drifting to the left, overloading the wing with Gaitán and Capdevila (who, playing in the position of Emerson, offered different options at left-back). Braga, in turn, clearly knew what they were doing and didn't think twice about counter-attacking mainly through their left side, exploiting the space that both Maxi Pereira and Witsel (playing higher up than usual, in a similar position to the home Zenit match) left behind.

Witsel (red circle) played higher than usual

Benfica were quite good at getting the ball back high up and managed to do it often, particularly during the first half. However, when Braga got past the first pressure area and the ball got to Hugo Viana, they were extremely dangerous and often found acres of space and few opponents in front of them. Oddly enough, such an open contest didn't produce many scoring chances during the first half.

After getting past Benfica's initial pressure, Braga often found huge pockets of space to exploit.
Notice how much space and how many opponents Mossoró has in front of him.

The second half was more of the same, only crazier. Neither team could afford to drop points (especially the hosts) and, therefore, it was not surprising to see more scoring chances in the second half's first 10 minutes than in the entire first half. Benfica were even more inclined to attack in numbers, opening up spaces behind them. With Alan less defensively cautious (he was not a winger, rather a right-midfielder for the first 45 minutes), it was very hard to tell who would get the first goal.

60 minutes into the match, Jorge Jesus' men started tiring out, encouraging the away team to try their luck and get something more than just a point from the game, turning it into a free-for-all scoring-chance galore. Ironically, the first goal would come from the penalty spot, after a reckless header from Elderson - hitting Bruno César rather than the ball. Four minutes later, Braga's left-back would redeem himself tapping in a ball that bounced off Artur, after he saved Hugo Viana's free kick. The last goal came in dramatic fashion on the 92nd minute, at a time when Braga were defensively unbalanced after replacing Mossoró, Alan and Hélder Barbosa.

In short, it was strange to see such an open match from two teams that have played so well in Europe (Benfica in this year's Champions League quarter-finals and Braga as last year's Europa League runners-up), which is usually an indicator of the ability to control a game.  In tactical terms, it was interesting to realise how much last night reflected a whole season for both teams - for better and for worse - and it didn't look like a typical title decider at all. If anything, it resembled the high-scoring matches between the top 5 of the Premier League.