Wednesday, November 21, 2012
Sabotage Times - Benfica
There is a new piece from Combination Play on Sabotage Times -this time on which Benfica would be expecting Celtic. The article can be found here.
Friday, November 16, 2012
New piece for Sabotage Times
My new article for Sabotage Times revolves around Porto upcoming starlet James Rodríguez and can be found here.
Monday, November 12, 2012
Wednesday, November 7, 2012
Will Ronaldo's Real Madrid win the Champions League?
Last night Real Madrid managed to salvage a point against the ever impressive Borussia Dortmund, whose goalkeeper might have done something more to keep Mezut Özil's effort out. The result was obviously not good, but the overall display should be far more worrying.
José Mourinho is famous for many, many things, but one thing he usually excels at is tactics. The last two matches against the reigning German champions exposed too many frailties in a team that tends to become broken between the six men at the back and the foursome up front. Even though today's headlines in Spanish newspapers will probably lash out at the defence (and rightly so), there was another thing that caught my attention.
Cristiano Ronaldo is most likely Portugal's best player ever - with all due respect to Eusébio. His transformation from tricky (yet profligate) winger at Sporting and Manchester United into powerful, lethal goalscorer gave him the recognition, accolades and goals he craved so much. His stats are most definitely beyond reproach - in his 448 club matches so far, he has scored 263 goals, a bit over 0,5 goals per match.
Ronaldo also had his sights set on becoming the leader on the field, both at national and club level. Thanks to his ability to solve games singlehandedly, his team-mates always look to him for an easy fix, a way out for tougher games, where the team's skills might not be enough. Most of the times, it works. However, when it doesn't, things get much tougher, especially for Real Madrid.
This is where the issue of Ronaldo starts to become a problem. Paulo Bento (Portugal's coach) and José Mourinho both design their teams and relevant moves around Ronaldo - the midfielders know they have to cover for him, Coentrão and Marcelo are aware they will have no cover from up front and the strikers know they're simply there to divert their opponents' attention for Ronaldo's efforts. However, their rivals' coaches are also very aware of that and often find the first chink in Portugal or Real Madrid's armour on their left wing.
Worse, Ronaldo is becoming more and more predictable. His dribbling skills are not what they used to be and his deployment on the left is specifically designed to allow the full-back to overlap him on the wing and allow Ronaldo into the centre to shoot at goal. By now, any knowledgeable coach is aware of CR7's insistence on drifting inward and his reluctance to make the simple pass, play in a team-mate or deliver a cross.
Yesterday all of that was plain for everyone to see. Dortmund's right-back Lukas Piszczek had clear instructions from coach Jürgen Klopp to push high up the field and exploit the space behind Ronaldo - much like he did two weeks ago or like Denmark did in Euro 2012. With the not so dynamic midfield duo of Xabi Alonso and Modric, Real Madrid's right wing was constantly under attack. As for his attacks, Dortmund were clever enough to double up on him - Piszczek defending him up close and a team-mate (usually Gundogan) covering for his right-back on the inside.
Ronaldo also needs to work on his leadership skills, since he is the first to get frustrated with his team-mates and angry at the referee when things don't go according to plan. A leader must inspire those around him and drive them to excellence, instead of just taking the credits for the goals scored and sulking when things do not work out.
While no doubts remain about Ronaldo's individual skills, worth and importance, it is hard to conceive a scenery where his team won't be punished precisely for having one of the world's two best players. Even though it is enough for most matches in La Liga, it surely is not enough for the tougher ones in the Champions League and at international level. If he insists on pursuing the "me, me, me" road, he won't be remembered as he would most definitely like - one of the truly greats of all time.
José Mourinho is famous for many, many things, but one thing he usually excels at is tactics. The last two matches against the reigning German champions exposed too many frailties in a team that tends to become broken between the six men at the back and the foursome up front. Even though today's headlines in Spanish newspapers will probably lash out at the defence (and rightly so), there was another thing that caught my attention.
Cristiano Ronaldo is most likely Portugal's best player ever - with all due respect to Eusébio. His transformation from tricky (yet profligate) winger at Sporting and Manchester United into powerful, lethal goalscorer gave him the recognition, accolades and goals he craved so much. His stats are most definitely beyond reproach - in his 448 club matches so far, he has scored 263 goals, a bit over 0,5 goals per match.
Ronaldo also had his sights set on becoming the leader on the field, both at national and club level. Thanks to his ability to solve games singlehandedly, his team-mates always look to him for an easy fix, a way out for tougher games, where the team's skills might not be enough. Most of the times, it works. However, when it doesn't, things get much tougher, especially for Real Madrid.
This is where the issue of Ronaldo starts to become a problem. Paulo Bento (Portugal's coach) and José Mourinho both design their teams and relevant moves around Ronaldo - the midfielders know they have to cover for him, Coentrão and Marcelo are aware they will have no cover from up front and the strikers know they're simply there to divert their opponents' attention for Ronaldo's efforts. However, their rivals' coaches are also very aware of that and often find the first chink in Portugal or Real Madrid's armour on their left wing.
Worse, Ronaldo is becoming more and more predictable. His dribbling skills are not what they used to be and his deployment on the left is specifically designed to allow the full-back to overlap him on the wing and allow Ronaldo into the centre to shoot at goal. By now, any knowledgeable coach is aware of CR7's insistence on drifting inward and his reluctance to make the simple pass, play in a team-mate or deliver a cross.
Yesterday all of that was plain for everyone to see. Dortmund's right-back Lukas Piszczek had clear instructions from coach Jürgen Klopp to push high up the field and exploit the space behind Ronaldo - much like he did two weeks ago or like Denmark did in Euro 2012. With the not so dynamic midfield duo of Xabi Alonso and Modric, Real Madrid's right wing was constantly under attack. As for his attacks, Dortmund were clever enough to double up on him - Piszczek defending him up close and a team-mate (usually Gundogan) covering for his right-back on the inside.
Ronaldo also needs to work on his leadership skills, since he is the first to get frustrated with his team-mates and angry at the referee when things don't go according to plan. A leader must inspire those around him and drive them to excellence, instead of just taking the credits for the goals scored and sulking when things do not work out.
While no doubts remain about Ronaldo's individual skills, worth and importance, it is hard to conceive a scenery where his team won't be punished precisely for having one of the world's two best players. Even though it is enough for most matches in La Liga, it surely is not enough for the tougher ones in the Champions League and at international level. If he insists on pursuing the "me, me, me" road, he won't be remembered as he would most definitely like - one of the truly greats of all time.
Monday, October 29, 2012
So much to do, so little time
Franky Vercauteren is the next coach of Sporting, but maybe even he didn't realise the magnitude of the task that has been laid out before him. For several years now Sporting have been nothing short of a handful of players, usually left to their devices, surrounded by media frenzy and vulnerable coaches. Will the Belgian be any different?
Any tactical analysis of Sporting tends to be quite hard to carry out, because there's seldom the feeling that this a team that has been drilled by its coach(es). Indeed, to an outsider only able to observe matches, it is very difficult to find any pre-established orders or instructions and half the team seem to be thinking very different things from the other half. The thing that shocks the most while watching the Lions is the team's displays, even more than the results - since there seems to be no apparent order. Unlike Oceano Cruz's claims, the mistakes that have punished Sporting are not individual.
Regardless of individual talent, it is up to the coach to define some basic guidelines and then fine-tune the team within said guidelines. The latest versions of Sporting have not been able to show that the coach (whoever he is) has got through to the players, and keep on disappointing their faithful supporters. Based on this and many other matches, Franky Vercauteren faces an uphill battle. Let us take a closer look to some of the key issues in random order.
1. Ricky van Woflswinkel. It's sad to see so much potential going to waste. Vercauteren must be able to muster all of the Dutchman's lost confidence and turn him back into a goalscoring machine once again. Wolfswinkel's first touch seems to be deserting him and his speed is far from what it used to be. considering there are hardly any alternatives left, the striker needs to be on top form.
2. A solid eleven. I'm not one to defend that the same eleven players must play no matter what, but while it's relatively easy to name Porto, Benfica or Braga's first eleven, getting Sporting's right is a fool's errand. Vercauteren must decide on an established group of players around which to form the team's core.
3. A clear tactical mindset. Again, as with the previous issue, this is not to say the coach may not alter his formation, but over the past couple of seasons, it's amazing how many tactical arrangements Sporting players have gone through. Yes, it's possible (even desirable) to be tactically flexible, but that comes after establishing your own model
4. Stop putting yourself in silly positions. As mentioned elsewhere last week, offensive coverage is a key aspect of the modern game, something that Sporting do not seem to master at all. Let us take a closer look at some cases in point.
5. Playing out from the back. If a team are at all serious about winning matches consistently, they must play to their strengths, and not let the game dictate its own flow. Sporting may not rely on Boulahrouz or Rinaudo to dictate their play, lest they keep giving away the ball cheaply, like it happened today over and over. Vercauteren must not be afraid to spend time instructing his players on how to get the ball out from te back (as his playing and coaching instincts will surely tell him to). Sporting are in dire need of a sense of purpose to their game.
Any tactical analysis of Sporting tends to be quite hard to carry out, because there's seldom the feeling that this a team that has been drilled by its coach(es). Indeed, to an outsider only able to observe matches, it is very difficult to find any pre-established orders or instructions and half the team seem to be thinking very different things from the other half. The thing that shocks the most while watching the Lions is the team's displays, even more than the results - since there seems to be no apparent order. Unlike Oceano Cruz's claims, the mistakes that have punished Sporting are not individual.
Regardless of individual talent, it is up to the coach to define some basic guidelines and then fine-tune the team within said guidelines. The latest versions of Sporting have not been able to show that the coach (whoever he is) has got through to the players, and keep on disappointing their faithful supporters. Based on this and many other matches, Franky Vercauteren faces an uphill battle. Let us take a closer look to some of the key issues in random order.
1. Ricky van Woflswinkel. It's sad to see so much potential going to waste. Vercauteren must be able to muster all of the Dutchman's lost confidence and turn him back into a goalscoring machine once again. Wolfswinkel's first touch seems to be deserting him and his speed is far from what it used to be. considering there are hardly any alternatives left, the striker needs to be on top form.
2. A solid eleven. I'm not one to defend that the same eleven players must play no matter what, but while it's relatively easy to name Porto, Benfica or Braga's first eleven, getting Sporting's right is a fool's errand. Vercauteren must decide on an established group of players around which to form the team's core.
3. A clear tactical mindset. Again, as with the previous issue, this is not to say the coach may not alter his formation, but over the past couple of seasons, it's amazing how many tactical arrangements Sporting players have gone through. Yes, it's possible (even desirable) to be tactically flexible, but that comes after establishing your own model
4. Stop putting yourself in silly positions. As mentioned elsewhere last week, offensive coverage is a key aspect of the modern game, something that Sporting do not seem to master at all. Let us take a closer look at some cases in point.
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| Sporting have just lost the ball and are completely unbalanced. |
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| One mere second later, Académica already have a numbers-up situation. |
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| In this case, Schaars is under heavy pressure and no one gets narrower and more compact. The shaded area represents a potential free path to goal. |
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| This play happened near half-time. Notice how many players Sporting have behind the ball. Académica look much more organised and dangerous. |
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| Rinaudo plays it back and still Sporting players remain wide and far apart. Sensing the danger, Académica immediately pounce on Rojo. |
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| Five seconds have passed and Sporting still have only four players near the ball, the same number as Académica. |
5. Playing out from the back. If a team are at all serious about winning matches consistently, they must play to their strengths, and not let the game dictate its own flow. Sporting may not rely on Boulahrouz or Rinaudo to dictate their play, lest they keep giving away the ball cheaply, like it happened today over and over. Vercauteren must not be afraid to spend time instructing his players on how to get the ball out from te back (as his playing and coaching instincts will surely tell him to). Sporting are in dire need of a sense of purpose to their game.
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| This shot is spot on, allowing us to understand the perspective of the player with the ball, and his difficulties to find an open team-mate. |
Saturday, October 27, 2012
City's victory does not paper over the cracks
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| Starting elevens |
Yesterday's match between Manchester City and Swansea had created many expectations after City's latest loss for the Champions League - and subsequent questioning of Roberto Mancini's tactical and man-management skills. Would the Italian manager persist with the three-man defence or would he heed his players' call? In the end, the Citizens took the three points, but Swansea will probably count themselves unlucky not to get a point.
As it turned out, Mancini surprised many a pundit (yours truly included) by leaving his stubbornness aside for once and went with the player favourite 4xx4x2. The first half was basically a stalemate and it often reminded the Premiership of the late 90's - two teams arranged in the same formation sitting in front of each other, waiting for their key players to decide the match.
While City came out flat, with hardly any dynamics, movement and creativity, there were no "parked buses" on Swansea's half. In fact, the Welsh were more than willing to play an open contest, trying to exploit City's vulnerability at the back breaking quickly - which they did fairly well, with Michu putting the ball in the net after a correct call for offside and forcing Joe hart to make a great save a few minutes later. City weren't even making Michael Laudrup's men work for the result.
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| City were rather toothless throughout the first half, but improved a great deal in the second. |
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| Swansea were more direct than City, often trying to play in Michu behind the centre-backs. |
Mancini replaced the ineffective Kolarov (even though his poor game was not exclusively his own fault) with Balotelli and the change brought immediate results. While the Italian maverick did not exactly set the match alight, the different tactical arrangement meant Tévez was an extra man in midfield, but it also meant that the front four (Tévez, Balotelli, Agüero and Nasri) were more fluid in their positioning. Outnumbered in midfield, Swansea were no longer able to make as many interceptions as they had done in the first half, allowing City to pile on the pressure.
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| Swansea were excellent in breaking up City's play in the first half. The Welsh were not as good at it during the second half. |
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| The difference in passes in City's attacking third. While subtle, it shows a greater presence in the centre, mainly thanks to Tévez. |
The match should have been beyond Swansea's reach by then, but City never managed to dictate the tempo of the game (despite all of Touré's attempts) and finished the match with unnecessary suffering and going back to the three-man defence, this time trying to hold on to the result.
Swansea were worthy adversaries; it's always refreshing to see a mid-table team resisting the temptation of playing route one football and insisting on playing out from the back, even when trailing - it most likely means their manager's ideas are coming across nicely and are being accepted by the players. As for City, the much-needed win can't hide the team's persisting problems and shouldn't allow players and coaches to believe the worst is behind them. On most matches, the start players will suffice, but harder opponents will not be as kind.
- Highlights
Carlos Tévez was absolutely critical for the victory - and his scoring the winning goal was only fitting. His movement, work rate and bravery were essential for his team to grab the win. This may well be turn out the Argentinean's best season in England.
Wayne Routledge showed an interesting skill set and often provided his team's out-ball. His wonderful trickery with the ball made him a safe bet for his team to break out from City's initial pressure zone, hugging the touchline and forcing City to spread out to deal with him.
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| Routledge was often the men Swansea looked for to escape City's pressure. |
Wednesday, October 24, 2012
Attacking coverage - what is it exactly?
Football pundits (this columnist included, pardon the immodesty) can often be found saying and/or writing words and expressions that sometimes have vague definitions for most people. Today we will be tackling the myth of attacking coverage and what it represents. The foundations of the "attacking coverage" principle are two-fold:
This is when Terry takes a dreadful defensive approach. With Luiz now closer to his man, Terry gets closer to the man with the ball, opening a huge boulevard for the pass behind him, instead of restricting the passing option.
- Provide support for the player with the ball; and
- Maintain the defensive balance.
Basically this means that there must be one or more players beside and/or behind the player with the ball in order to help keep possession, but also to make sure that, if the ball is lost, there is someone ready to contain the initial threat and stop opponents from breaking quickly.
While both these cases can also be ascribed to poor individual decision making, this article will focus primarily on the attacking coverage and how important it is for the player with the ball to read the game and understand what the best option may be.
- Goal #1 - Shakhtar v Chelsea
The play starts on the right. Hazard (yellow) has dropped back and gets a pass from Terry. Trying open up a space for his team-mate, Ramires (blue) moves forward. The ball will be played to Mikel (red). Notice how the four Shakhtar players form an almost perfect diagonal, restricting passing options.
Mikel gets the ball and, instead of passing it onto David Luiz (orange) or Ivanovic (green), he returns to the middle of the field. Ramires (blue) moves back, trying to provide support for his team-mate.
Mikel, under heavy pressure, eventually dispatches the ball to Hazard, but both Mikel (red) and Ramires (blue) are higher up than the Belgian. Cole can be seen on the halfway line and Ivanovic (please see next picture) is further up. This means that there is only Terry and Luiz behind Chelsea's wunderkind.
Hazard gives the ball away and now there is a 2v2 situation, with Ivanovic (green) too high up. With Luiz (orange) wide open, Terry (purple) correctly tries to delay the play.
Luiz (orange) runs diagonally towards the centre, while Terry (purple) continues in the centre, waiting for backup.
Conclusion
Good game-reading skills are essential anywhere, but in such a stringent context as the Champions League, one mistake is often what it takes to get punished by the other team. Without proper attacking coverage (i.e. safe passing options), both Mikel and Hazard should have realised the danger and played it safe. On the other hand, their team-mates should have provided better support while attacking and adapted accordingly as soon as they started guessing the ball might be lost.
- Goal #2 - Spartak Moscow v Benfica
In this particular case, Benfica are, as usual, attacking down the right. Salvio (the right winger) passes the ball to Matic (the team's holding midfielder).
Matic (blue) is immediately pressured by Rafael Carioca (the eventual goalscorer). Benfica right-back Maxi Pereira (orange) is currently the team's most advanced player. The left-back Melgarejo (red) notices his team-mate in difficulties and still pushes forward, rather than offering a safe passing option. Notice how many players Benfica have in front of the ball.
In a poor decision, Matic tries to get the ball to Melgarejo, only to see it intercepted by Bilyaletdinov. The shaded area indicates how there is no one behind Matic (blue) besides the centre-backs, in their own half.
In this picture, it's easy to see that there are as many defenders as there are attackers. Jardel (purple), a bit like Terry, worries too much about the ball and forgets to occupy or restrict the passing option. The ball would get to the unmarked Jurado.
Jurado holds the ball up, waiting for a team-mate. Rafael Carioca, who had initially put Matic under pressure, speeds past his and Jurado's markers and puts the ball in the back of the net.
Conclusion
This was another prime example of the need to read the game according to the player's positioning and the team's. While it's true Matic's pass was less than stellar, one mustn't forget the numerous bad decisions from his team-mates, not offering enough safe passing options - including one of them even pushing up after seeing his holding midfielder in trouble. If Matic had been properly supported, there would have been a couple of passing options beside or behind him, in order to both keep possession and avoid a fast breakaway if the team lost the ball, as they did.
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