A logical victory

Starting line-ups

Some matches do feel like they are played on paper. Portugal's win over Holland was a logical victory. In an unbelievably open match, fraught with scoring chances, the Portuguese organisation trumped the desperate Dutch attempt to throw forwards at problems. The questions remain: how is it possible that such a decisive game was this open and chaotic? And have Portugal learnt the necessary lessons for when they play more disciplined sides?

There were a few issues for the Dutch national team. Would their coach stick to his game plan from the two first matches? Or would he play their all-out attacking formation, including Van der Vaart and Huntelaar? As it turned out, Bert van Marwijk chose to heed the people's voice and went with the latter, despite earlier predictions. In fact, van Marwijk revolutisioned the whole team, dismantling Van Bommel and De Jong's partnership in midfield, replacing the former Barcelona and Milan midfielder with Van der Vaart, shifting Sneijder to the left and playing Van Persie off Huntelaar. Looking at the line-ups and the Dutch team's positioning during the first minutes, it was hard to imagine how the dam would not break sooner than later, but that is part of football's magic.

Portugal actually seemed a bit stunned by Holland's boldness, as if Paulo Bento could not believe his counterpart would actually be so daring. Therefore, the Selecção was somewhat confused about who should be marking whom up until Holland's goal. Instead of their sterile game of individual antics, Van der Vaart's presence provided Holland with the out-ball they needed for their transitions, leaving De Jong exclusively for defensive duties. Besides, with Van Persie roaming around Miguel Veloso's areas, there was uncertainty about who should track Van der Vaart and who should shift sideways to create 2v1 situations against Robben.

Coentrão (yellow) and Veloso (orange) tried to keep Robben from coming inside, which would open up space for Van der Vaart for the first 15 minutes.

 

The Dutch goal came from one such situation, but, by then, Portugal were already showing signs of improvement. Indeed, the Selecção should be credited for not losing their collective heads after conceding an unwelcome goal. Even though a large part of their game plan consisted on allowing the Dutch centre-backs time on the ball and just keeping the ball from getting into the final third (much like the match against Germany), Portugal managed to remain calm and collected and stick to their strategy - let their opponent break in two and exploit the wings, knowing that the defensive contribution from Sneijder, Van der Vaart or Robben would be close to none. Truth be told, this match sometimes resembled two 5-a-side matches played in two distinct halves.

 

Ronaldo (yellow) goes for the aerial duel, dragging the full-back. Notice how much space Coentrão has to run into. All Postiga (blue) has to do is to make a distracting move.

 

Ronaldo flicks it to Coentrão and the full-back gets into a simple 1v1 situation. Notice how unprotected Holland's back line is.

 

Despite not getting the Dutch starting line-up spot on, our tactical predictions were not entirely wrong. Holland were hardly defensively solid with Van Bommel, which meant that, without him, Holland's defensive situation could only get worse. In fact, the Dutch back four were still very shaky, to say the least, and they were even more vulnerable to Ronaldo's diagonal runs in behind them, particularly due to their slow movement and the lack of pressure on the player with the ball from midfield - a good description of Portugal's first goal.

With Holland nearly arranged in an odd-looking 5-0-5, there remain doubts about whether the four phases of the game were extensively drilled during training camp, given how uncoordinated most of the players looked from this tournament's get-go. While Portugal did let the match devolve into a wide open contest, dangerously close to some Premier League games, there was a sense that the Portuguese national team were on top of things and that Portugal were actually more likely to score (particularly on a breakaway) than conceding.

  

Portugal made nearly twice as many interceptions as Holland. Holland's interception chalkboard is eerily similar to the match against Germany.

 

The second half brought yet another revolution. Despite maintaining the same eleven, Van Marwijk made a few more changes, namely with Van Persie going right, Robben going left and Sneijder as No. 10. While it is true that the Inter maestro provided more stability and tried to move the ball around, their defensive problems remained the same, which makes it that much harder to understand exactly what the Dutch manager was hoping to accomplish.

The Portuguese midfield was heroic in tracking the Dutch penetration attempts, but Pepe was at his imperial best, sweeping up behind his full-backs whenever they were beaten. Veloso, in turn, was critical for the team's ability to shift the ball from side to side and initiate the counter-attacks. 15 minutes into the second half, the game opened up once again and, like the Denmark match, Portugal should have wrapped things up way earlier than they did. Fortunately for Portugal, Holland were already in shambles and relied exclusively on some piece of trickery from one of their forwards.

With Robben on the left, Willems was even more exposed and Portugal were even freer to exploit that wing through Moutinho, Nani and João Pereira. Logically enough, those were the top passing combinations of the match. As if things weren't hectic enough, the Dutch coach went for a gung-ho approach and a 3-man defence, with Robben and Affelay as wing-backs. Portugal just kept waiting for Holland and ramming down the wings, sure that one of their many chances would end up going in.

João Pereira and Moutinho's was Portugal's second most frequent passing combination.

Moutinho and Nani's was Portugal's most frequent combination, often with Moutinho playing Nani through for yet another scoring chance.

 

There are some important conclusions to take from this match. First off, this was a definitive piece of evidence that talent alone is not enough to win games. Sure, Holland oozes talent in some positions, but such a glaring lack of solidarity and collective ideas is certain to undermine any team. Secondly, it is hard to understand how a nation of World's vice-champions, known for their football avant-garde thinking, seems so out of touch with modern football, either at club- or national level.

As far as Portugal are concerned, there are also a few notes. The most important one has to do with Ronaldo: this match was just what the doctor ordered. Two goals, a shot against the woodwork, numerous scoring chances and lots of space to run into are most likely more than enough for the Portuguese captain to make amends for errors past. The second issue has to do with Bento's quicker decision to introduce Custódio, when compared to the Denmark match.

However, there are some lingering question marks. How will this team fare against more solid teams? Portugal still lack the ability to control the match when they're in front and become too exposed to a random incident, for instance. Finally, the Portuguese coach needs to address the zonal-marking approach to set pieces, which is clearly not working. Despite their latest victory, it would be foolish to think that Portugal do not have areas in which they urgently need to improve.

Portugal have been very poor at defending set pieces, especially at the far post.

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What should Portugal do?

In Group B, the so-called Group of Death, everything is still up for grabs, even for Germany, on six points. No team has clinched qualification yet and all of them stand to be eliminated, with the right set of results. Next Sunday, Portugal and the Netherlands will meet for a decisive match, a match which the Dutch need to win by a two-goal margin and hope that Germany won't rest on their laurels against Denmark.

• Attack. 

Bert van Marwijk's team is far from a solid, cohesive unit. More often than not it ends up breaking in two separate sectors: the 4 defenders plus Van Bommel and De Jong, and the 4 players up front. With both centre-backs clearly uncomfortable on the ball and with little creativity from both holding midfielders, the Netherlands rely too often on Robben's skills, Sneijder's vision or Van Persie's runs in behind the defence. All of this would make up for an interesting attacking plan, but it seems that the players do not have a collective idea of when to do the right thing - Robben's insistent dribbles inside and shots all over the place being a perfect example.

Nevertheless, one mustn't forget that this is a team made of some world-class players and that, as Van Persie showed against Germany, a few extra yards of space for either one of those players could mean a whole different game. For instance, Robben tends to play on Portugal's left, the wing that Cristiano Ronaldo does not protect well enough (most likely according to Paulo Bento's instructions). With Van der Wiel looking to go forward whenever possible, this could create difficult times for Fábio Coentrão, yet again. However, both Dutch wingers tend to drift inside with their dribbles, which may play into Portugal's hands, since that is an area in which they have been stronger than on the wings.

Also, due to the absence of a collective idea and the lack of movement, the Netherlands try to pass it over the top toward Van Persie. For this particular match, Paulo Bento would be wise to allow Pepe (since he is quicker and more intense) to sweep up and let Bruno Alves take the first line of central defending, as this would keep the Dutch wingers from coming inside and playing Van Persie through on goal with short diagonal balls.

Aware that the Netherlands have to win the match by two goals and will probably want to take control, Portugal may well decide to play the waiting game they played against Denmark (after scoring) and Germany, allowing both centre-backs and both holding midfielders time on the ball and then pouncing on the mistakes they tend to make - even though better finishing is absolutely critical.

Van Persie is often keen on receiving through balls in behind the defence.

• Defence. 

Despite having two particularly defensive-minded holding midfielders in Van Bommel and De Jong, this Dutch team does not seem as airtight as it did two years ago in South Africa, even though many of their starters remain the same. Oddly enough for two players with their experience, both Van Bommel and De Jong have been dragged out of position too easily, although it is fair to say that, given the lack of defensive support from the four forwards, they do have a lot of ground to cover. In their previous match, for instance, most of Germany's scoring opportunities came from overloading the Netherlands' left wing, forcing the holding midfielders out wide, and then attacking the space where they were supposed to be. Despite Willem's valiant efforts, the team still remain afraid of letting him on his own against aggressive wingers.

Both Van Bommel and De Jong tend to help out defensively on the left.

Germany's two assists came from similar areas and from similar plays,
after forcing the two Dutch holding midfielders out.

The Netherlands clearly pay more attention to their left wing,
virtually neglecting the middle of the park.

Furthermore, Mathijsen and Heitinga are slow centre-backs who do not particularly enjoy quick forwards or changes in positioning. This may very well be a good time to tell Postiga to work the channels, dragging one of the centre-backs, and instruct either Ronaldo or Nani to make direct runs in the central areas of the Dutch defence.

There is one final, important issue. The Netherlands favour a high(ish) defensive line, but do not exert the necessary pressure on the man on the ball, often allowing him to make through passes into the box, where Ronaldo and Nani's finishing skills may prove decisive.

• Conclusion.

If football was played on paper, this would look like a no-brainer. Portugal are better organised, defensively stronger in central areas and like to play on the counter. Besides, their wingers' speed and trickery are exactly what the Dutch defence doesn't need. With Van Marwijk's front four less than willing to help out defensively, Portugal may end up winning just by being smarter. Also, given the Dutch team's profile, Hugo Viana could be a clever move by Paulo Bento, since the Braga midfielder is an expert on picking defences apart by finding quick forwards 30 or 40 yards away with his long passes (even though this option is highly unlikely).

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Portugal get the win, but face tactical dillema

Starting line-ups

Portugal and Denmark met last Wednesday in what could potentially be the end of the road for the Selecção if they didn't get the win they so desperately needed. Up against their nemesis - who were on the back of a somewhat fortunate victory against the Netherlands -, Portugal only had one way to go: forward.

Both coaches chose to keep their starting elevens, as if stating that any adjustments that theirs side might need were minor. Paulo Bento had expressed his confidence in Postiga and explained how the role of a striker extends further than just goal stats, which eliminated any lingering doubts and hopes about the possibility of Nélson Oliveira starting the match. Morten Olsen, in turn, had no apparent reason to tweak a team that had frustrated the World vice-champions.

Even though both the Portuguese coach and players had said that they were happy about their display against Germany and the criticism was ill-founded, the fact is that Portugal heeded the call for a more proactive game. In fact, although the Portuguese defensive positioning wasn't criticised for being laid back, they stepped it up a notch and pressured the Danes near their box - it was clear that Bento had watched their previous match and wanted to keep Denmark from playing the ball out the back.

Portugal wasn't willing to allow Denmark to slow the game down.
Postiga forces the goalkeeper to make the pass, Nani pressures his man,
and Moutinho (yellow) and Meireles try to win the ball back.

Moutinho (yellow) chases one of Denmark's midfielderes
and Meireles (orange) offers coverage.

While it's true that Portugal was trying to win the ball back as soon as possible, Bento was also interested in keeping Denmark from slowing the game too much and dictating the tempo. That away, the Portuguese would always be proactive and on alert. However, Denmark managed to avert this pressure a few times, namely through their go-to play - the ball goes from one of the centre-backs to the wing, one of the midfielders gets it back in the centre and quickly plays it toward the weak side.

The ball comes from the wing to the central midfielders.
With a simple first-touch move, Denmark free themselves from the Portuguese shackles.

Unmarked, the midfielder passes it over the top.
Bendtner's (yellow) movement is critical, dragging Bruno Alves.
The winger (out of the picture) has lots of space to run into.

After the first 15 of intense attack down the right from the Danes, Portugal finally managed to stop the bleeding and started winning the ball back more and more. Not only were the interceptions further up, but Ronaldo was also better at linking up attack and defence, something Portugal lacked against Germany. In fact, Ronaldo was so dedicated to it that he virtually left his wing unattended (more on that later).

Looking at the dashboards, it's easy to see that Nani was more willing to track back.

The first Portuguese goal was not exactly surprising - even if the way it was scored was. The Selecção seemed to have finally found their rhythm and every player was clearly more confident on and off the ball. Nani and the three midfielders were tireless workers when Portugal did not have possession of the ball and were particularly good in picking up loose balls. Indeed, the second goal was a perfect example of it and it meant a boost in morale for Hélder Postiga, the scorer. The match seemed all but over, but a Danish cross from the right a few minutes before half-time led to Bendtner's goal and a sea of uncertainty.

Even though they weren't too successful, Denmark kept crossing from the right.

With Veloso keeping the playmaker Eriksen rather quiet, Portugal were able to control the game, even if they were not dominating. Attracting their opponent into the trap, Bento's men kept allowing Agger time on the ball and pounce as soon as he misdirected a pass or tried to take one player too many, which led to numerous counter-attacks, two of which were wasted by Ronaldo and would effectively have killed the game.

With no killer instinct and their usual profligacy, Portugal seemed to start to feel the pressure for a win and became nervous. Meireles and Moutinho both reverted to the quick-draw passing mode and the Danes were offered a way back into the game. It was by then that Ronaldo's instructions not to track back started making less and less sense, because while Olsen's men had tried to do it during the first minutes of the match, they had now no doubts about where to hit Portugal. Even though there's no need for a team to be symmetrical, it still needs to be balanced - which it clearly wasn't. Any (current and future) adversary of the Portuguese team will have chalked the hole on the left wing down in their playbook.

Even though the huge gape and Coentrão's suffering was plain for everyone to see, Bento surprisingly replaced Postiga with Nélson Oliveira. While it meant that Portugal was now able to hold the ball up a bit longer, it failed to address the problem on the left wing and the Danish goal seemed in the cards. When Bendtner scored his second goal, it was hardly surprising at all.

Varela somehow managed to score the goal that allowed Portugal to breathe a bit better for now, but this was a game that they should have won in a breeze, given Denmark's evident frailties in the organised attacking phase. In a tournament this competitive, not scoring when you have the chance means you probably won't be around for much longer.

Notice how much more defensively active the right wing is when compared to the left one.

If Portugal are to avoid crashing out immediately after progressing from the Group of Death, they must improve at dictating the tempo, score the opportunities that their good defending yields and, most importantly, address the huge gap that Ronaldo leaves on the left wing. If not, the Netherlands may just be the team to hurt them badly.

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The solution for tiki-taka?

Starting elevens

Spain and Italy could not provide a better match for a football Sunday afternoon. Filled with great players, tactical nuances and good goals, this one was a treat for the eye. We were even presented with a seldom seen tactical battle - Spain with a false nine up against Italy with a three-man defense - that had many guessing if we were witnessing the birth of the answer to tiki-taka.

Italy's defensive positioning: three at the back (yellow), three in midfield (orange),
plus two wing-backs.
Spain opt for a striker-less system.

1. The Italian defense. With De Rossi sweeping up behind Chiellini and Bonucci, there was some curiosity about what the three centre-backs would do without the ball, since they would probably have no one to mark directly. Indeed, with Fàbregas often vacating the striker space for Silva and Iniesta's penetrations, it would seem three men at the back would be foolish. However, the Italian defense made a great case for themselves by doing three things:

• When the ball came from the wings into the middle and a through ball appeared possible, De Rossi would push up to try and avoid the key pass - his back covered by Chiellini and Bonucci (plus one of the wing-backs).
• By having a three-man defense, Italy weren't overly concerned with either passes over their heads or through balls (Spain's specialty and raison d'être).

Even with Navas (yellow) trying to stretch the play, the wing-back could protect the outside
and that side's centre-back could provide coverage without unbalancing the defense.

Giaccherini (the wing-back) follows the Spanish winger (yellow arrow).
Chiellini covers inside and  cuts the passing line (green arrow).

• When possession was lost in midfield, Italy could afford to have one of their centre-backs move high up the field to stop Spain's quick transitions.

2. The Spanish defense. Spain didn't seem their usual selves - either by strategy or due to fatigue. With a team split in half between Barcelona and Real Madrid players, the defensive side of their game seemed a bit confusing. Spain used to be good at winning the ball back quickly, resting in possession of the ball afterwards. The back four seemed a bit afraid of moving up and minimising the space between the lines and it was clear that Busquets, Xavi and Xabi Alonso didn't have the necessary energy to do it. Besides, Italy's 3x5x2 meant that their wing-backs were picked up by Spanish full-backs, rather than their wingers - suddenly, the three Spanish midfielders had to divide their attention.

Without quick forwards or wingers, Spain's transitions were always likely to be slowed down, especially because neither Xavi or Xabi Alonso have it in them to motor up and down the field. With no pressure high up, Spain became predictable after winning the ball back.

3. The Italian attack. There were numerous interesting aspects in the Italian attacking phase. For instance, Cesare Prandelli's system could make for a broken team, with the two forwards detached from the rest of the team. On the contrary, Maggio and Giaccherini (deputising as left wing-back) provided clear routes to come out from the back and had the freedom to run almost at will. More importantly, Balotelli and Cassano (especially the latter) were critical in linking up both phases of Italy's game by dropping back or running into the space behind Spain's full-backs (busy with Italy's wing-backs).

The other relevant issue was how Italy bypassed Spain. The apparently obvious answer would be Pirlo, in his deep-lying midfielder position. Instead, it was De Rossi (out of his sweeper position) who orchestrated most attacks, shifted the ball around and dictated the tempo of the game. He was the second Italian player with the most touches (68 to Pirlo's 49), the best and most frequent passer of the ball and provided the most long balls (13 to Pirlo's 9) - all of it with an 85% passing accuracy (all statistics from whoscored.com).

4. The Spanish attack. Spain kicked off these Euros much like the World Cup in 2010. By trying to make everyone as happy as possible and accommodate many of the midfielders (Silva, Iniesta, Fàbregas, Xavi Alonso and Xavi), Vicente Del Bosque made the same mistake as the first match in South Africa, against Switzerland. Once again Silva and Iniesta tended to drift inward and Fàbregas wasn't particularly effective on his false nine role, especially because there was no Messi or Aléxis Sánchez penetrating the space he had freed up.

Spain were missing an attacking reference.
Here there is only Iniesta trying to make the Italian defense uncomfortable.

Without Pedro Rodríguez, David Villa or Jesus Navas on the wings and without a striker to make short diagonals behind the defense, the midfield area was packed with Italian players and Buffon went almost untroubled, if it weren't for Spain's goal. 

Spain insisted on playing through the middle,
this time with no one making diagonal runs to meet Xavi or Alonso's key passes.

To make matters worse, Puyol's absence means that Sérgio Ramos plays as centre-back, not providing his usual surges upfield. Arbeloa is not that kind of player and Jordi Alba was quieter than expected, further worsening the Spanish woes. Fàbregas' goal was possibly the one time where Italy's defense were not quick enough to make the necessary adjustments - highlighting the importance of blind-side runs.

Iniesta (yellow) passes the ball to Silva and moves out wide, dragging his marker.
On the weak side, Fàbregas (blue) makes a run toward the box.
Giaccherini's positioning (orange) is poor, not tucking in to provide coverage. 

With De Rossi forced to meet Silva, Giaccherini's defensive coverage is already too late.

Torres ended up taking Fàbregas' place up front and, just like the World Cup, David Silva was once again sacrificed for width. Will Del Bosque make him go through the same and leave him out for next game? Will Torres (or Llorente) get the nod ahead of Xabi Alonso, for instance (Fàbregas' role is often understated, but his vertical movement from behind wreaks havoc for being unexpected)?

In conclusion, it was a wonderful match and one that left us yearning for the next installments of this tournament. Will the Euros set the stage for a tactical (mini-)revolution and will De Rossi revolutionise the sweeper position - following the footsteps of Beckenbauer or Matthäus? Is this the end of the road for tiki-taka?

A drop in the ocean

The Euros have only just seen their second day come to an end and already there are lessons to be learnt. Denmark's victory over the Netherlands was an almost perfect display of good positioning, clear ideas on how to shift the ball from side to side and looking for the open space.

Furthermore, both Daniel Agger and Simon Kjaer were almost faultless at the back. The situation below shows how good defensive coverage is critical, particularly against such strong players in 1v1 situations such as the Dutch.

1. Afellay takes on the Danish right-back Jacobsen. Notice Kjaer's positioning (yellow). From where he is, he can both keep an eye on the striker lurking behind him and cover for Jacbosen, in case Afellay gets by him.

2. Afellay gets by Jacobsen. The Dutch winger manages to dribble the Danish right-back. The moment he realises that, Kjaer immediately goes to his team-mate's help, creating a 2v1 situation and frustrating Afellay. Notice where the positioning of the closest Dutch players.

3. Kjaer tackes Afellay. The Danish centre-back wins the ball back from Afellay. Notice how poor attacking coverage means that Kjaer has lots of time to think whom he is passing the ball to. 

Even though these seem isolated situations, good defensive drilling and positioning may represent the difference between a 1-0 win, a draw or a defeat. When accompanied by a clear notion of where the ball should travel to in the few seconds afterwards, the whole team's task suddenly becomes much easier.

History repeating itself

Starting elevens

Portugal and German offered us the first chess match of the Euros. The three games up to this point had drifted a bit from what was widely expected - cagey contests with few goals. The Portuguese line-up had no surprises, with Hélder Postiga and João Pereira getting the nod ahead of Hugo Almeida and Miguel Lopes, but Germany manager Joachim Löw went with Mats Hummels instead of Per Mertesacker, most likely to in order to offer quicker defensive coverage for Ronaldo's charges.

Portugal were happy to acknowledge Germany's superiority and played cautiously. Resisting the temptation to drop their lines too much, Paulo Bento's men had a clear game plan: to keep the ball from getting to their opponent's final third. For that, they tried to stifle Germany's first build-up stage, with Moutinho and Meireles picking up Schweinsteiger and Khedira, respectively. However, the presence of Hummels meant that Germany were able to bypass that obstacle rather easily, especially because Hélder Postiga did not seem to know whom to mark.

Hummels offered the Mannschaft better circulation of the ball.

20 minutes into the game, the Selecção kept finding it harder and harder to discover routes for their breakaways. Incapable of playing through the right, the main alternative lay with Fábio Coentrão's long passes towards Cristiano Ronaldo or Postiga, which seldom worked out. Furthermore, despite being vocal with their concerns about Ronaldo, Löw had clearly done his homework, as Miguel Veloso was always closely marked by either Özil or Gómez. This, in turn, meant that Portugal's routes were rather predictable and unsuccessful.

Portugal kept trying to stifle Germany's midfield.

With both teams seeming more afraid to lose than willing to win, the second half was not that different. Neither eleven was being able to do what they do best. Whilst Germany were more proactive, they still could not find space through the middle and started to look more for Gómez's aerial threat. On the other hand, Portugal's transitions were not reaching their destination due to numerous wayward (simple) passes and out of sync movement.

Löw tried to change that by asking Schweinsteiger to play higher up so that Özil could exploit the free space in front of the Portuguese defense. The strategy partially worked, with the German maestro easily overloading the wings (Ronaldo and Nani had clear instructions not to track back and provide the out-ball), but it did not deliver the end product. As for Portugal, without someone in the Rui Costa or Deco mould, it was hard to shake things up from midfield, with both wingers too static.

A deadlock seemed to be in the cards up until the 72nd minute, when Mário Gómez proved that, while he lacks Klose's link-up play, he possesses a rare ability to transform a loose ball into a goal in a glimpse. From that moment on, Portugal had to chase the result and Bento threw Varela on the pitch for Meireles (Nélson Oliveira had already taken Postiga's position on the 69th minute) for one final push. After conceding the goal, the Selecção showed just how much more they have to offer when they are not just waiting for their opponent and, on the contrary, are willing to make use of all their strengths going forward.

Even though the Portuguese players, coach and fans will most likely complain about bad luck and mention the two shots that hit the woodwork, the truth of it all is that Portugal can only blame themselves. While a team's organisation is paramount, that alone must not be their only game plan, if they want to achieve success. Bento will rally his troops by stating that Portugal had the better chances, but he would be better off  asking his players not to shy away from what they do best.


This article will also be available at PortuGOAL.net.

Predictions for the Euros

The Euros are only a week away and one can't help but try to guess how they will unfold. Therefore, the Portugoal team put on their thinking hats and answered five questions. To learn what they were, check this.