Welcome back!

Starting elevens

First things first: what a great start to the Portuguese league. An entertaining match, two teams aiming for the victory, uncertainty about the result, subtle tactical changes, one penalty and one sending-off. One can only hope this is but an appetizer for what's to come throughout the remainder of the competition.

One of the key aspects worth noting is the difference in Braga's behaviour. Not so long ago, most teams were expected to play a timid game at the Luz, eager to give the initiative to the home team. It was a very refreshing and positive sign to see José Peseiro's men wanting none of that and looking to control the match. In fact, Beto was probably selected ahead of Quim precisely because of his better ability with his feet, which enabled Braga to play among the central-defenderes and their goalkeeper to avoid any potential pressure Benfica might exert up front - sometimes exaggeratedly so.

On the other hand, Jorge Jesus seems to be set in his ways and his chosen eleven almost looked like a testament to his will not to give any fire power up. In matches as even as this, prudence would probably recommend a more balanced squad (as seen last season, for instance), but Jesus was having none of that and went with Cardozo, Rodrigo, Bruno César and Salvio up front. This meant that Benfica were even willing to initiate their attacks with Javi García dropping back, almost transforming the team in a 3x3x3x1.

Javi García dropped back and both centre-backs widened their positions,
with Maxi Pereira and Melgarejo pushing forward. 

Braga, in turn, had a distinct notion of where and when to pressure, usually allowing any of the three players from the back time on the ball and then pouncing on Witsel (or any other player that might drop back), meaning that Benfica were finding it very hard to play out from the back. Peseiro seemed to have instructed his players to exploit the space behind Witsel (and the other four attacking players) and it worked for a couple of times before the half-hour mark.

The strengths

One of Peseiro's qualities known to everyone is the amount of work dedicated to ball possession and combination play. Not only did Braga's back four seem quite comfortable on the ball, but we were also able to see how well the players move with the ball and in space. Furthermore, with Viana, Mossoró and Lima on the team, this is a side that can shift the ball around like few others and tire their opposition.

Mossoró often moved towards the right, trying to create overloads for rookie Melgarejo (such an unfortunate first match for Benfica from the young prospect), who had little support from Bruno César. To make matters worse for Benfica, Lima would frequently move away from his (supposed) markers and create confusion about who should be marking him, keeping Javi García from aiding Benfica's recently appointed left-back.

On the other hand, Jorge Jesus is known for his well-drilled set pieces, which have worked wonders in the past, particularly in this sort of matches. Tonight's match offered perfect evidence that even a free kick as simple as this one can offer a clear scoring chance, provided everyone knows what their job is.

Bruno César (red) provides the screening, keeping any Braga player
from tracking the run from Maxi Pereira (green).

With a simple, coordinated move,
Maxi has no opponent in front of him and almost provides an assist.

Second half


The second half brought the sizzle that had beenmissing - the goals. It started out with Benfica's first, 49 minutes into the match. Given that they had been in control for most of the first 45 minutes, it was odd to see the away team a bit detached - and, at the same time, it showed the importance of keeping the lines close to each other.

Rodrigo attracts two opponents and Ismaily (blue) correctly provides the coverage.
Oddly enough, no other Braga players seemed worried about Salvio (yellow).

As expected, the rebound falls to Salvio, who is all alone,
with Custódio still trotting back.

Benfica were in front and the team from Minho looked a bit lost for a while. Despite a stuttering performance, maybe this was what the Eagles needed to up their game and take control of the match. Nevertheless, Benfica offered yet more evidence how hard they find it to dictate the tempo and lull their opponents into submission a few minutes later. As it was often the case last season, the centre of the field remains unprotected and Javi García and Witsel are often overrun. Braga's goal was a good example.

Paulo Vinicius plays a simple pass to Lima (blue), who had dropped back.
Afraid to lose his man, Garay (red) tracks him and opens up space.
Maxi is worried about Amorim (green), who drifts inside, clearing the way for Ismaily.

Ismaily has open road ahead of him.
Garay (red) remains stranded and opens up a hole in the middle.

After that, the match slowed down quite a bit, the exception being Rodrigo and Mossoró. The two remaining goals came from almost random situations, rather than as a result of carefully thought out plays or movement. Still, it is worth noting that, while Braga coped well with the numerical inferiority, Custódio, Viana and Amorim looked exhausted as the match drew to an end, no doubt due to their presence in the Euros.

Conclusion

All in all, this made for a very interesting match. Even though this is just the beginning of the season, Braga looked well-equipped for the upcoming months, with very interesting notions while in possession, which will tend to improve as the competition progresses. As for Benfica, it was hard not to see some of the mistakes from last season, but Jesus is an intelligent coach and will surely know how to coax the best out of their players. After all, this was just the first of many, many matches.

Portugal lose, but pave the way

Starting elevens

It is seldom easy to be content, let alone happy, after a defeat. Regardless of one's efforts, there is a distinct feeling that one was found wanting. On the other hand, Phil Jackson, the former NBA coach who led different teams to 11 titles, once said that there were defeats that clearly built a team - the ones where the players had given their all and surrendered their egos on behalf of something bigger than them. Tonight was one of those times for Portugal.

Both coaches chose their favourite eleven, with one change on either side - the striker. While Paulo Bento's was a forced one, due to Hélder Postiga's injury, Vicente Del Bosque surprised everyone by choosing Negredo ahead of Torres and Fàbregas. The first few minutes let us see that the Spanish coach was going for someone a bit quicker when trying to lose his marker, in an attempt to force the Portuguese defence backwards. It was clear Spain meant business and were not willing to take Portugal lightly.

Furthermore, Del Bosque maintained Xavi higher up than usual - just like he had done against France. With that move, Spain were trying to keep Veloso from having too much time on the ball and, from an attacking point of view, give Xabi Alonso the space to spray long balls and turn Xavi into a no. 10 of sorts.

Xavi (yellow) played higher up for most of the match, both while attacking and defending.

While Portugal did not pressure up high, they did try (and succeeded for the most part) to keep their opponents from calmly playing out from the back and make Xavi, Iniesta and Alonso play with their back towards Rui Patrício's goal. With Spain's usual lack of width - since Silva and Iniesta both drifted inward - and speed, there was not much danger of the back four being bypassed by balls over the top. Indeed, Bento's men often left Arbeloa to be marked directly by Coentrão, given that the Real Madrid full-back does not excel at bombing forward. It seemed as though Bento was setting the trap for the full-back to push forward, only to be caught in possession and vacate the space for Ronaldo.

Portugal did not just sit and wait. On the contrary, they tried to trouble the Spanish build-up.

Besides, Moutinho, Meireles and Nani were doing a great job on making sure they denied Spain their preferred passing options through the middle. By leaving Arbeloa to Coentrão, Meireles and Moutinho were able to focus their attention on their opponent's favourite route and provide an out-ball for Ronaldo's escapades.

Portugal's defensive approach neared perfection,
as much as possible against a side such as Spain.

As expected, the Portuguese transitions often had Hugo Almeida as their main focal point, usually on Piqué's side, trying to drag the Barcelona centre-back out of position and open up space for Ronaldo, who had a clear goal of working the channel between Piqué and Arbeloa. Even though many of those long balls went astray, it clearly showed how Spain can be troubled by aerial duels - not because of the aerial duels themselves, but because it disrupts their well-drilled defensive positioning.


Portugal were also very good at killing the Spanish transitions into attack. Moutinho was phenomenal in that particular regard, by always showing up to disturb the first pass and therefore preventing (usually) Xabi Alonso from picking the perfect pass to his team-mates. Even though there isn't actually any chalkboard that shows that, it is an invisible job that brought safety to Portugal's back four. With it, Portugal actually gave Spain a good run for their money and the possession stats at halftime clearly showed it: Portugal had 45% of time on the ball.


Even though there were not that many clear-cut chances, Portugal and Spain each had a few opportunities to finish off the game. In fact, as the match went on, it became ever clearer that whichever team scored first would most likely win it. Navas came on for Silva 60 minutes in to try to stretch the play and there were actually a few plays that seemed to show that that was the way to go - now Coentrão could not play tucked in and had to meet the Spanish winger on the outside, which opened up space between the left-back and Bruno Alves. However, the World champions were not too eager to take advantage of that.

In spite of all the intensity, this was not a game awash with scoring chances.

Despite taking the game to their opponents, Portugal clearly need to improve their finishing.

Spain dominated all of the extra-time and could have even achieved victory, were it not for a huge save from Rui Patrício. The Selecção looked too tired to keep running after the ball and Spain just kept racking up minutes on the ball. With Nani exhausted and Oliveira instead of Almeida, Portugal found it very hard to get the first pass after getting the ball back just right, which in turn resulted in more Spanish possession.

All in all, this was a very interesting contest, tactically and otherwise. Even in defeat, Portugal can take solace in knowing they were worthy opponents to this superb Spanish team and that playing Spain (almost) in the eye is not something that we see every day. Despite the loss, the Selecção have showed that Del Bosque's team are not an insurmountable obstacle and that Portugal will soon become a force to be reckoned with in their own right.

Chalkboards created via the Stats Zone app, available for free in the App Store.

This article will also be available at PortuGOAL.net.

3 reasons why Portugal will defeat Spain

The first of the semi-finals of Euro 2012 pits Portugal against Spain, a definitive regional clash of styles and longstanding grudges. Portugal replies to Spain's tiki-taka and smothering control of the tempo and ball with dogged defending and quick breakaways. In fact, if you are able and willing to overlook the previous contests between these two teams (which makes Spain look like virtual victors, with just one defeat in 7 official matches), you will see that, even taking Germany into account, the Selecção are probably the team best-equipped to beat the Spaniards. Let's find out why.

1. The tactical aspect. As France showed to perfection, many teams, including very good ones, opt to change their approach, dynamics, position and habits when they play Spain. It is indeed the best tribute one can pay to this team: the Spanish superiority is a given, perhaps like never before, and one must surely adapt to their style, rather than using its strengths.

This is the first issue where Paulo Bento's approach seems to pay off. Portugal will not be tempted to change a single player, for instance. The Portuguese have favoured sitting back and playing on the break from the tournament's get-go, which makes them naturally prepared for their opponent's pass-and-move game. That said, they have also showed (against Denmark, for instance) that they can pressure up front, if necessary. Moreover, despite the futility of the hype surrounding the 4-0 scoreline last time these teams met (in a friendly, lest we forget), it is still worth remembering that Paulo Bento's option back then was to play Spain at their own game (at the time): pressure up high, force Xavi and Xabi Alonso to get the ball with their backs to goal and avoid the penetrating passes.

In this regard, Portugal seem to be in luck, once again. Moutinho and Meireles are tireless workhorses, able to motor up and down the field and help their defenders, but they are also more than willing to let others shine and make the key passes that Ronaldo or Nani thrive on. Bento's men will obviously need all hands on deck, but the Portuguese coach will be comfortable knowing that his defence is getting better with every passing match and that Pepe's speed and game reading skills may just be the necessary answer to Spain's style.


2. Hugo Almeida. No, really. Even though he would most likely start on the bench, were it not for Postiga's injury, the hefty striker may just come in handy. Assuming that Portugal will cede possession and let Spain seize control of the game, the Selecção will need a quick out-ball. With all eyes on Ronaldo, Almeida may provide a useful focal point to keep Piqué and Sérgio Ramos busy and flick the ball over to either Ronaldo or Nani, taking advantage of Arbeloa or Jordi Alba's ventures upfield.


3. Ronaldo. There is no escaping the Portuguese captain. If Portugal are to defeat the World and European champions, Ronaldo will have to step up to the plate. While it is true that the rest of team will have to be at their best ever, the Real Madrid forward will most likely be in charge of providing the extra flare and instilling fear in the Spanish defence. With Hugo Almeida up front, Ronaldo will probably enjoy more space between the centre-backs and Busquets, which may just give him the necessary opportunity to score.

The save of the tournament

Some things in football need no words to accompany them. Here is Gianluigi Buffon's huge save against England.

Portugal pick up steam

Starting line-ups

Portugal and the Czech Republic were the first teams battling it out for a place on the Euros' semi-finals. Surely enough, we were presented with a more timid approach from both teams, since this was a winner-take-all contest and none of them wanted to leave this soon after getting this far.

In these stages of the competition, it is rather obvious that everyone has done their homework and, more often than not, the two elevens try to cancel their opponent's strengths, rather than showing their own. Therefore, the sight of centre-backs hoofing the ball forward was rather unoriginal and not exactly unexpected, given the little space both midfields had to operate in.

With Dadira deputising for Rosicky (who was not fit enough to start), the Czech manager Michal Bilek tried to pack the centre of the field and make his team narrow, somewhat emulating what he had done against Russia. Paulo Bento responded by bringing both Nani and Ronaldo inside, hoping the full-backs would take the outside routes.


Portugal started out poorly and, much like in the match versus Germany, often misplaced (simple) passes, which undermined one the main strengths of the Selecção: the quick transitions into attack. In fact, the Czechs took control of the game for the first 25 minutes, exploiting preferentially the wings, as expected.

Meireles tries to close the middle while Selassie pushes forward, unattended by Ronaldo.

 

Because he is trying to cover for his position and Ronaldo's, he is already late.
This particular situation often left Coentrão exposed.

Both Raúl Meireles and João Moutinho were too wary of leaving their original positions and giving away the midfield battle, a fear that went on until the 25th minute, when Moutinho finally appeared a bit higher up and fed Ronaldo a perfect through ball. Even though the referee ended up blowing the whistle for Ronaldo's foul, it was the wake-up call that the team needed.

Moutinho (yellow) finally gets himself higher up and Ronaldo (red) drifts inward.

Ronaldo (red) thrives on exploiting the space behind defences,
namely when fed a perfect through-ball such as Moutinho's (yellow).

It was hard to tell whether Paulo Bento chose to kept Meireles on the left-side of the midfield because that is where he ended the match against Holland or because he was looking to exploit the Gebre-Selessie's possible forward movement. Either way, it meant that Portugal were (only marginally) more dangerous down the left wing, particularly after the 25th minute, where Coentrão started feeling more at ease and motoring up and down the field, with Ronaldo more and more central.

Portugal's performance changed dramatically 25 minutes into the game.

Bento's instructions and corrections at halftime were clearly spot on. The first play of the second half resembled a Portuguese shot across the bow for the Czechs. In less than 30 seconds, Meireles did what Portugal still hadn't done thus far - something a midfielder is supposed to do in a 4x3x3 (especially if the striker is not that mobile, as is Hugo Almeida's case). Besides getting the ball between the Czech lines, he then proceeded by taking up the space vacated by Ronaldo, who was already waiting for a possible cross. This play would be a symmetrical replica of Ronaldo's goal.

Meireles (yellow) gets the ball between the lines for the first time in this match.

Meireles (yellow) then pushes up on the left wing,
which in turns allows Ronaldo (red) to roam and look for the cross.

With the team fired up, every sector of the team was closer, allowing midfielders and defenders to play higher up and collect their opponent's clearances. Even though the Portuguese pressure was not stifling in all fairness, it did wear the Czechs down, to the point where there were actually very few breakaways from Bilak's men. 

Moutinho and Meireles were finally free from their tactical shackles and started not only shifting the ball from side to side, but also overloading the wings so that Ronaldo and Nani could prove their mettle further inside, where they could be more dangerous. Moutinho's passing chalkboards are a very good example: by the end of the first half, the Porto midfielder had played the fifth most passes. He finished the game atop the passing table, by some distance.

Moutinho was much more active and incisive during the second half.

Despite the numerous shots (mostly off target), Portugal weren't being able to finish their opponent off, which could prove costly down the road. With the Czechs worn down and apparently not appreciative of their odds, it seemed the Portuguese goal would be just a matter of time. And indeed, the goal came from the inevitable Ronaldo, eager to make up for his two shots that had previously hit the woodwork. Moutinho penetrated the channel, much like Meireles had done in the first play of the second half, and crossed for an unstoppable header from the Real Madrid forward. Game over.

Chalkboards created via the Stats Zone app, available for free in the App Store.

This article will also be available at PortuGOAL.net.

A logical victory

Starting line-ups

Some matches do feel like they are played on paper. Portugal's win over Holland was a logical victory. In an unbelievably open match, fraught with scoring chances, the Portuguese organisation trumped the desperate Dutch attempt to throw forwards at problems. The questions remain: how is it possible that such a decisive game was this open and chaotic? And have Portugal learnt the necessary lessons for when they play more disciplined sides?

There were a few issues for the Dutch national team. Would their coach stick to his game plan from the two first matches? Or would he play their all-out attacking formation, including Van der Vaart and Huntelaar? As it turned out, Bert van Marwijk chose to heed the people's voice and went with the latter, despite earlier predictions. In fact, van Marwijk revolutisioned the whole team, dismantling Van Bommel and De Jong's partnership in midfield, replacing the former Barcelona and Milan midfielder with Van der Vaart, shifting Sneijder to the left and playing Van Persie off Huntelaar. Looking at the line-ups and the Dutch team's positioning during the first minutes, it was hard to imagine how the dam would not break sooner than later, but that is part of football's magic.

Portugal actually seemed a bit stunned by Holland's boldness, as if Paulo Bento could not believe his counterpart would actually be so daring. Therefore, the Selecção was somewhat confused about who should be marking whom up until Holland's goal. Instead of their sterile game of individual antics, Van der Vaart's presence provided Holland with the out-ball they needed for their transitions, leaving De Jong exclusively for defensive duties. Besides, with Van Persie roaming around Miguel Veloso's areas, there was uncertainty about who should track Van der Vaart and who should shift sideways to create 2v1 situations against Robben.

Coentrão (yellow) and Veloso (orange) tried to keep Robben from coming inside, which would open up space for Van der Vaart for the first 15 minutes.

 

The Dutch goal came from one such situation, but, by then, Portugal were already showing signs of improvement. Indeed, the Selecção should be credited for not losing their collective heads after conceding an unwelcome goal. Even though a large part of their game plan consisted on allowing the Dutch centre-backs time on the ball and just keeping the ball from getting into the final third (much like the match against Germany), Portugal managed to remain calm and collected and stick to their strategy - let their opponent break in two and exploit the wings, knowing that the defensive contribution from Sneijder, Van der Vaart or Robben would be close to none. Truth be told, this match sometimes resembled two 5-a-side matches played in two distinct halves.

 

Ronaldo (yellow) goes for the aerial duel, dragging the full-back. Notice how much space Coentrão has to run into. All Postiga (blue) has to do is to make a distracting move.

 

Ronaldo flicks it to Coentrão and the full-back gets into a simple 1v1 situation. Notice how unprotected Holland's back line is.

 

Despite not getting the Dutch starting line-up spot on, our tactical predictions were not entirely wrong. Holland were hardly defensively solid with Van Bommel, which meant that, without him, Holland's defensive situation could only get worse. In fact, the Dutch back four were still very shaky, to say the least, and they were even more vulnerable to Ronaldo's diagonal runs in behind them, particularly due to their slow movement and the lack of pressure on the player with the ball from midfield - a good description of Portugal's first goal.

With Holland nearly arranged in an odd-looking 5-0-5, there remain doubts about whether the four phases of the game were extensively drilled during training camp, given how uncoordinated most of the players looked from this tournament's get-go. While Portugal did let the match devolve into a wide open contest, dangerously close to some Premier League games, there was a sense that the Portuguese national team were on top of things and that Portugal were actually more likely to score (particularly on a breakaway) than conceding.

  

Portugal made nearly twice as many interceptions as Holland. Holland's interception chalkboard is eerily similar to the match against Germany.

 

The second half brought yet another revolution. Despite maintaining the same eleven, Van Marwijk made a few more changes, namely with Van Persie going right, Robben going left and Sneijder as No. 10. While it is true that the Inter maestro provided more stability and tried to move the ball around, their defensive problems remained the same, which makes it that much harder to understand exactly what the Dutch manager was hoping to accomplish.

The Portuguese midfield was heroic in tracking the Dutch penetration attempts, but Pepe was at his imperial best, sweeping up behind his full-backs whenever they were beaten. Veloso, in turn, was critical for the team's ability to shift the ball from side to side and initiate the counter-attacks. 15 minutes into the second half, the game opened up once again and, like the Denmark match, Portugal should have wrapped things up way earlier than they did. Fortunately for Portugal, Holland were already in shambles and relied exclusively on some piece of trickery from one of their forwards.

With Robben on the left, Willems was even more exposed and Portugal were even freer to exploit that wing through Moutinho, Nani and João Pereira. Logically enough, those were the top passing combinations of the match. As if things weren't hectic enough, the Dutch coach went for a gung-ho approach and a 3-man defence, with Robben and Affelay as wing-backs. Portugal just kept waiting for Holland and ramming down the wings, sure that one of their many chances would end up going in.

João Pereira and Moutinho's was Portugal's second most frequent passing combination.

Moutinho and Nani's was Portugal's most frequent combination, often with Moutinho playing Nani through for yet another scoring chance.

 

There are some important conclusions to take from this match. First off, this was a definitive piece of evidence that talent alone is not enough to win games. Sure, Holland oozes talent in some positions, but such a glaring lack of solidarity and collective ideas is certain to undermine any team. Secondly, it is hard to understand how a nation of World's vice-champions, known for their football avant-garde thinking, seems so out of touch with modern football, either at club- or national level.

As far as Portugal are concerned, there are also a few notes. The most important one has to do with Ronaldo: this match was just what the doctor ordered. Two goals, a shot against the woodwork, numerous scoring chances and lots of space to run into are most likely more than enough for the Portuguese captain to make amends for errors past. The second issue has to do with Bento's quicker decision to introduce Custódio, when compared to the Denmark match.

However, there are some lingering question marks. How will this team fare against more solid teams? Portugal still lack the ability to control the match when they're in front and become too exposed to a random incident, for instance. Finally, the Portuguese coach needs to address the zonal-marking approach to set pieces, which is clearly not working. Despite their latest victory, it would be foolish to think that Portugal do not have areas in which they urgently need to improve.

Portugal have been very poor at defending set pieces, especially at the far post.

Chalkboards created via the Stats Zone app, available for free in the App Store.

This article will also be available at PortuGOAL.net.

What should Portugal do?

In Group B, the so-called Group of Death, everything is still up for grabs, even for Germany, on six points. No team has clinched qualification yet and all of them stand to be eliminated, with the right set of results. Next Sunday, Portugal and the Netherlands will meet for a decisive match, a match which the Dutch need to win by a two-goal margin and hope that Germany won't rest on their laurels against Denmark.

• Attack. 

Bert van Marwijk's team is far from a solid, cohesive unit. More often than not it ends up breaking in two separate sectors: the 4 defenders plus Van Bommel and De Jong, and the 4 players up front. With both centre-backs clearly uncomfortable on the ball and with little creativity from both holding midfielders, the Netherlands rely too often on Robben's skills, Sneijder's vision or Van Persie's runs in behind the defence. All of this would make up for an interesting attacking plan, but it seems that the players do not have a collective idea of when to do the right thing - Robben's insistent dribbles inside and shots all over the place being a perfect example.

Nevertheless, one mustn't forget that this is a team made of some world-class players and that, as Van Persie showed against Germany, a few extra yards of space for either one of those players could mean a whole different game. For instance, Robben tends to play on Portugal's left, the wing that Cristiano Ronaldo does not protect well enough (most likely according to Paulo Bento's instructions). With Van der Wiel looking to go forward whenever possible, this could create difficult times for Fábio Coentrão, yet again. However, both Dutch wingers tend to drift inside with their dribbles, which may play into Portugal's hands, since that is an area in which they have been stronger than on the wings.

Also, due to the absence of a collective idea and the lack of movement, the Netherlands try to pass it over the top toward Van Persie. For this particular match, Paulo Bento would be wise to allow Pepe (since he is quicker and more intense) to sweep up and let Bruno Alves take the first line of central defending, as this would keep the Dutch wingers from coming inside and playing Van Persie through on goal with short diagonal balls.

Aware that the Netherlands have to win the match by two goals and will probably want to take control, Portugal may well decide to play the waiting game they played against Denmark (after scoring) and Germany, allowing both centre-backs and both holding midfielders time on the ball and then pouncing on the mistakes they tend to make - even though better finishing is absolutely critical.

Van Persie is often keen on receiving through balls in behind the defence.

• Defence. 

Despite having two particularly defensive-minded holding midfielders in Van Bommel and De Jong, this Dutch team does not seem as airtight as it did two years ago in South Africa, even though many of their starters remain the same. Oddly enough for two players with their experience, both Van Bommel and De Jong have been dragged out of position too easily, although it is fair to say that, given the lack of defensive support from the four forwards, they do have a lot of ground to cover. In their previous match, for instance, most of Germany's scoring opportunities came from overloading the Netherlands' left wing, forcing the holding midfielders out wide, and then attacking the space where they were supposed to be. Despite Willem's valiant efforts, the team still remain afraid of letting him on his own against aggressive wingers.

Both Van Bommel and De Jong tend to help out defensively on the left.

Germany's two assists came from similar areas and from similar plays,
after forcing the two Dutch holding midfielders out.

The Netherlands clearly pay more attention to their left wing,
virtually neglecting the middle of the park.

Furthermore, Mathijsen and Heitinga are slow centre-backs who do not particularly enjoy quick forwards or changes in positioning. This may very well be a good time to tell Postiga to work the channels, dragging one of the centre-backs, and instruct either Ronaldo or Nani to make direct runs in the central areas of the Dutch defence.

There is one final, important issue. The Netherlands favour a high(ish) defensive line, but do not exert the necessary pressure on the man on the ball, often allowing him to make through passes into the box, where Ronaldo and Nani's finishing skills may prove decisive.

• Conclusion.

If football was played on paper, this would look like a no-brainer. Portugal are better organised, defensively stronger in central areas and like to play on the counter. Besides, their wingers' speed and trickery are exactly what the Dutch defence doesn't need. With Van Marwijk's front four less than willing to help out defensively, Portugal may end up winning just by being smarter. Also, given the Dutch team's profile, Hugo Viana could be a clever move by Paulo Bento, since the Braga midfielder is an expert on picking defences apart by finding quick forwards 30 or 40 yards away with his long passes (even though this option is highly unlikely).

Chalkboards created via the Stats Zone app, available for free in the App Store.

This article will also be available at PortuGOAL.net.