Benfica 1-2 Chelsea: Chelsea score at the death

Starting elevens

Chelsea all but emulated the fashion in which they conquered last season's Champions League with a dramatic goal from a right-sided corner kick in the final moments of the match - this time in the 92nd minute, through Branislav Ivanovic.

Jorge Jesus chose to leave the excellent Lima out of the starting line-up (replaced with Rodrigo), while his counterpart Rafa Benítez, without Eden Hazard, was forced to shuffle Ramires to the right flank and deliver midfield patrolling duties to club legend Frank Lampard. Otherwise, the starting elevens were pretty much as expected.

Benfica looked like a transformed team from the one that were beaten by FC Porto last Saturday at Estádio do Dragão. Instead of playing the rare expectant brand of football they put on display in Porto, they reverted to their preferred style and it showed - both in a good and a bad way. Indeed, the Eagles immediately started pressing the minute the referee blew the whistle for the first time.

Chelsea, in turn, seemed oddly overwhelmed and vulnerable down the middle, supposedly one of the areas of the pitch where they tend do excel. Faced with Benfica's high-tempo game and quick accelerations, the Londoners tried to slow the game down, even though Benfica were hardly willing to allow them to do it.

• Lampard and Luiz too far apart

In the opening stages of the match, Benfica effectively created several excellent chances largely thanks to Nemanja Matic and Enzo Pérez's superb work, only to be let down by their team-mates finishing.

Matic and Pérez dictated most of the action in midfield throughout the first half,
but their influence waned as the match wore on.

Still, the role that both Rodrigo and Óscar Cardozo played cannot be overstated. The young Brazilian forward tended to drop deeper and link up play, vacating the space for Gaitán to exploit and allowing Cardozo to act as a wall against which their midfielders could bounce their passes and thus meet Chelsea defence facing towards goal.

While Cardozo was usually the target for passes in front of the penalty box,
Rodrigo dropped off to his left, often switching positions with Gaitán.

One of the key issues during the first half was the distance David Luiz and Frank Lampard maintained between themselves, often allowing Benfica to bisect Chelsea's midfield and pose numerous threats to their defence. Rodrigo would attract David Luiz's attention, a move that was not duly compensated by Lampard - ergo a space that Benfica swiftly pounced on.

During the first half, Benfica often pushed forward through the centre.
The second half would not bring such good rewards, though.

• Benfica dominate while Chelsea struggle

Benfica dominated the initial proceedings, with Chelsea struggling to get the ball forward for most of the first period. However, Benítez's men had a clear blueprint laid out for them by their coach, with Benfica's left side the favourite area for Chelsea's attacks. Not only was Ramires, the Blues' main threat in their counter-attacking approach, playing on the right, but Fernando Torres was also instructed to drift to that wing as well.

After the initial 20 minutes, Chelsea started looking more in control, even though there was hardly the impression they were unbeatable through sheer defensive organisation. With Benfica keeping the English from playing out from the back, Chelsea were still finding it quite hard to get past Benfica's back line, even though they always looked dangerous as soon as the ball entered the area behind Matic and Pérez.

Benfica looked more incisive for the opening 20 minutes.

The first half came to an end with the distinct impression that Benfica had been unfortunate not to have scored, something for which they can only blame themselves, after getting into such promising positions. By half-time, despite having attempted more shots, Benfica had hit none on target.

• Benfica start subsiding

The Portuguese vice-champions started the second half much in the same way they had opened the match - aggressive, direct and with a clear sense of purpose. However, after the first 5 minutes, where they again created some good-looking chances, Chelsea became more positive with their game, often bringing Óscar and Juan Mata into play (albeit still in counter-attacking mode).

Chelsea were less expectant throughout the second half, as the player influence chalkboard clearly shows.
Also, notice the difference in space between David Luiz and Lampard in both halves.

Benfica were managing to work the high defensive line well, but Chelsea's close off-side calls should have provided some warning to their opponents. Instead, the Blues were allowed to score their goal with barely a touch of the ball between Petr Cech and Torres, right down the middle - the area in which Benfica most often look vulnerable. Torres' work must be praised, but the way the goal happened (poor defensive transition on Benfica's part through the centre) can hardly be news for anyone to follows up the team up close.

Even Cardozo was able to level the score though Azpilicueta's unnecessary handball from the penalty spot, by then Benfica were looking less able to stamp their authority on the match (you may want to check Matic and Enzo Pérez's chalkboards a bit farther up once more).

The first-half intricate passing in the attacking third gave way to a more sterile approach in the second period.

Moments before Benfica's goal, Jorge Jesus had replaced Rodrigo - not as lively throughout the second half - with Lima and Ola John for Melgarejo, forcing Gaitán to play at left-back. Chelsea immediately took their attacking down the right up a notch.

Chelsea smelled blood down Benfica's left side with Gaitán at left-back.

Even though the Argentinean worked his boots off, his flank was still Chelsea's favourite target (particularly for Ramires) and it was fitting that the winning goal came from a corner precisely down that side, after another one of Ramires' many sprints.

• Conclusion

Even though Benfica players, coaches and fans alike will most likely feel gutted over the next couple of days, there is good reason for the club to look ahead with hope. The Eagles looked much more dangerous by remaining true to their style and the fans can hardly complain about the lack of an attacking bite this time around.

Chelsea's maturity and experience at this stage proved all too important, but Portuguese fans must take solace in the fact that their sides do not feel as far removed from English teams as they once did. As for Chelsea, they will probably part ways with a coach that provided them with some stability, a presence in next season's Champions League and yet another European trophy. Not bad for a stop-gap solution.

Topic of the day - Chelsea

How can the reigning European champions be such a lost cause?

Any analysis of last night's match I might have thought of doing is now tragically informed by the knowledge that Roberto Di Matteo was sacked by Chelsea. The question now remains: which manager is bold enough to go where so many have failed before him?

It is often hard to understand what goes on in the minds of today's CEO, presidents, directors, managers or voters. It seems that people dedicate less and less time to assess processes, rather focusing on results and results alone – ignoring that results may sometimes be random, whereas processes are not.

Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich fired José Mourinho in September 2007, a few months into that season. The precedent for sacking coaches in the middle of the season had been established and only Carlo Ancelotti managed to see out two full seasons (even if he was fired by the end of the second after winning an unprecedented double in his first year in charge). After that, Luiz Felipe Scolari, André Villas-Boas and now Roberto Di Matteo have all been axed before the end of the season.

The Italian manager was André Villas-Boas' assistant coach during the Portuguese's few months in charge and therefore was able to watch first-hand the developments of his former boss' sacking, which meant that he had to be aware of the pressure that had been mounting over the past weeks. Despite leading Chelsea to the Champions League for the first time, Di Matteo's position never looked secure and Abramovich actually seemed reluctant to hire him on a permanent basis as the club's manager.

Di Matteo succeeded where AVB had failed for numerous reasons, but it was particularly because he was not so adamant at casting the dressing room owners aside - possibly one of AVB's biggest mistakes - and, most importantly in my view, because he went for the diametrically opposed: a cautious, compact and disciplined team that broke quickly and exploited the space left by their opponents.

Despite their ultimate success, Abramovich was not satisfied, insisting on winning with panache - and took out his seemingly endless chequebook and signed players that were specifically designed to bring the attractive and spectacular, if not romantic, approach he has been craving for so long.

Now any coach will tell you that defending is the easiest - and most likely best -starting point while coaching a team. Yes, it can be challenging at times, but deploying your players in two compact banks of four when you have players - such as John Terry, John Obi Mikel, Didier Drogba or Petr Cech - who thrive on that particular brand of football was clearly the easiest and familiar way to go. That was why I was so curious to see what Roberto Di Matteo would bring when next season started.

To be honest, all the signs were there. Even though Chelsea managed to grab several wins and hold on near the top of the Premier League for a few weeks, it didn't look like a case of "if", but "when". While it was true the Pensioners were playing a more expansive kind of football, they were also displaying leaks all over the place and there were no significant adjustments made to the initial plan of playing all of Óscar, Mata and Hazard behind the ever unhappy Torres.

Chelsea kept playing fast, attacking football, which was sometimes enough, but kept conceding too many goals, giving the ball away too cheaply. They were constantly overrun in the middle, not because Mikel and Ramires were poor, but because they were so often left exposed by their front four - and too often Ashley Cole, whose defensive positioning is becoming more and more questionable by the day.

Mind you, they didn't forget how to defend - they were simply out of their comfort zone. Terry is not a quick defender and is vulnerable to balls over the top. Ricardo Carvalho, the player who used to cover for him, is long gone and neither David Luiz nor Gary Cahill are good replacements for that particular sort of task.

When the two men felt the heat from above, Villas-Boas and Di Matteo went in different directions. AVB remained true - probably ill-advisedly - to his principles and stood his ground in a crucial match for the team's aspirations (at Napoli) by daring to leave out some of the squad's key figures and showing who was the boss (not him, evidently). Di Matteo, conversely, tried to steer into safety and resorted to a strategy that had worked miracles in the past, playing compact, benching Fernando Torres, deploying the right-back Azpilicueta further up front, and leaving Hazard up front on his own, trying to exploit the space behind the apparently unstoppable Lichtsteiner.

To be honest, even though I'm aware that Chelsea lost 3-0 and that Cech was back to his golden days, I have to admit that it was the most comfortable I have Chelsea this season. Yes, Juventus bossed them around, but that was pretty much what happened during the last few months of last season - and it still yielded results. On the other hand, whenever Chelsea managed to break free from Juventus' initial pressure, they were extremely dangerous, particularly through the sheer speed and skills of Óscar and Hazard.

Regardless of the identity of the new Chelsea manager, it will be extremely hard not to see a return to safer sceneries. The new gaffer will have no time, no wiggle room to implement his ideas and will probably go back to basics: Where and how to defend, break quickly, bench Torres and take advantage of Hazard's swiftness and dribbling skills, and Óscar's vision.

Despite the unfortunate end, Di Matteo's last match in charge could well prove a blueprint for the next man - provided he has the time to put it in place.

Attacking coverage - what is it exactly?

Football pundits (this columnist included, pardon the immodesty) can often be found saying and/or writing words and expressions that sometimes have vague definitions for most people. Today we will be tackling the myth of attacking coverage and what it represents. The foundations of the "attacking coverage" principle are two-fold:

1. Provide support for the player with the ball; and 
2. Maintain the defensive balance.

Basically this means that there must be one or more players beside and/or behind the player with the ball in order to help keep possession, but also to make sure that, if the ball is lost, there is someone ready to contain the initial threat and stop opponents from breaking quickly.

While both these cases can also be ascribed to poor individual decision making, this article will focus primarily on the attacking coverage and how important it is for the player with the ball to read the game and understand what the best option may be.

• Goal #1 - Shakhtar v Chelsea

The play starts on the right. Hazard (yellow) has dropped back and gets a pass from Terry. Trying open up a space for his team-mate, Ramires (blue) moves forward. The ball will be played to Mikel (red). Notice how the four Shakhtar players form an almost perfect diagonal, restricting passing options.

Mikel gets the ball and, instead of passing it onto David Luiz (orange) or Ivanovic (green), he returns to the middle of the field. Ramires (blue) moves back, trying to provide support for his team-mate. 

Mikel, under heavy pressure, eventually dispatches the ball to Hazard, but both Mikel (red) and Ramires (blue) are higher up than the Belgian. Cole can be seen on the halfway line and Ivanovic (please see next picture) is further up. This means that there is only Terry and Luiz behind Chelsea's wunderkind. 

Hazard gives the ball away and now there is a 2v2 situation, with Ivanovic (green) too high up. With Luiz (orange) wide open, Terry (purple) correctly tries to delay the play.

Luiz (orange) runs diagonally towards the centre, while Terry (purple) continues in the centre, waiting for backup.

This is when Terry takes a dreadful defensive approach. With Luiz now closer to his man, Terry gets closer to the man with the ball, opening a huge boulevard for the pass behind him, instead of restricting the passing option.

Conclusion

Good game-reading skills are essential anywhere, but in such a stringent context as the Champions League, one mistake is often what it takes to get punished by the other team. Without proper attacking coverage (i.e. safe passing options), both Mikel and Hazard should have realised the danger and played it safe. On the other hand, their team-mates should have provided better support while attacking and adapted accordingly as soon as they started guessing the ball might be lost. 

• Goal #2 - Spartak Moscow v Benfica

In this particular case, Benfica are, as usual, attacking down the right. Salvio (the right winger) passes the ball to Matic (the team's holding midfielder).

Matic (blue) is immediately pressured by Rafael Carioca (the eventual goalscorer). Benfica right-back Maxi Pereira (orange) is currently the team's most advanced player. The left-back Melgarejo (red) notices his team-mate in difficulties and still pushes forward, rather than offering a safe passing option. Notice how many players Benfica have in front of the ball.

In a poor decision, Matic tries to get the ball to Melgarejo, only to see it intercepted by Bilyaletdinov. The shaded area indicates how there is no one behind Matic (blue) besides the centre-backs, in their own half.

In this picture, it's easy to see that there are as many defenders as there are attackers. Jardel (purple), a bit like Terry, worries too much about the ball and forgets to occupy or restrict the passing option. The ball would get to the unmarked Jurado.

Jurado holds the ball up, waiting for a team-mate. Rafael Carioca, who had initially put Matic under pressure, speeds past his and Jurado's markers and puts the ball in the back of the net.

Conclusion

This was another prime example of the need to read the game according to the player's positioning and the team's. While it's true Matic's pass was less than stellar, one mustn't forget the numerous bad decisions from his team-mates, not offering enough safe passing options - including one of them even pushing up after seeing his holding midfielder in trouble. If Matic had been properly supported, there would have been a couple of passing options beside or behind him, in order to both keep possession and avoid a fast breakaway if the team lost the ball, as they did.

Tottenham - Chelsea: So close, yet so far

Starting elevens

There was a huge buzz surrounding this match, with André Villas-Boas's Tottenham going up against his former club. Would the Portuguese manager instigate his team to go all out from the referee's first whistle or would the Lilywhites be more cautious?

While Chelsea were without John Terry (suspended) and Frank Lampard (on the bench), Tottenham were also without two key players: Moussa Dembélé and Gareth Bale, meaning Tom Huddlestone would partner up with Sandro in midfield and Dempsey would deputise on the left. Unfortunately for Tottenham, those absences were far more critical than Chelsea's and it showed throughout the whole match.

With neither team interested in pressuring up front, Roberto Di Matteo's team were clearly more sure of themselves and more comfortable on the ball. Without Bale's defensive contribution and Dempsey not willing to track back that quickly, Chelsea kept venturing down the right wing, constantly creating overloads.

Tottenham showed huge difficulties in playing out from the back. With neither Gallas or Caulker particularly adept at spreading the play, a player like Dembélé is critical, since he can hold up the ball and glide through opponents before spraying passes. Furthermore, this is a team based around Bale's sheer speed for the out-ball, a trait that was canceled due to Dempsey's altogether different characteristics. The simple shifting of the American midfielder into the wing caused not only inefficiency down the left flank, but it also removed Desmpey's bite in the centre, where he excels at picking up the scraps from his striker, unlike Sigurdsson.

The stark difference in Dempey's contribution

The Icelandic, in turn, was playing too high up to help out defensively, but didn't create anything going forward - as is often the manager's intention when deploying such a player that high. AVB would realise that and Sigurdsson and Dempsey would eventually change positions midway through the first half. For a team with such ingrained routines down the left, Aaron Lennon had to step up, which he didn't until the 25th minute, immediately spreading the panic in Chelsea's defence. He would in fact create Tottenham's best opportunity for Sigurdsson ten minutes later. Chelsea were winning by half-time and rightly so.

The second half was entirely different. Tottenham were finally unafraid of pushing up and make Chelsea's midfield duo work, which yielded results almost immediately, through Gallas' goal on 46 minutes. A few minutes later, the home team would score the second when Defoe redirected Lennon's mishit shot. While Tottenham's first 15 minutes were in part due to their greater intensity and dynamics, Lennon's input cannot be overstated, since he was the only home player (with the exception of the ever impressive Jermaine Defoe) capable of beating opponents on 1v1 situations, dragging them out of place.

The difference between the first and second halves is clear,
with the whole team wider and more advanced.

The match now seemed to be Tottenham's to lose. Chelsea were somewhat lost and looked incapable of turning things around. Even though Mata and Hazard's role in the final comeback was absolutely critical, there were two factors that played their part against Tottenham: Gallas' waning capabilities and the midfield's lacklustre protection of their back four.

The different defensive contributions from Sandro and Huddlestone

Bale's absence was obviously important, but Dembélé's might have been worse. In addition to his ability to constantly offer an out-ball, his defensive performance is just as relevant. The chalkboard above shows how differently Sandro and Huddlestone helped out their team while defending, a difference that only became clearer as the match wore on. In fact, Huddlestone's exhaustion was a direct cause of Chelsea's second goal and his replacement came moments too late.

As for Gallas, the return of either Kaboul or Assou-Ekotto cannot come too soon for AVB. Despite his impressive, title-winning track record, the French centre-back's limitations are plain for all to see. Unfortunately for him, he's not the same solid, reliable match-winning defender he used to be and today's match further exposed him. Not only has his positioning become questionable - resulting in misdirected clearances -, his reading abilities also seem to be deserting him, of which Chelsea's third goal was enough proof.

This was a match that Tottenham could and should have won after getting on top, were it not for a few critical shortcomings in midfield and defence. Dembélé and Bale will be back soon, as will Parker, Kaboul and Assou-Ekotto, which will only make them stronger. Despite the loss, André Villas-Boas can take comfort in knowing his team are evolving and on their way to become a squad strong enough to look their opponents in the eye.

Champions League - Bayern breakdown

Bayern expected line-up and typical movement

Even though it wasn't exactly the people's choice, next Saturday's Champions League final promises to be a very entertaining match, especially because the two teams couldn't be more different. Because Chelsea has been thoroughly analysed here, here, here and here, today's article will focus primarily on the German team.

While Chelsea have turned into a cohesive defensive unit with a safety-first approach under interim manager Roberto Di Matteo, Bayern Munich's stance is attacking and, as a consequence, their line-up has a clear imbalance in favour of the offense. In fact, it's hard to envision another team that would seem more appropriate (on paper, at least) to Chelsea's newfound defensive solidity.

• Positive

Make no mistake about it: Bayern are a world class team; otherwise, they wouldn't have beaten Real Madrid, Manchester City and Napoli - among others - on their way to the final. As previously mentioned, their strength lies clearly up front, with the likes of Mario Gómez, Franck Ribéry, Arjen Robben and Bastian Schweinsteiger.

There are two key aspects to Bayern usual play. First off, Mario Gómez. It's only fair that any analysis kicks off with this unbelievably great poacher. The striker has had an amazing couple of seasons and, were it not for  Messi's outwardly feats, would be the competition's top scorer. The other aspect are the two wingers, Ribéry and Robben. Both of them are very good on 1v1 situations and can wreak havoc at any given time.

Despite their similar nominal position, their movement is very different. Whereas Robben hugs the touchline and tends to drift inward, Ribéry is more keen on dropping back and collecting the ball further back towards the goal line.

Bayern are excellent at focussing attention on one wing and exploring the blind side.
When Robben drifts inward, Gómez tends to meet him for the one-two, freeing up Ribéry.

• Negative

Similarly to Chelsea, the Germans will line up without key players, such as Alaba, Gustavo and Badstuber - which is to say almost their whole left side. Bayern have been consistently and frighteningly weak down the left wing. For starters, Ribéry has a troublesome tendency to turn off his defensive chip and both Alaba and Gustavo are not the greatest positional masters of defense, opening up the gates repeatedly. 

Any team facing Bayern know that the left is usually the best way to go.

As it turns out, all of these absences might not be that unlucky for Jupp Heynckes, since Lahm will probably have to deputise on the left, with Rafinha taking the right, and Kroos will get back to his natural position beside Schweinsteiger. With Kroos getting pulled back, Müller will probably have to step in as the player in the hole. The thing about Müller is that he has a Jekyll-and-hide football persona, which is not exactly the sort of thing you want for a Champions League final.

Apart from that, Bayern's overall defensive positioning leaves much to be desired. Perhaps the presence of Van Buyten is able to bring some much-needed stability to the back four, since Heynckes' men repeat mistakes that every grassroots team is weary of making, such as no defensive coverage and one of the midfielders wandering off. For instance, the German Cup final laid bare their frailties against a simple player partnership such as Kagawa and Lewandowski, which is to say that Mata and Drogba will feel right at home.

It's odd that a simple route-one strategy is able to create so many goal-scoring opportunities.

• Conclusion

All in all, it should be an evenly balanced match, given the Champions League tradition that both teams will be too wary of conceding a goal. Nevertheless, it's this blog's opinion that Chelsea's sober, defensive-minded approach will trump Bayern's attitude of throwing caution to the wind and attacking in numbers - even though it is important to bear in mind that both teams will be missing important players, which may mean that one (or both) of them will find themselves a bit off balance.

...And the FA Cup goes to Chelsea

Starting elevens

After a long, doctor-ordered break, Combination Play is back - and with a report on Chelsea vs. Liverpool, no less. Last Saturday, the two teams played the first of two matches between them in four days' time. This time, Chelsea got the better of Liverpool, but barely.

Roberto Di Matteo's men started off brimming with confidence, surely a direct result of their last feats. With Di Matteo's favourite eleven for the most challenging games, Chelsea were cohesive, intense (both offensively and defensively) and willing to attack. On the other hand, the team coached by Kenny Dalglish were clearly waiting for what the contest might bring and chose to sit back.

With Gerrard and Mata instructed to play close to their midfield, the middle of the park was packed, as expected. However, Chelsea's goal ten minutes into the game shook things up and served as proof of the Blues' attacking intent. The play that led to the first goal was also useful to assess the importance of offensive and defensive coverage, as well as Luis Enrique's approach when facing Ramires.

The importance of offensive coverage cannot be overstated.
Spearing (blue) has just misplaced a pass.
Henderson is higher up the field and Gerrard is nowhere to be seen.

Realising the danger to his team, Gerrard (red) rushes back, while Henderson just trots
toward his area. Mata has all the time in the world to pick his pass.

As if it were not enough, Luís Enrique made the wrong choice of going for the tackle,
instead of trying to delay Ramires and wait for backup, which allowed Ramires through.

In fact, the Liverpool midfield was one of their bigger problems. With Gerrard close to Suárez and Henderson straying up field, Spearing was easy prey for Mata, who was thriving in the pockets behind his opponent's midfield and dragging Spearing all over the place. With Chelsea faithful to their now usual 4x4x1x1, the transitions into attack were directed at Drogba, who was finding it very easy to knock the ball down for the Spaniard wizard to play his team-mates into play.

Unlike previous matches, Lampard played higher than Mikel and was allowed to make runs into the box, further worsening the Reds' situation. Liverpool, in turn, were rather slow on the ball and clearly lacked a creative spark. In fact, Gerrard would often drop back to pick up the ball, leaving Suárez even more isolated up front. Given the opponent's lower threat, Ivanovic was happy to meet the Uruguayan high up, keeping Liverpool from getting enough quality time on the ball.

Notice how poorly Liverpool's back four was shielded throughout the match.

Dalglish had to change something for the second half and he decided to shift to a more traditional 4x4x2, with Henderson playing as right-midfielder, Gerrard beside Spearing and Bellamy just off Suárez. Somewhat predictably, the Liverpool midfield was constantly overrun, namely for Chelsea's second goal, scored by Drogba.

With a little flick, Lampard was able to find himself loads of space to run into and assist Drogba.

The match seemed to be pretty much wrapped up, but three minutes later, Dalglish replaced Spearing for Carroll. Henderson went back to his more natural central-midfield role, Bellamy went back to his right-winger spot and Suárez dropped to play off Carroll. As it turned out, Carroll proved a pivotal presence to get Liverpool back into the game. Not only did he take full advantage of a defensive mistake from Chelsea for the first goal, but he also provided an attacking outlet for his team, particularly because both Terry and Ivanovic had a hard time dealing with the Geordie's physique and approach.

After clawing their way back into the game, Liverpool kept on piling up the pressure over the Blues', whose coach was a bit late in reacting to his team's obvious increasing fatigue. It was then that Carroll was even more valuable, by not allowing Chelsea's back four any resting time, giving them a taste of their own poison - actually, Carroll was very unfortunate not to see a second goal stand near the end of the match.

All in all, the best team won. Liverpool were seldom aggressive, had huge problems getting the ball out from the back, were slow on the ball and weren't exactly ambitious in their approach. On the contrary, Chelsea were always keen on controlling the game and its tempo and, were it not for Carroll's somewhat fortuitous goal, would probably see out the match at ease.

Benfica - how to improve for next season?

It's always hard, risky and perhaps unfair to analyse how to improve a team that were without any of their centre-backs and were two goals down (on aggregate) when one of their best players was sent off. Nevertheless, even though the Eagles left Stamford Bridge with their heads held high, that's exactly what we're going to do - because there are some specific areas that could - and should - be improved, despite Benfica's valiant attitude.

Chelsea and Benfica offered an enthralling battle last Wednesday to see which team would go on to meet Barcelona in the Champions League semi-finals. Similarly to what had happened against Braga, Benfica were willing to break the game in two and take advantage of their dynamic attacking movement. Therefore, it was hardly surprising that, like the match versus Braga, the game was packed with goal-scoring chances, great saves by the goalkeepers and a jittery home crowd.

Today we will be considering 3 particular issues: defensive positioning, defensive set pieces and defensive transitions. It's true that Benfica were unfortunate on both matches, but it's also true that Champions League powerhouses tend to make underdogs pay on those apparently minor "details". If the Eagles are to build on this season, they must be humble enough to acknowledge that there is a sizable gap between Portuguese football and this particular European competition - the sooner they own to it, the faster they will become powerhouses in their own right.

1. Defensive positioning. Benfica are often admired for their relentless attacking football, an approach that almost paid off last Wednesday. However, good defensive positioning and coverage are a foundation that any team that aspires to greatness must have. Regardless of how much damage both Bruno César and Maxi Pereira can inflict on their opponent's half, it's just as important that they master their defensive duties - something at which they have failed over and over throughout the season.

Maxi Pereira pushes high up to meet Kalou, ending up side by side with Bruno César.
Notice the space behind both Benfica players, with little coverage from Javi García.

With a simple one-two, Kalou gets into space and García is already late to cover for his team-mates.

2. Defensive set pieces. It's a well-known fact that Benfica can wreak havoc with their attacking set pieces, but it is less known that they seem to be very vulnerable on defensive ones. Lately they have conceded against FC Porto and Braga (just to mention bigger games) through this sort of play and here they were fortunate not to allow Chelsea to score from corners, in particular. Despite the recent changes Jorge Jesus made to their zonal approach, there are still tweaks to make if they are to overcome stronger sides.

Benfica insisted on concentrating a large of number of players at the near post.
As a result, David Luiz ends up alone and unmarked. Notice the space at the far post.

After a bad clearance, Luiz gets the ball unmarked and with very little coverage.
Capdevila managed to avoid disaster here.

3. Defensive transitions. Probably the single most important issue in modern football. Most teams are aware that they should take the ball away from where they won it back, because their opponent is less likely to have as many players on the blind side. They are also more and more aware that the ball should be shifted from side to side - preferably in a quick fashion - in order to find space between the lines. The thing that tends to set teams apart nowadays is their reaction to the moment they give the ball away. Sure, this is nothing that gets noticed on highlights, but take a closer look and see for yourselves. It can't be just a coincidence that the better teams are usually the ones that are better at defensive transitions - or do you really think Barcelona (for instance) is all about attack?

Both Bruno César and Maxi are caught high up. None of the makes a foul to stop the breakaway.
Benfica is about to have seven players in front of the ball.

Javi García (the team's fulcrum with his fist clenched) makes the interception seconds later
and tells his team-mates they should have "killed the play" when they could.

Notice the difference the other way around. Artur has just released the ball for a quick breakaway.
Realising how many men Chelsea had in front of the ball, Lampard quickly made the foul to stop the play.

Conclusion. All of this can be dismissed as nothing more than tactical hooey, but more often than not, these are decisive moments for the outcome of any given match. Even though Benfica can get away with defensive carelessness on most matches in the Portuguese championship, the Champions League is much more competitive - and the big sharks don't mind taking their time.

Vintage Champions League

Starting line-ups

Benfica and Chelsea met yesterday at the Luz to see which team would go through to the next stage of this season's Champions League. What we saw was a typical display of this competition, with the underdogs playing better football and the powerhouse withstanding one attack after another (and almost conceding a goal), only to score in the last minutes of the match in a quick breakaway.

Benfica manager Jorge Jesus chose his expected eleven, with Gaitán and Bruno César on the wings, and Aimar behind Cardozo. On the contrary, Chelsea interim coach Roberto Di Matteo changed half his team and left Bosingwa, Cahill, Essien, Lampard, Sturridge and Drogba on the bench (with even Paulo Ferreira getting a highly unlikely nod), clearly stating his mission for this leg - and showing that every player in the Chelsea roster will have his moment.

Chelsea's game plan was clear: sit back, soak pressure, lots of time on the ball (even if it didn't necessarily mean progressing up the field with it) and a breakaway, where possible. With Benfica wary of exerting their usual full-on pressure on the opponent's defensive line, Chelsea defenders and midfielders had numerous moments where they could slow the tempo of the game, annoying the Eagles' fans. Di Matteo had clearly done his homework and played the more industrious and defensively aware Kalou on the left wing, in order to try to check Benfica's preferential attacking route - the right wing. Additionally, Torres was told to drift toward that space in order to take advantage of Maxi Pereira's bold positioning - and dragging his direct marker with him.

Torres connects to the long ball behind Maxi Pereira, dragging Luisão with him.
Kalou runs into the space his team-mate opened up.

Here, Luisão tries to get back to his position and Javi García compensates his team-mate.

This simple movement gives Meireles space to shoot (because he is already late, Maxi tries to take Javi García's place)

As usual, Benfica attacked down the right, with Gaitán, Witsel and Aimar all taking turns to push up, trying to drag both Meireles and Mikel out of position - which they did at times, even though not as frequently as expected. The problem was the infamous weakest link: the left wing. Even though Emerson has taken a lot of flack throughout the season, it hasn't always been his fault, and last night was just another example. Ramires, playing to the right, but narrower than Kalou, helped creating numerical superiority in midfield and often tried to take on Emerson, since Bruno César (and then Gaitán, after his permanent move to the left) rarely tracked back, leaving acres of space for the Blue Kenyan to exploit (see the yellow area in the top diagram). As it turned out, that would be Benfica's fatal mistake.

Ramires (nr. 7), a nominal right-winger, played narrow

Even though this seems a counter-attack, it is just normal play - and already Ramires has lots of space to run into

With both teams in similar formations, it would all come down to speed and creativity. Chelsea, as stated elsewhere, are much more calm and collected, and better organised, which meant they would be less vulnerable to breaking runs and counter-attacks. Paulo Ferreira was essential for the Londoners' newfound stability on the right, since he is much more reliable defensively and has a deeper understanding of a fullback's duties. The Eagles would have to step up for the second half.

And that's exactly what they did. As it so often happens in the latter stages of this competition, the favourites were constantly subject to attacks during the second half's first 15 minutes, a period in which Benfica could (and should) have scored. Cech made great saves, Luiz bravely saved Cardozo's effort off the line and it seemed Chelsea's fortress was about to collapse. It was plain to see that the increase in speed from Witsel (showing that he is just the man Benfica needed for this sort of matches), Aimar and Gaitán (much better on the left) was making Meireles and - particularly - Mikel uncomfortable, especially because Torres was back to his old self, unable to hold on to a single ball. With Mata off his game (it's clear that he shouldn't start his moves from the middle), Ramires was the only out-ball the Blues had.

Jesus was desperate to win the match and replaced Aimar and Bruno César with Rodrigo and Matic, meaning that Witsel would go right, Matic would take his place beside Javi García and Rodrigo would play just off Cardozo - and that's when it all started to crumble. As it has often been the case, Benfica's attempt to win the match unbalanced the whole team. Witsel's influence on the right was diminished and the Portuguese team started losing control. While Chelsea's goal was a recap of their strengths (experience, resilience, a more compact midfield and breakaways), it was also something that we have see too often in Benfica: their will to win at any cost often means that the team lose their balance.

This would lead to Chelsea's goal. Notice how high up Emerson is, with no offensive coverage.

After Ramires' impressive run, it's up to Torres to proceed. Matic shows once again he still has a lot to learn.
The green arrow indicates where he should be providing coverage.

There is one last issue being mentioned. Managers keep telling us that there is always some strategy behind their decisions, but it's sometimes hard to understand what it is. What's the logic in shuffling Witsel to the right, only to bring him back to the middle ten minutes later? Mind you, Jesus is far from being the only manager to do that, and we can only hope that some day we will get a straight answer to this question from a manager.