Friday, April 5, 2013

Benfica 3-1 Newcastle: Benfica get over shaky start



In a match that resembled a rerun of past Europa League matches at Estádio da Luz, Benfica found a way to overcome a less than stellar performance for the better part of the first half and got themselves a positive result for the game in Newcastle in a week's time.

Despite their domestic concerns, both Benfica and Newcastle coaches chose not to rotate their squads too much. Jorge Jesus played André Almeida, André Gomes and Rodrigo so Maxi Pereira, Enzo Pérez and Lima could rest. As for Newcastle, a team that has been constantly battered with injuries throughout the season, Krul, Santon and Perch got the nod for this match.

Without Salvio, Gaitán remained on the left while Ola John played down the right, even though the two players had distinct roles. While the Dutch winger tried to get some chalk on his boots, Gaitán would often play narrower, opening the flank for Melgarejo's forays. Newcastle were clearly looking for that opening - and it took approximately 3 minutes to see Papis Cissé exploiting twice the space between Benfica centre-backs and full-backs - a clear indication of a plan, if there ever was one.

The players' distribution offers a stark contrast between the teams' intentions.
Notice how Garay clearly leans towards the touch line.

Newcastle started off more proactive than expected, not reverting too much to their usual mode while playing away. Indeed, they were often dangerous down the flanks, especially the left one, which they kept targeting relentlessly while they could, with either Cissé or Sissoko exploiting the space vacated by Melgarejo. Sissoko, in particular, was always allowed too much space behind Matic and André Gomes.

Gomes' display was a bit like Beckham's for Paris Saint-Germain against Barcelona: while he was not particularly at fault for anything, he didn't bring much to the table and the team were sometimes made to pay for it.

The chalkboard for André Gomes' unambitious display

As mentioned before, for the first 25 minutes Benfica didn't put Newcastle under great pressure, often transitioning idly into defence, which opened up spaces for the excellent Sissoko and Cissé to break into. It was therefore hardly surprising when the English team found their way into Artur's net, with Melgarejo mistiming his pressing, Garay arriving late at an attempted compensation and Sissoko (who else) crossing for Papis Cissé's simple tap-in.

The play that led to Newcastle's goal. Notice the 20-yard vertical pass,
splitting open Benfica's defence.

By that time, Benfica looked a bit lost, unable to put Tim Krul to work (with Newcastle hitting the woodwork). Without Enzo Pérez, Matic was unable to provide the creative spark and still cover for his team-mates when passes went astray. The Eagles managed to level things a bit out of thin air, with Cardozo firing a powerful left-footed shot that Krul was only able to parry, and Rodrigo reacting quicker than Yanga-Mbiwa. Suddenly, Benfica were back into the match.

The difference in Newcastle's passes in the attacking third before and after Benfica's goal.

After Benfica's goal, Newcastle immediately seemed deflated, no longer able to create chances. Rodrigo was instrumental by dropping back, confusing the English team's marking duties, forcing their midfield to spread too much. Newcastle's uncoordinated defending must be highlighted - putting as many players as possible behind the ball does not necessarily mean defending well. After the 25th minute, Tim Krul was the the main responsible for keeping Benfica from getting a better score line.

Rodrigo was much more involved as soon as Benfica leveled the score.

The start of the second half was remarkably similar to the first period. Papis Cissé found once again a way past between Luisão and André Almeida, but he was unlucky as he saw his chip over Artur Moraes hitting the woodwork once again. Despite the good finish to the first half, Jorge Jesus would soon after resort to his go-to selection, replacing André Gomes and Rodrigo with Enzo Pérez and Lima. The move didn't take long to pay divididends, when the indefatigable Lima pounced on a ill-advised backpass from Santon to his goalkeeper.

With Newcastle getting more and more tired by the minute, Benfica felt a goal could be just around the corner - but still the clear-cut chances were not presenting themselves. It took a very clumsy handball in the penalty box from Steven Taylor to allow Benfica to get a more comfortable result when they travel to Newcastle in a week's time.

In the end, Benfica deserved the win, but they must stop presenting their opponents with wobbly starts if they are to mount a serious challenge for this trophy. As for Newcastle, the first 20 minutes showed that this team are capable of doing something more than what they have been showing this season, but on the whole the team looks quite feeble defensively and without a proper attacking bite when they play away.

Thursday, April 4, 2013

Champions League - the chalkboards

This week's matches for the Champions League quarter-finals offered wonderful, action-packed matches. Below you will find a few interesting chalkboards.

Mandzukic was critical to Bayern's constant pressing and his work rate cannot be overstated.

Borussia Dortmund have only themselves to blame for not emerging victors from this match.
In the second half, Jürgen Klopp's team were more incisive in their pressing and took control.

Bayern Munich's unrelenting pressing brought out the technical limitations of Barzagli, Bonucci and Chiellini.
Notice how most of the interceptions and tackles are not made in central-defence areas.

David Beckham was the surprise Carlo Ancelotti decided to spring on Barcelona.
Even though the English midfielder was not to blame for anything, his contribution was rather limited.

Zlatan Ibrahimovic had a quiet match, by his standards, but still managed to grab an all too important goal.


Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Has Portugal's 'Holy Trinity' crumbled?


Only a decade on from their last championship, Sporting are in the doldrums. A review of league tables over the past ten years suggests that the Leões are a fading force and that Portugal's 'Big Three' is becoming an out-dated concept. 

On a morning on which Sporting's Fito Rinaudo declared that 'it is difficult to get up and go to training' with his side not challenging for honours, there seems no better time to consider the decline of the Verde-e-Brancos and its knock-on effect on the Primeira Liga.

A glance at league finishes between 2002 and last season tells its own story, with the third-placed team in the Primeira Liga increasingly adrift of the eventual champions. A quick crunch of statistics reveals that between 2001/02 and 2006/07, the team finishing third trailed the champions by an average of 10 points. Figures relating to the same gap between 2007/08 and 2011/12 show that those propping up Portugal's top two in the last five years have lagged behind by 17 points on average - an extra seven points a season.

An under-performing Sporting is no doubt contributing to this growing phenomenon and a look at the current league table confirms that the idea of a 'Big Three' in Portugal is becoming out-dated: Sporting languishing in mid-table while Benfica and Porto fight it out at the top.

If we rewind to 2001/02, it was all so different. Sporting were champions, the free-scoring Brazilian Mário Jardel spearheading a side that had an intoxicating blend of youth (e.g. Hugo Viana and Ricardo Quaresma) and experience (e.g. Paulo Bento, João Pinto and gnarled centre-half André Cruz). Under the steady hand of Romanian coach Lazslo Boloni, Sporting finished five points clear of Boavista and looked destined to enjoy continued success.

Those days are now nothing but sepia-stained memories, as Sporting face up to a very different reality. Currently, they reside in 10th spot in the league - a massive 34 points behind their cross-city rivals. The Leaos may well be paid-up members of the traditional 'Big Three', but - if we include this term's debacle - they have only lived up to their billing once in four seasons. On that occasion (in 2010/11) they finished third, but still trailed 36 points behind the champions, Porto.

As mentioned, a Sporting of some description does currently sit third in the Primeira Liga, but it comes in the form of northerners Sporting Braga. Braga are enjoying a purple patch in their history and are perhaps the greatest beneficiaries of the green-and-white slump down in Lisbon, this year sampling the delights of playing Champions League football for the first time. Though Braga command more limelight, however, they still seem some way from casting themselves as one of a 'Big Three' - and currently trail Benfica by 18 points.

Which brings us back to the absence of a competitive Sporting and whether they can re-assume their traditional role in Portuguese football.

The roots of Sporting's current problems aren't hard to trace. Godinho Lopes' disastrous tenure as chairman has perhaps been the biggest single factor and, though he has now resigned, the club are still picking up the pieces from his rein. The recent lack of stability in Sporting's boardroom has certainly been mirrored in their dug-out: current coach Jesualdo Ferreira the ninth incumbent of the hotseat at the Alvalade since Paulo Bento was fired in 2009. Having no strategy has seemingly been the strategy at Sporting and some of their financial dealings have been desperate: Daniel Carriço sold to Premier League Reading for well under a million Euros and Portuguese international Joao Pereira leaving for Valencia last summer at a cut-price €3.5m.

This instability and mismanagement has certainly affected what happens on the pitch where Sporting's players have been underperforming for far too long. There are exceptions to the rule, such as goalkeeper Rui Patricio, but Sporting's first team currently seems geared to sucking the life out of its genuine talents. Striker Ricky Van Wolfswinkel is perhap the biggest example - the Dutchman having gone from worldbeater to confidence-dry disaster zone in less than a season. Peruvian André Carillo is another who currently flatters to deceive, while former Barcelona prodigy Jeffrén rarely plays, let alone shows the ability that sees him valued in the €12m bracket.

Perhaps Sporting's best bet of digging themselves out of their current mess comes, unsurprisingly, in the form of their academy. The early careers of Ronaldo, Figo, Nani and Paulo Futre were forged at Sporting and if the present crop of NextGen talent is anything to go by, more stars of the future nestle up their sleeve. England-born Eric Dier is one such leading light and the 18-year-old's performances since breaking into the first team represent one of the few bright sparks in an otherwise gloomy season. Wonderkids João Mário and Bruma are also tipped for the top and Sporting need to develop and harness this next wave of talent, while ensuring they don't 'cash in' too early on such young gems.

With chairman-elect Bruno de Carvalho set to inject fresh impetus, the signs are that Sporting will improve. However, they certainly have ground to make up if Portugal's 'Big Three' is to be anything other than a catchphrase; perhaps players, such as Rinaudo, can motivate themselves in the knowledge that the gap between Sporting and their traditional rivals is currently growing wider by the year.


Tuesday, February 19, 2013

FC Porto win, but fail to finish Málaga off

Starting elevens

FC Porto and Málaga offered a much awaited Iberian duel between two of the most entertaining teams to see which team would progress to the Champions League's next round.

With James Rodríguez only fit for the bench, FC Porto coach Vítor Pereira stuck with Izmailov deputising for the Colombian star and Varela got his starting place back after Atsu played against Beira-Mar. Málaga coach Manuel Pellegrini, in turn, chose to play Roque Santa Cruz up front, with Joaquín in his usual position out wide and Isco on the left. In the middle, Toulalan and former União de Leiria midifelder Iturra fought an unfair battle against the home team's central trio of Fernando, Lucho Gonzáles and João Moutinho.

Pereira's men came out pressing out of the gate, trying to stifle the opposition and convey a message of dominance. Moutinho or Lucho would be the first man to lead the pressing as soon as Willy Caballero put the ball in the centre-backs' feet, since all four of Málaga's back line looked uncomfortable on the ball.

Oddly enough, Pellegrini favoured Júlio Baptista over a third player in midfield, which would eventually prove costly. With Isco nominally on the left (even though he would never hug the touch line), much of Málaga's threat was diminished, with the Argentinean coach seemingly putting his faith in a more direct approach.

Because Isco was deployed on the left, he was supposed to pick up Danilo's runs - something he did not seem too willing to do and that opened huge pockets of space both for Danilo and Lucho as well. With Izmailov frequently acting as a fourth midfielder (just starting a bit wider), Toulalan and Iturra often found themselves overwhelmed in the middle, with too much ground to cover.

Indeed, unlike most 4x2x3x1 and 4x4x2, Málaga were surprisingly different while defending, choosing not to form two banks of four, allowing Moutinho and Lucho to roam free and dictating the match's flow and tempo. FC Porto would start their moves on one of the flanks, quickly move the ball into the centre and swiftly displace it towards the other wing, where numerous 2v1 situations kept being created.

FC Porto found large holes in the middle against Toulalan and Iturre.

However, despite all the space the Portuguese champions benefited from, they were not able to convert it into clear-cut chances, missing a creative spark or a bit more aggressiveness on the wings. Danilo, in particular, regressed in his ways and did not offer any threat out wide, tapering FC Porto's play toward the centre even further.

As the match wore on, Málaga started looking like undoing themselves, becoming ever more disjointed, especially in transitions into defence, Toulalan and Iturra still trying to cover as much of the pitch as possible, with little help from Málaga's forwards (when asked about it in the press conference, Pellegrini would deny that lack of protection was decisive).

The second half did not seem to offer any news, with Málaga apparently content with the result and not willing to commit too many men forward and become exposed - ironically so, since their forwards contributed very little while attacking and even less while defending. James Rodríguez started warming up and as he was summoned to go on the pitch, João Moutinho scored the match's only goal from Alex Sandro's accurate assist. It was basically the first time a FC Porto midfielder had tried to make a run into the box and confuse their opponents' marking duties.

The Dragons were quicker and more precise throughout the ten minutes that followed the goal, but the simultaneous presence of James Rodríguez and Izmailov annihilated FC Porto's presence out wide. The home team would look more dangerous after Atsu took the place of the Russian winger, stretching the play and making Sérgio Sánchez and De Michelis pay for their sluggishness.

All in all, the Spaniards managed to fend off most of FC Porto's attempts to break them down the middle, but were virtually non-existent in attack. If they are to mount a serious challenge for a place in the next round, they will have to up their game quite a bit. The question remains, though: Will FC Porto resort to a more cautious approach and let Málaga dominate (thus opening space at the back) or will they insist on stifling their rivals' potential threat?

Friday, February 15, 2013

Bayer Leverkusen v Benfica: The pics

After the initial breakdown, it's now time for a more detailed analysis of last night's match between Bayer Leverkusen and Benfica. Indeed, there are some curious (and revealing) facts about the performance of both teams.

Interceptions made by both sides.

Let's start off with both teams' interceptions. As stated in the previous article, the two teams seemed to switch roles to perfection. Because Benfica handed Bayer Leverkusen the initiative, the German team were much less effective when it came to defending. Used to sit back and pounce on the break, Bayer Leverkusen were often caught off-guard after giving the ball away. Notice how Bayer Leverkusen's interceptions are very near the touch line.

On the other hand, Benfica's chalkboard provides a very interesting reading. Instead of going for the jugular, as they so often do, the Eagles dropped back and were happy to soak up pressure. If you look carefully at Benfica's chalkboard, you will see that only 2 of their 20 interceptions were made (just a tad) after the halfway line.

Another interesting aspect of yesterday's match was the fluidity of Bayer Leverkusen's 3 forwards - Stefan Kiessling, Gonzalo Castro and André Schürrle. Even though they all had nominal starting positions, their movement was constant and their interplay was worth noticing. Kiessling, for instance, was crucial by dropping back to collect the ball with his back to goal, allowing Schürrle to exploit the space Kiessling had just vacated.

Kiessling and Castro's versatile displays.


  • Split in two

While the flow of the match was not exactly divided in two perfect halves, it still proves interesting to break down the data between first and second half. Let's begin with Castro's contrasting performances.

Castro's dashboard divided in both halves.

Castro was one of the most decisive players throughout the first half. Even though he started out on the right and remained there for the most part while defending, the right-winger would often drift centrally whenever his team had the ball. With this, not only did he create several numbers-up situations against Benfica's duo of Matic and André Gomes (similarly to what FC Porto's Defour did against Benfica), but he also freed the wing for Hogasai to venture forward. In the second half, however, his contribution was much more limited, partly because of Gaitán's higher defensive work rate.

Bayer Leverkusen's passes in their attacking third - first half and second half.

Thanks to the three forward's movement and guile, Bayer Leverkusen enjoyed large spells of possession and good positions to create danger from (even though they rarely got around to finishing the moves) during the first half. As you can see in the chalkboard above, not only did the German team insist on playing to the wings, but they also found it easy to penetrate down the centre and link up play. In the second half, their forays down the centre were much more speculative and their wing play was often frustrated by Benfica, as opposed to what happened in the first half.


Bayer Leverkusen's shots - first half and second half.

Although they benefited from a better run of play throughout the first period, the chalkboard above shows how Bayer Leverkusen were limited to long-range efforts for the most of the first 45 minutes. It was in the second half that they got closer to Artur Moraes' goal, at a time when they were getting more and more desperate to at least score a goal. Their best, most fluid play was no match for the more direct approach they favoured in the second half, particularly after going one goal down.

Benfica's passes in their attacking third - first half and second half.

As for Benfica, dividing their play between the two halves also provides interesting insight. By looking at the chalkboard above, you will see that the passes made in their attacking third were often lateral and that the central route hardly ever worked. However, there were still some attempts to knit a few short passes together. If you take a look at the second half's chalkboard, you will see that Benfica's passes are much more direct and incisive (hardly ever through the middle), typical for a team dedicated to counter-attacking.

Benfica's shots - first half and second half.

Even though there is no staggering difference between the first and second halves in terms of shots, it remains clear that not only did Benfica manage to shoot more, but they were also allowed to shoot from more favourable positions.

Thursday, February 14, 2013

Benfica on their way to Europa League's last 16

Starting elevens
Bayer Leverkusen v Benfica was (together with Tottenham v Lyon) probably the most attractive fixture of this round of the Europa League. Two very good teams, with very different approaches and formations were expected to battle it out for a place in the next round.

If ever there was the need for evidence that the Europa League does not command the same amount of respect and interest from clubs (and therefore fans), last night's match offered proof enough. Both coaches chose to rotate their squads, seemingly more worried about next weekend's matches in their own leagues (Bayer, for instance, will be playing against a team that lies second from last). Benfica coach Jorge Jesus rested Máxi Pereira, Enzo Pérez, Lima and Sálvio. Sasha Lewandowksi and Sami Hyppia followed a similar path and made several changes in defence and midfield, the attack remaining intact.

When both teams got on the pitch, there remained no doubts: Bayer Leverkusen would deploy a 4x3x3, a system that often creates problems for Jesus' charges. There was some talk ahead of the match that Benfica and Bayer Leverkusen might switch roles as home and away teams - Benfica pressing intensely and Bayer Leverkusen playing on the break -, but the exact opposite happened.

Despite fielding an eleven jam packed with attack-minded players, Jesus' strategy was much more cautious, with Ola John and Urreta mindful of their defensive duties. This, in turn, forced the German team to resort to a sort of game they are not comfortable with: taking initiative and having time on the ball. Nevertheless, it should be said they managed to adapt their strategy quite well for the first 25 minutes. As so often is the case when playing against a 4x3x3, there was a void in the middle, since Gaitán - who was playing off Cardozo - did not drop back, meaning Bayer Leverkusen always had an extra man in midfield.

In fact, both Matic and André Gomes felt the need to push up towards Bayer Leverkusen's midfielders to prevent them from having too much time on the ball, but that frequently left Benfica's back four against Bayer Leverkusen's extremely fluid three-pronged attack - Castro on the right, Schürrle on the left and Kiessling as the striker.

During those first 25 minutes, the home team found numerous passing lanes right through the middle, with Kiessling checking to collect the ball and return it to either Schürrle or Bender, Bayer Leverkusen's most attack-minded midfielder. Thanks to Hosogai's forays down the right (with Castro drifting centrally and opening up the space), the Germans would often find find themselves in very good positions, only to be let down by their touch or decision.

After the first period's initial half, Benfica gradually took over and started taking control of the match. Even though the Eagles were not exactly wreaking havoc in their attacking third, Bayer Leverkusen looked very fragile whenever they gave the ball away, usually too slow to get back into position, a typical trait of a team more used to playing on the counter-attack. In many case, the positioning of the centre-backs, in particular, left much to be desired.


  • Second half


The second half brought no significant changes, apart from the odd decision from Bayer Leverusken's coaching duo to remove Schürrle in favour of Sidney Sam. The team immediately looked less dangerous - in fact, Sam never had the chance to leave his mark -, which played right into the hands of Benfica. The match was becoming more and more stagnant, particularly because Enzo Pérez came on for the injured André Gomes and Gaitán probably got an earful from Jorge Jesus in order to help out defensively.

Benfica struggled a bit in set pieces and they were almost made to pay for it on 60 minutes, but the scramble ended up yielding nothing but a corner for Bayer Leverkusen, who insisted on committing many men forward on such occasions. After the aerial duel, the Eagles were very quick to break away and Cardozo had all the time (and skill) to fake a first shot and then calmly chip the ball over the goalkeeper.

The goal seemed to awaken the German team, who by then were more willing to take chances in attack and were once again more fluid. Benfica tried to cool the tempo of the match, but were still vulnerable here and there to combination plays down the middle. The match would end with a last ditch interception near Benfica's goal line, a crucial moment for a more relaxed approach in a week's time.

Bayer Leverkusen find themselves in a very awkward position. A draw with no goals would put them in the driver's seat, but now they will be forced to get exposed in a type of game that does not favour them. Besides, Benfica are always much stronger when they play in their own turf and it is hard to envision the round taking a wrong turn for the Portuguese vice-champions.

Monday, January 28, 2013

Why did Benfica defeat Braga?


Two days after Braga bid adieu to their last hopes of remaining in the Portuguese title race, it's time to dissect the motives that led to Benfica's superiority throughout most of the match - and why José Peseiro's team are less solid than Braga's versions over the last few years.

The last time Benfica came out as winners from the Quarry, Braga were coached by Jorge Jesus. Over the past seasons, the Eagles had found it hard to tear down the defensive, quick-breaking wall put up by Domingos and Leonardo Jardim - two coaches known for appreciating defensive solidity (allegedly one of the reasons why Jardim left Olympiakos). Therefore, there was some curiosity regarding both coaches' plans - would they battle it out in a gung-ho approach or would they rather go for a more cautious concept?


  • 1. The 4x3x3.


Without Cardozo, Lima was Benfica's only striker - a departure from their usual ways. With the introduction of Gaitán, Benfica were set up in a 4x3x3, with Jorge Jesus clearly aiming to control the centre. Matic, Enzo Pérez and Gaitán often formed a perfect triangle. While both Argentinians were authorized to push forward almost at will, Gaitán had the freedom to roam wherever he saw fit, in order to overload Braga's defence - in fact, he would turn out to be the match's decisive player.

The picture also shows that, even though Braga were more expectant than usual, Mossoró and Éder would often remain up front, removed from the midfield contest. Custódio and Hugo Viana, not the fastest players around, were clearly not enough for Matic, Gaitán and Enzo Pérez, not to mention Lima's movement.


  • 2. The 4x1x4x1 in the defensive phase.


Not only did Jesus prefer a 4x3x3 while attacking, he also chose a different shape to defend at Braga - in this case, 4x1x4x1, a typical defensive shape for teams that play in a 4x3x3. Certainly aware of Mossoró's threat, Jorge Jesus wasn't willing to let the Brazilian run the show with quick breakaways. With Matic behind Enzo Pérez and Gaitán, Jesus made sure there was always a player between the lines, Mossoró's preferred area of dominance.

This simple tweak kept Braga from succeeding in their quick transitions, particularly because none of Ruben Amorim, Viana, Custódio or Alan (nowadays, at least) are quick enough to accompany Éder or Mossoró in their forays. Braga would actually manage to get the ball out to Éder, who would find himself alone and have no other option but to try his luck, even when the circumstances did not recommend it.


  • 3. Benfica easily circumvent Braga's defence.

Braga's more cautious approach did not necessarily translate into a better defensive positioning. In fact, Benfica was not too troubled by their opponents' strategy and often found a way around it. In this particular case, Lima drops back from the centre-back (who tries to stick close to him) to collect the ball. He then gives it back to the unmarked Enzo Pérez, who in turn gives it to Gaitán.


After delivering the ball to Enzo Pérez, Lima quickly turns and exploits the space behind his marker. Without anyone to mark him (Viana tries to pressure Enzo Pérez, but to no avail), Gaitán has all the time he needs to pick his pass and play Lima in.


While this particular play did not yield a goal, it was a very good example of how Benfica saw nothing wrong with Braga's positioning.


  • 4. Salvio, the wingman.

Benfica ruled the match for approximately 75 minutes. Salvio, in particular, was the main enforcer, despite going against Ismaily and Ruben Amorim, supposedly deployed on the left to stop the Argentinean winger's threat. In the first picture, the ball gets to Salvio, who wastes no time sending it Gaitán's way. Lima's movement dragging the centre-back is most important. With Ismaily focused on Salvio and the centre-back on Lima, Gaitán (red) sprints past Hugo Viana and gets the ball in space.
 

Here, Gaitán (red) is once again able to pick his pass. By faking to check to get the ball, Lima confuses every Braga defender and Salvio (blue) will be free in the centre of the box.


Despite the presence of five defenders in their own box, Salvio will be able to shoot and collect the rebound to his own shot.


  • 5. Braga's poor defensive transitions.

First things first. See if you can count the number of Braga players in and/or around the box. In a potentially advantageous play for them, Braga have no less than nine players directly involved - which means there is only one defender and the goalkeeper behind this picture.



When the free kick is taken and it goes wrong, Braga immediately have four players in front of the ball, besides some who will only trot back.


Three seconds after the free kick, Benfica are already up 3v2. Remember, the play was originally intended to pose a threat to Benfica.


Five seconds after the free kick, this is what the situation looks like for Braga. Gaitán runs unchecked, with Lima and Ola John waiting for their moment.


Eight seconds after a potentially dangerous free kick in Braga's favour, Benfica are about to enter their opponents' box. Lima would eventually score the Eagles' second, thanks in part to Haas' less than stellar pressing and Beto's fluffing.


  • 6. Braga take 76 minutes to commit men forward.

After finding themselves trailing and with not many chances to get back into the match, Braga looked alive the very minute João Pedro came on for Ruben Amorim. It was basically the first time José Peseiro's charges insisted on driving forward. In the case of Braga's goal, Éder dropped back and, unlike previous situations, actually had someone exploiting the space he had just vacated. João Pedro (red) intelligently attacks the space between centre-back and full-back.


The second picture shows how João Pedro (red) is sprinting unmarked to connect to Éder's lobbed pass.


Keeping calm under pressure, João Pedro gets Artur out of the way and puts the ball in the back of the net. Braga had just pulled one back, but it was too little, too late.