Portugal's World Cup: The Aftermath

Portugal's campaign at the World Cup ended in rather predictable fashion, but is a lack of planning at the heart of it all? You can check it out here.

Portugal: What lies behind and ahead

Despite its high-profiled nature,
Pepe's ill-tempered reaction was not
the root of all evil for Portugal.
Photo by o.canada.com

Up until 5pm on June 16, 2014, everything seemed to be tip-top in Portugal. The sun was (finally) shining, summer was in bloom and the TV, press and Internet were littered with motivational jingles and clichés. The national team was just about to kick-off their World Cup in the fraternal soil of their "país irmão" and the side boasted Cristiano Ronaldo, the world's best player and figurehead of recent Champions League victors Real Madrid.

By 7pm, everything was a mess. The football team that used to unite all Portuguese people (or some thought or wished) had become a joke, its players a cluster of pampered professionals who did not deserve the money they got nor the pride their fellow country men had invested in them. In short: same ol', same ol' back in Portugal. Love and embrace 'em when they win, crush 'em when they lose.

Rather than discussing the result and what it all means - or may mean - at length, we will be looking at the process, namely where some of the problems lay and how/if they can be sorted out in time.

• The formation

The formation of any given team is of little importance in the grand scheme of all things football. As the saying goes, tactics stand for nothing on paper - meaning that it's rather the dynamics that are implemented within said tactical framework that are relevant, not the theoretical representations of a 4x3x3 or 3x5x2.

In the case of the Portuguese national team, there seems to be little to no collective thinking, not in terms of group cohesion, but rather in terms of what to do in the game's different phases. The centre-backs seem to have the ball or their direct opponent as their sole responsibility, regardless of where it ends up taking them. The midfielders do not provide the necessary coverage for each other, let alone for their defence. The poor attackers are left to their own devices, with a game plan that essentially boils down to "get the ball to Ronaldo now!"

Therefore, it results utterly pointless to dissect the formation, since none will work if there is no tactical blueprint and if the players' features do not fit into it (when in doubt, please see Spain's case during the current World Cup). Whether in 4x4x2, 4x3x3 or 4x2x3x1, without an underlying collective understanding of the game, few teams will prosper.

• The Ronaldo conundrum

Cristiano Ronaldo is by far the team's most gifted player. He is the captain, the man everyone turns to for guidance. That much was clearly on display when Nani (for instance), presented with a clear-cut opportunity, kept looking over his shoulder to give the ball to Ronaldo. However, it's become painfully clear that Ronaldo's numerous shots, sprints and goals come at a defensive cost.

The chances created by the German team and the absence
of defensive input down Portugal's left paint an explanatory picture.

It is no surprise then that Real Madrid managed to grab their Décima by pairing him with Benzema up front, thus efficiently covering both wings. Most opponents had identified Portugal and Real Madrid's left wing as their main gateway. If Portugal coach Paulo Bento is to insist on this formation based on the same principles, the left wing - now without Fábio Coentrão, no less - will be a primary target for upcoming opponents.

On the attacking front, Ronaldo actually suffered from being offered little service down his side, despite the scare Portugal gave Germany in the match's initial period, where Hugo Almeida ended up squandering a good opportunity presented by his captain.

Despite his limited playing time at Manchester United, Nani was often called upon to carry the ball forward.

In fact, it was Manchester United's once super-sub Nani that saw the ball more often, while also contributing a little more defensively. All this seems to confirm that Ronaldo might just be better off stationed up front - playing off a proper, designated no. 9 such as Éder - than parading all his abilities down the left.

Portugal ended up favouring their right side both offensively and defensively.

• Miguel Veloso

When Miguel Veloso first burst onto the scene of Portuguese football, it was a breath of fresh air. It seemed Portugal would have a gifted ball-playing holding midfielder for years to come. Unfortunately for him, it did not pan out that way and Veloso now finds himself plying his trade for Dynamo Kiev after being considered for greater heights. He has become slow and apparently lost even the ability to put himself in the right spots according to his position, often jeopardising the team's defensive solidity.

Miguel Veloso contributed precious little defensively against Germany.

If William Carvalho is to replace him against the United States (a possibility formulated elsewhere), the defensive dashboard of Portugal's defensive midfielder might be a tad busier than the above one.

• Éder

During his early years, Hugo Almeida was thought to be the answer to many Portuguese supporters: A tall, strong, robust, left-footed striker. The long-standing issue of "good football but the balls never goes in the net" that harassed the Portuguese national team (and clubs to a lesser extent) seemed to be all but over.

However, like Veloso, Almeida's evolution stagnated. A good four-year spell at Werder Bremen earned him a move to Turkish side Besiktas, all of which did not grant him an extension of his somewhat limited bag of tricks. Despite his physical presence, Almeida does not offer the link-up play the maligned Hélder Postiga provides and he's not exactly the most mobile of players.

Éder replaced the injured Hugo Almeida and immediately improved Portugal's incisiveness.

When Almeida was forced to limp off the pitch, on came Braga's Éder, a forward who, despite his long-term injury, seems to combine most features of his two fellow strikers: On one hand, he is able to hold the ball up and allow his team to progress up the pitch. On the other hand, he's fast enough to create problems, as Germany's Mats Hummels can attest.

• Conclusion

All in all, there seems to be a glaring beckoning for greater collective organsiation within the Portuguese team. In a tournament where most teams have fared apparently under no detailed instructions from their managers and relied hugely on their top performers, the only way to improve the side's odds is to offer them a map they can follow, rather than leaving them to their own devices. In a competition that has been so dominated by individual displays, Portugal must make use of a clear plan if they are to stop the progressively decaying talent pool from drying out altogether.

Portugal vs USA: The Preview

After last Monday's dreadful performance and worse result against Germany, Portugal will certainly have a lot to improve if they don't want to start packing their bags just yet. A match preview that includes the reasons why Éder and William Carvalho might be the men to help them do just that can be found here.

Portugal: The truth behind the numbers

The Euros that saw "football coming home" to England in 1996 marked a revolution for Portuguese football. After that tournament, Portugal were present at every major competition with the exception of the 1998 World Cup in France (the start of a trend), with the Golden Generation taking centre stage.

The nearly twenty years that followed have seen Portugal progress to two semi-finals and one final, which led many to believe the side would finally be able to be a member of the elite club of European powerhouses. Boasting one of the world's two best players in Cristiano Ronaldo certainly didn't hurt matters; the future looked rosy.

• Those dreaded World Cups

What those handpicked stats hide is that Portugal are usually terrible when it comes to World Cups. In 1986, Portugal defeated England 1-0 (the start of another trend) but crashed out after losing to Poland and Morocco, amidst disputes over bonuses and scandals involving prostitution. The tournament yielded bruised egos, one fired coach and a few banned players. In 2002, there were again squabbles over monetary compensation, poor managing choices and seemingly endless shopping sprees (besides defeats against South Korea and the United States). The tournament yielded bruised egos, one fired coach and a few banned players.

Luís Figo watches Landon Donovan's celebration at the 2002 World Cup.
Photo by Telegraph.co.uk

Only in 2006 did Portugal show up and manage to actually look good (the fact that the competition was played on European soil should not be deemed a random factor), reaching the semi-finals. However, it should be noted that the two opponents Portugal overcame to play Germany in the semi-finals were England and the Netherlands, the only two top teams Portugal have consistently beaten over the past 20 years. Against Germany, France, Spain or Italy, the track record is less than impressive.

• Those happy Euros

One of the unheralded advantages of Euros is that if one team qualifies from the group stages, they immediately earn bragging rights about reaching a competition's quarter-finals. If the draw is favourable on top of that, players, coaches and directors (as well as supporters) might even go as far as saying that they've reached the semis.


In 1996, Portugal were eliminated by Karel Poborsky's (who would later play for Benfica) expertly taken lob in the quarter-finals. For a nation that had remained absent from tournament finals for so long, it was an honourable display. In 2000, the feared France put the Portuguese out of the tournament at the semi-finals with the penalty that spurred so much controversy throughout the nation (Turkey were the quarter-final opponents).

A tearful 19-year-old Cristiano Ronaldo will be out
to make sure such moments don't happen once again.
Photo by Goal.com

The 2004 history is well known, of course, but it hides the fact that the opponents that Portugal defeated were precisely England and the Netherlands - the two teams that have become as close to automatic knock-out wins as possible for the Portuguese side. In 2008, Portugal crashed out against Germany (no coincidences there, then) in the quarter-finals and 2012 saw them being eliminated in the semis via penalty shoot-out at the hands - and feet - of Spain, after losing to Germany once again in the competition's first match. The team the Portuguese had beaten to reach the semi-finals was the Czech Republic.

• Conclusion

While history might be cast aside as a mere collection of facts, it might help us shed some light on a few tendencies. In this particular case, it seems to show that Portugal fare rather well on European soil (whether it is the Euros or World Cups) and less well on other continents. It also reveals that, contrary to popular belief - and the 3-0 win against Germany back in 2000 notwithstanding - Portugal have consistently failed to punch above their weight and that their best results are usually linked with favourable draws.

Portugal 0-4 Germany: Where to go from here?

Portugal certainly had a nightmare of a start to their World Cup in Brazil, but all is certainly not lost. You can check out why here.

Portugal vs Germany: The preview

Today's main course at the World Cup pits Portugal against Germany. If you want to whet your appetite even further, you can have a look at the preview for Metro.

Portugal 1-0 Sweden: Tactical notes

Halfway through the play-off, Portugal seem to have the upper hand to get to next year's World Cup in Brazil, which is a far cry from claiming that the place in the finals is as good as booked. Let's delve a bit more into the tactical side of the match.

• 1. 4x3x3: An innovative formation?

Both teams played their expected XI and formations, but there were certain nuances to the tactical clash. On the Portuguese side, both Ronaldo and Nani seemed to have clear instructions to drift toward the centre, which meant that Portugal did not display the usual combination of one striker and two wingers, but rather one striker accompanied by two forwards. With both men inside and Sweden trying to remain as narrow as possible, the wings were paved in gold for both full-backs and/or midfielders João Moutinho and Raúl Meireles.

However, the players that managed to get close to the goal line were hardly in good crossing or passing positions, which often forced them to a backward pass only for the man behind to hoof it into the box, a threat with which the Swedish defence managed to cope with no major scares for the better of the first half. That was indeed one of the reasons why Portugal benefitted from 14 corners (8 of them in the first half). On the other hand, it was clear that Portugal coach Paulo Bento was trying to get Cristiano Ronaldo into scoring positions by having the team attack predominantly down the right, with the Real Madrid star effectively acting as a second striker. That alternative, while hinging on Ronaldo's impressive physical attributes hardly paid off, since no one else on the team thrives on that brand of football.

• 2. Defending in numbers does not equal good defending

In a rigid 4x4x1x1, with Elmander slightly off Ibrahimovic, Sweden's intention was to keep the Portuguese midfielders from getting the ball while facing their goal and then sit back a few yards ahead of the penalty box. With two compact, narrow banks of four, both Elmander and Ibrahimovic were allowed to remain ahead of the ball, which meant that Portugal often had numbers-up situations. Nevertheless, Sweden looked incapable of countering the simple triangle-shaped passing combinations so typical of a 4x3x3, with dreadful spatial awareness and their players frequently looking more interested in following the man than adjusting their positioning according to the ball.

• 3. Virtue lies in the centre

Even though Portugal did struggle to get into promising positions to shoot and provide killer passes, every time Moutinho (most frequently) or Meireles invaded enemy lines, Sweden's defensive approach immediately looked dodgy. Given the rigidity with which the Swedish team tend to play, a more aggressive approach in midfield might just do the trick in four days' time, but for that to materialise, Meireles (in a lower and lower cadence over the past couple of seasons) and Moutinho (a yard off his usual pace) must bring a greater sense of urgency to their attacking forays, even if it means a more conservative positioning from both full-backs, so as not to unbalance the team.

Furthermore, given their positioning high up the pitch, neither Ronaldo nor Nani put any effort in tracking back throughout the first half (the second period was a non-event as far as the Swedish attacking threat is concerned), thus exposing João Pereira - usually as good going forward as he is poor at the back - and Fábio Coentrão on the flanks. In short, greater investment down the middle may prove beneficial both at the front and at the back.

• 4. The perfect pair to stop Ibrahimovic

As so often happens with the talented, yet mercurial striker, Ibrahimovic went largely anonymous over the 90 minutes. Usually a player that thrives on open spaces - such as those Portugal were leaving behind, especially during the first half, in Bruno Alves and Pepe the PSG star seems to have met his match. On one hand, he is forced to get into high-powered, intense aerial duels with Ronaldo; on the other hand, should he manage to get free from Alves, Pepe is probably the best partner to cover up for his team-mate, largely due to his speed and ability to sweep up behind. If Erik Hamren insists on such predictable attacking manoeuvres next Tuesday, Paulo Bento may well thank him for not putting Alves and Pepe to the test on the floor, where they struggle the most.

Even though a 1-0 result offers a great advantage in such a cagey contest, Portugal can ill afford to sit back and let the clock run. However, a greater offensive balance from Sweden might be ideal for Postiga, Ronaldo and Nani, with Moutinho or Veloso spreading passes for the break. For that Portugal will have to convey a more assured sense of defending than they did last night, in the few times Sweden managed to attack.

Portugal fail to capitalise

Starting elevens

Portugal and Russia met in Moscow for a potential decider about which team gets top spot in the group (thus avoiding the dreaded play-off). Ruben Micael played in what is usually Raúl Meireles' position, while Russia named an expected side, with Dzagoev's absence the only surprise.

On a synthetic turf, Portugal faced some initial difficulties trying to knit together a string of passes. Russia's original plan was very clear: allow the centre-backs time on the ball and pounce whenever the ball got to the midfielders or the full-backs, biting them at the ankles. When the ball was sent back to the Portuguese centre-backs or goalkeeper, the Russian players would exert intense pressure. That was the backdrop against which the first and only goal of the match came about.

Micael has just been caught out in possession.
Pepe (red) realises it and sprints to close the gap.

Bruno Alves (green) misreads the whole situation and is late to react.
He does not follow Pepe's move and is nowhere near the ideal positioning.

Portugal actually reacted quite well to Russia's goal and managed to find their footing. Pressuring high up the field, Paulo Bento's charges managed to win numerous balls back, stifling Russia's initiative. Nevertheless, the Eastern team proved very dangerous whenever they bypassed the Portuguese initial pressure. Micael remained too high up for the most part of the time he was involved in the match and Moutinho was lost as to whether join forces with Micael or help out Miguel Veloso, who was often left stranded.

Miguel Veloso was often left to fend off Russian attacks by himself.

Russia seemed both happy with the result and confident that their quick transitions would end up punishing Portugal eventually - and therefore dropped back. Nevertheless, their defending was sloppy at best, and Portugal actually managed to create a string of chances through virtually the same play via their 4x3x3 - much like FC Porto versus Paris Saint-Germain - on the right flank (Fábio Coentrão's injury was not exactly a blessing in disguise).

Nani (blue) passes the ball to Postiga, who in turns gives it to Pereira.
The presence of Micael (orange) keeps the centre-back
from providing the necessary coverage.

Nani takes full advantage of Postiga's movement
and Micael's presence to run into space.

This was relatively easy for Portugal to achieve because both Fayzulin and Shirokov would remain too high up (somewhat similarly to Micael), which meant Bento's men had no trouble finding either Postiga or Ronaldo unchecked in the middle. Despite several opportunities, Portugal's decision-making in the final third was seldom as good as it should have been.

To make matters worse for the Portuguese, their effective pressure high up was not combined with effective defending at the back, either derived from individual distractions or from the excessive space allowed after the initial pressure area.

Resorting to a familiar strategy, Paulo Bento replaced Ruben Micael with Varela and Portugal were rearranaged in a 4x2x3x1. Moutinho sat closer to Veloso, and Nani shifted to the centre off Postiga. This B plan has yielded its results in the past - against Denmark, for instance -, but this time it was Portugal's final straw. Despite Bento's laudable intent, the midfield became unbalanced and the Selecção were never again able to exert the same pressure or create another scoring chance.

Even though this was not Portugal's finest hour, the result may seem a bit harsh, considering the displays from both teams. By half-time, Portugal had had lots more shots, a higher number of passes and a higher percentage of accurate passes - even if their second half was not quite as bright and it was hard to see how Portugal would end up scoring.

Portugal lose, but pave the way

Starting elevens

It is seldom easy to be content, let alone happy, after a defeat. Regardless of one's efforts, there is a distinct feeling that one was found wanting. On the other hand, Phil Jackson, the former NBA coach who led different teams to 11 titles, once said that there were defeats that clearly built a team - the ones where the players had given their all and surrendered their egos on behalf of something bigger than them. Tonight was one of those times for Portugal.

Both coaches chose their favourite eleven, with one change on either side - the striker. While Paulo Bento's was a forced one, due to Hélder Postiga's injury, Vicente Del Bosque surprised everyone by choosing Negredo ahead of Torres and Fàbregas. The first few minutes let us see that the Spanish coach was going for someone a bit quicker when trying to lose his marker, in an attempt to force the Portuguese defence backwards. It was clear Spain meant business and were not willing to take Portugal lightly.

Furthermore, Del Bosque maintained Xavi higher up than usual - just like he had done against France. With that move, Spain were trying to keep Veloso from having too much time on the ball and, from an attacking point of view, give Xabi Alonso the space to spray long balls and turn Xavi into a no. 10 of sorts.

Xavi (yellow) played higher up for most of the match, both while attacking and defending.

While Portugal did not pressure up high, they did try (and succeeded for the most part) to keep their opponents from calmly playing out from the back and make Xavi, Iniesta and Alonso play with their back towards Rui Patrício's goal. With Spain's usual lack of width - since Silva and Iniesta both drifted inward - and speed, there was not much danger of the back four being bypassed by balls over the top. Indeed, Bento's men often left Arbeloa to be marked directly by Coentrão, given that the Real Madrid full-back does not excel at bombing forward. It seemed as though Bento was setting the trap for the full-back to push forward, only to be caught in possession and vacate the space for Ronaldo.

Portugal did not just sit and wait. On the contrary, they tried to trouble the Spanish build-up.

Besides, Moutinho, Meireles and Nani were doing a great job on making sure they denied Spain their preferred passing options through the middle. By leaving Arbeloa to Coentrão, Meireles and Moutinho were able to focus their attention on their opponent's favourite route and provide an out-ball for Ronaldo's escapades.

Portugal's defensive approach neared perfection,
as much as possible against a side such as Spain.

As expected, the Portuguese transitions often had Hugo Almeida as their main focal point, usually on Piqué's side, trying to drag the Barcelona centre-back out of position and open up space for Ronaldo, who had a clear goal of working the channel between Piqué and Arbeloa. Even though many of those long balls went astray, it clearly showed how Spain can be troubled by aerial duels - not because of the aerial duels themselves, but because it disrupts their well-drilled defensive positioning.


Portugal were also very good at killing the Spanish transitions into attack. Moutinho was phenomenal in that particular regard, by always showing up to disturb the first pass and therefore preventing (usually) Xabi Alonso from picking the perfect pass to his team-mates. Even though there isn't actually any chalkboard that shows that, it is an invisible job that brought safety to Portugal's back four. With it, Portugal actually gave Spain a good run for their money and the possession stats at halftime clearly showed it: Portugal had 45% of time on the ball.


Even though there were not that many clear-cut chances, Portugal and Spain each had a few opportunities to finish off the game. In fact, as the match went on, it became ever clearer that whichever team scored first would most likely win it. Navas came on for Silva 60 minutes in to try to stretch the play and there were actually a few plays that seemed to show that that was the way to go - now Coentrão could not play tucked in and had to meet the Spanish winger on the outside, which opened up space between the left-back and Bruno Alves. However, the World champions were not too eager to take advantage of that.

In spite of all the intensity, this was not a game awash with scoring chances.

Despite taking the game to their opponents, Portugal clearly need to improve their finishing.

Spain dominated all of the extra-time and could have even achieved victory, were it not for a huge save from Rui Patrício. The Selecção looked too tired to keep running after the ball and Spain just kept racking up minutes on the ball. With Nani exhausted and Oliveira instead of Almeida, Portugal found it very hard to get the first pass after getting the ball back just right, which in turn resulted in more Spanish possession.

All in all, this was a very interesting contest, tactically and otherwise. Even in defeat, Portugal can take solace in knowing they were worthy opponents to this superb Spanish team and that playing Spain (almost) in the eye is not something that we see every day. Despite the loss, the Selecção have showed that Del Bosque's team are not an insurmountable obstacle and that Portugal will soon become a force to be reckoned with in their own right.

Chalkboards created via the Stats Zone app, available for free in the App Store.

This article will also be available at PortuGOAL.net.

3 reasons why Portugal will defeat Spain

The first of the semi-finals of Euro 2012 pits Portugal against Spain, a definitive regional clash of styles and longstanding grudges. Portugal replies to Spain's tiki-taka and smothering control of the tempo and ball with dogged defending and quick breakaways. In fact, if you are able and willing to overlook the previous contests between these two teams (which makes Spain look like virtual victors, with just one defeat in 7 official matches), you will see that, even taking Germany into account, the Selecção are probably the team best-equipped to beat the Spaniards. Let's find out why.

1. The tactical aspect. As France showed to perfection, many teams, including very good ones, opt to change their approach, dynamics, position and habits when they play Spain. It is indeed the best tribute one can pay to this team: the Spanish superiority is a given, perhaps like never before, and one must surely adapt to their style, rather than using its strengths.

This is the first issue where Paulo Bento's approach seems to pay off. Portugal will not be tempted to change a single player, for instance. The Portuguese have favoured sitting back and playing on the break from the tournament's get-go, which makes them naturally prepared for their opponent's pass-and-move game. That said, they have also showed (against Denmark, for instance) that they can pressure up front, if necessary. Moreover, despite the futility of the hype surrounding the 4-0 scoreline last time these teams met (in a friendly, lest we forget), it is still worth remembering that Paulo Bento's option back then was to play Spain at their own game (at the time): pressure up high, force Xavi and Xabi Alonso to get the ball with their backs to goal and avoid the penetrating passes.

In this regard, Portugal seem to be in luck, once again. Moutinho and Meireles are tireless workhorses, able to motor up and down the field and help their defenders, but they are also more than willing to let others shine and make the key passes that Ronaldo or Nani thrive on. Bento's men will obviously need all hands on deck, but the Portuguese coach will be comfortable knowing that his defence is getting better with every passing match and that Pepe's speed and game reading skills may just be the necessary answer to Spain's style.


2. Hugo Almeida. No, really. Even though he would most likely start on the bench, were it not for Postiga's injury, the hefty striker may just come in handy. Assuming that Portugal will cede possession and let Spain seize control of the game, the Selecção will need a quick out-ball. With all eyes on Ronaldo, Almeida may provide a useful focal point to keep Piqué and Sérgio Ramos busy and flick the ball over to either Ronaldo or Nani, taking advantage of Arbeloa or Jordi Alba's ventures upfield.


3. Ronaldo. There is no escaping the Portuguese captain. If Portugal are to defeat the World and European champions, Ronaldo will have to step up to the plate. While it is true that the rest of team will have to be at their best ever, the Real Madrid forward will most likely be in charge of providing the extra flare and instilling fear in the Spanish defence. With Hugo Almeida up front, Ronaldo will probably enjoy more space between the centre-backs and Busquets, which may just give him the necessary opportunity to score.

Portugal pick up steam

Starting line-ups

Portugal and the Czech Republic were the first teams battling it out for a place on the Euros' semi-finals. Surely enough, we were presented with a more timid approach from both teams, since this was a winner-take-all contest and none of them wanted to leave this soon after getting this far.

In these stages of the competition, it is rather obvious that everyone has done their homework and, more often than not, the two elevens try to cancel their opponent's strengths, rather than showing their own. Therefore, the sight of centre-backs hoofing the ball forward was rather unoriginal and not exactly unexpected, given the little space both midfields had to operate in.

With Dadira deputising for Rosicky (who was not fit enough to start), the Czech manager Michal Bilek tried to pack the centre of the field and make his team narrow, somewhat emulating what he had done against Russia. Paulo Bento responded by bringing both Nani and Ronaldo inside, hoping the full-backs would take the outside routes.


Portugal started out poorly and, much like in the match versus Germany, often misplaced (simple) passes, which undermined one the main strengths of the Selecção: the quick transitions into attack. In fact, the Czechs took control of the game for the first 25 minutes, exploiting preferentially the wings, as expected.

Meireles tries to close the middle while Selassie pushes forward, unattended by Ronaldo.

 

Because he is trying to cover for his position and Ronaldo's, he is already late.
This particular situation often left Coentrão exposed.

Both Raúl Meireles and João Moutinho were too wary of leaving their original positions and giving away the midfield battle, a fear that went on until the 25th minute, when Moutinho finally appeared a bit higher up and fed Ronaldo a perfect through ball. Even though the referee ended up blowing the whistle for Ronaldo's foul, it was the wake-up call that the team needed.

Moutinho (yellow) finally gets himself higher up and Ronaldo (red) drifts inward.

Ronaldo (red) thrives on exploiting the space behind defences,
namely when fed a perfect through-ball such as Moutinho's (yellow).

It was hard to tell whether Paulo Bento chose to kept Meireles on the left-side of the midfield because that is where he ended the match against Holland or because he was looking to exploit the Gebre-Selessie's possible forward movement. Either way, it meant that Portugal were (only marginally) more dangerous down the left wing, particularly after the 25th minute, where Coentrão started feeling more at ease and motoring up and down the field, with Ronaldo more and more central.

Portugal's performance changed dramatically 25 minutes into the game.

Bento's instructions and corrections at halftime were clearly spot on. The first play of the second half resembled a Portuguese shot across the bow for the Czechs. In less than 30 seconds, Meireles did what Portugal still hadn't done thus far - something a midfielder is supposed to do in a 4x3x3 (especially if the striker is not that mobile, as is Hugo Almeida's case). Besides getting the ball between the Czech lines, he then proceeded by taking up the space vacated by Ronaldo, who was already waiting for a possible cross. This play would be a symmetrical replica of Ronaldo's goal.

Meireles (yellow) gets the ball between the lines for the first time in this match.

Meireles (yellow) then pushes up on the left wing,
which in turns allows Ronaldo (red) to roam and look for the cross.

With the team fired up, every sector of the team was closer, allowing midfielders and defenders to play higher up and collect their opponent's clearances. Even though the Portuguese pressure was not stifling in all fairness, it did wear the Czechs down, to the point where there were actually very few breakaways from Bilak's men. 

Moutinho and Meireles were finally free from their tactical shackles and started not only shifting the ball from side to side, but also overloading the wings so that Ronaldo and Nani could prove their mettle further inside, where they could be more dangerous. Moutinho's passing chalkboards are a very good example: by the end of the first half, the Porto midfielder had played the fifth most passes. He finished the game atop the passing table, by some distance.

Moutinho was much more active and incisive during the second half.

Despite the numerous shots (mostly off target), Portugal weren't being able to finish their opponent off, which could prove costly down the road. With the Czechs worn down and apparently not appreciative of their odds, it seemed the Portuguese goal would be just a matter of time. And indeed, the goal came from the inevitable Ronaldo, eager to make up for his two shots that had previously hit the woodwork. Moutinho penetrated the channel, much like Meireles had done in the first play of the second half, and crossed for an unstoppable header from the Real Madrid forward. Game over.

Chalkboards created via the Stats Zone app, available for free in the App Store.

This article will also be available at PortuGOAL.net.

A logical victory

Starting line-ups

Some matches do feel like they are played on paper. Portugal's win over Holland was a logical victory. In an unbelievably open match, fraught with scoring chances, the Portuguese organisation trumped the desperate Dutch attempt to throw forwards at problems. The questions remain: how is it possible that such a decisive game was this open and chaotic? And have Portugal learnt the necessary lessons for when they play more disciplined sides?

There were a few issues for the Dutch national team. Would their coach stick to his game plan from the two first matches? Or would he play their all-out attacking formation, including Van der Vaart and Huntelaar? As it turned out, Bert van Marwijk chose to heed the people's voice and went with the latter, despite earlier predictions. In fact, van Marwijk revolutisioned the whole team, dismantling Van Bommel and De Jong's partnership in midfield, replacing the former Barcelona and Milan midfielder with Van der Vaart, shifting Sneijder to the left and playing Van Persie off Huntelaar. Looking at the line-ups and the Dutch team's positioning during the first minutes, it was hard to imagine how the dam would not break sooner than later, but that is part of football's magic.

Portugal actually seemed a bit stunned by Holland's boldness, as if Paulo Bento could not believe his counterpart would actually be so daring. Therefore, the Selecção was somewhat confused about who should be marking whom up until Holland's goal. Instead of their sterile game of individual antics, Van der Vaart's presence provided Holland with the out-ball they needed for their transitions, leaving De Jong exclusively for defensive duties. Besides, with Van Persie roaming around Miguel Veloso's areas, there was uncertainty about who should track Van der Vaart and who should shift sideways to create 2v1 situations against Robben.

Coentrão (yellow) and Veloso (orange) tried to keep Robben from coming inside, which would open up space for Van der Vaart for the first 15 minutes.

 

The Dutch goal came from one such situation, but, by then, Portugal were already showing signs of improvement. Indeed, the Selecção should be credited for not losing their collective heads after conceding an unwelcome goal. Even though a large part of their game plan consisted on allowing the Dutch centre-backs time on the ball and just keeping the ball from getting into the final third (much like the match against Germany), Portugal managed to remain calm and collected and stick to their strategy - let their opponent break in two and exploit the wings, knowing that the defensive contribution from Sneijder, Van der Vaart or Robben would be close to none. Truth be told, this match sometimes resembled two 5-a-side matches played in two distinct halves.

 

Ronaldo (yellow) goes for the aerial duel, dragging the full-back. Notice how much space Coentrão has to run into. All Postiga (blue) has to do is to make a distracting move.

 

Ronaldo flicks it to Coentrão and the full-back gets into a simple 1v1 situation. Notice how unprotected Holland's back line is.

 

Despite not getting the Dutch starting line-up spot on, our tactical predictions were not entirely wrong. Holland were hardly defensively solid with Van Bommel, which meant that, without him, Holland's defensive situation could only get worse. In fact, the Dutch back four were still very shaky, to say the least, and they were even more vulnerable to Ronaldo's diagonal runs in behind them, particularly due to their slow movement and the lack of pressure on the player with the ball from midfield - a good description of Portugal's first goal.

With Holland nearly arranged in an odd-looking 5-0-5, there remain doubts about whether the four phases of the game were extensively drilled during training camp, given how uncoordinated most of the players looked from this tournament's get-go. While Portugal did let the match devolve into a wide open contest, dangerously close to some Premier League games, there was a sense that the Portuguese national team were on top of things and that Portugal were actually more likely to score (particularly on a breakaway) than conceding.

  

Portugal made nearly twice as many interceptions as Holland. Holland's interception chalkboard is eerily similar to the match against Germany.

 

The second half brought yet another revolution. Despite maintaining the same eleven, Van Marwijk made a few more changes, namely with Van Persie going right, Robben going left and Sneijder as No. 10. While it is true that the Inter maestro provided more stability and tried to move the ball around, their defensive problems remained the same, which makes it that much harder to understand exactly what the Dutch manager was hoping to accomplish.

The Portuguese midfield was heroic in tracking the Dutch penetration attempts, but Pepe was at his imperial best, sweeping up behind his full-backs whenever they were beaten. Veloso, in turn, was critical for the team's ability to shift the ball from side to side and initiate the counter-attacks. 15 minutes into the second half, the game opened up once again and, like the Denmark match, Portugal should have wrapped things up way earlier than they did. Fortunately for Portugal, Holland were already in shambles and relied exclusively on some piece of trickery from one of their forwards.

With Robben on the left, Willems was even more exposed and Portugal were even freer to exploit that wing through Moutinho, Nani and João Pereira. Logically enough, those were the top passing combinations of the match. As if things weren't hectic enough, the Dutch coach went for a gung-ho approach and a 3-man defence, with Robben and Affelay as wing-backs. Portugal just kept waiting for Holland and ramming down the wings, sure that one of their many chances would end up going in.

João Pereira and Moutinho's was Portugal's second most frequent passing combination.

Moutinho and Nani's was Portugal's most frequent combination, often with Moutinho playing Nani through for yet another scoring chance.

 

There are some important conclusions to take from this match. First off, this was a definitive piece of evidence that talent alone is not enough to win games. Sure, Holland oozes talent in some positions, but such a glaring lack of solidarity and collective ideas is certain to undermine any team. Secondly, it is hard to understand how a nation of World's vice-champions, known for their football avant-garde thinking, seems so out of touch with modern football, either at club- or national level.

As far as Portugal are concerned, there are also a few notes. The most important one has to do with Ronaldo: this match was just what the doctor ordered. Two goals, a shot against the woodwork, numerous scoring chances and lots of space to run into are most likely more than enough for the Portuguese captain to make amends for errors past. The second issue has to do with Bento's quicker decision to introduce Custódio, when compared to the Denmark match.

However, there are some lingering question marks. How will this team fare against more solid teams? Portugal still lack the ability to control the match when they're in front and become too exposed to a random incident, for instance. Finally, the Portuguese coach needs to address the zonal-marking approach to set pieces, which is clearly not working. Despite their latest victory, it would be foolish to think that Portugal do not have areas in which they urgently need to improve.

Portugal have been very poor at defending set pieces, especially at the far post.

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What should Portugal do?

In Group B, the so-called Group of Death, everything is still up for grabs, even for Germany, on six points. No team has clinched qualification yet and all of them stand to be eliminated, with the right set of results. Next Sunday, Portugal and the Netherlands will meet for a decisive match, a match which the Dutch need to win by a two-goal margin and hope that Germany won't rest on their laurels against Denmark.

• Attack. 

Bert van Marwijk's team is far from a solid, cohesive unit. More often than not it ends up breaking in two separate sectors: the 4 defenders plus Van Bommel and De Jong, and the 4 players up front. With both centre-backs clearly uncomfortable on the ball and with little creativity from both holding midfielders, the Netherlands rely too often on Robben's skills, Sneijder's vision or Van Persie's runs in behind the defence. All of this would make up for an interesting attacking plan, but it seems that the players do not have a collective idea of when to do the right thing - Robben's insistent dribbles inside and shots all over the place being a perfect example.

Nevertheless, one mustn't forget that this is a team made of some world-class players and that, as Van Persie showed against Germany, a few extra yards of space for either one of those players could mean a whole different game. For instance, Robben tends to play on Portugal's left, the wing that Cristiano Ronaldo does not protect well enough (most likely according to Paulo Bento's instructions). With Van der Wiel looking to go forward whenever possible, this could create difficult times for Fábio Coentrão, yet again. However, both Dutch wingers tend to drift inside with their dribbles, which may play into Portugal's hands, since that is an area in which they have been stronger than on the wings.

Also, due to the absence of a collective idea and the lack of movement, the Netherlands try to pass it over the top toward Van Persie. For this particular match, Paulo Bento would be wise to allow Pepe (since he is quicker and more intense) to sweep up and let Bruno Alves take the first line of central defending, as this would keep the Dutch wingers from coming inside and playing Van Persie through on goal with short diagonal balls.

Aware that the Netherlands have to win the match by two goals and will probably want to take control, Portugal may well decide to play the waiting game they played against Denmark (after scoring) and Germany, allowing both centre-backs and both holding midfielders time on the ball and then pouncing on the mistakes they tend to make - even though better finishing is absolutely critical.

Van Persie is often keen on receiving through balls in behind the defence.

• Defence. 

Despite having two particularly defensive-minded holding midfielders in Van Bommel and De Jong, this Dutch team does not seem as airtight as it did two years ago in South Africa, even though many of their starters remain the same. Oddly enough for two players with their experience, both Van Bommel and De Jong have been dragged out of position too easily, although it is fair to say that, given the lack of defensive support from the four forwards, they do have a lot of ground to cover. In their previous match, for instance, most of Germany's scoring opportunities came from overloading the Netherlands' left wing, forcing the holding midfielders out wide, and then attacking the space where they were supposed to be. Despite Willem's valiant efforts, the team still remain afraid of letting him on his own against aggressive wingers.

Both Van Bommel and De Jong tend to help out defensively on the left.

Germany's two assists came from similar areas and from similar plays,
after forcing the two Dutch holding midfielders out.

The Netherlands clearly pay more attention to their left wing,
virtually neglecting the middle of the park.

Furthermore, Mathijsen and Heitinga are slow centre-backs who do not particularly enjoy quick forwards or changes in positioning. This may very well be a good time to tell Postiga to work the channels, dragging one of the centre-backs, and instruct either Ronaldo or Nani to make direct runs in the central areas of the Dutch defence.

There is one final, important issue. The Netherlands favour a high(ish) defensive line, but do not exert the necessary pressure on the man on the ball, often allowing him to make through passes into the box, where Ronaldo and Nani's finishing skills may prove decisive.

• Conclusion.

If football was played on paper, this would look like a no-brainer. Portugal are better organised, defensively stronger in central areas and like to play on the counter. Besides, their wingers' speed and trickery are exactly what the Dutch defence doesn't need. With Van Marwijk's front four less than willing to help out defensively, Portugal may end up winning just by being smarter. Also, given the Dutch team's profile, Hugo Viana could be a clever move by Paulo Bento, since the Braga midfielder is an expert on picking defences apart by finding quick forwards 30 or 40 yards away with his long passes (even though this option is highly unlikely).

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Portugal get the win, but face tactical dillema

Starting line-ups

Portugal and Denmark met last Wednesday in what could potentially be the end of the road for the Selecção if they didn't get the win they so desperately needed. Up against their nemesis - who were on the back of a somewhat fortunate victory against the Netherlands -, Portugal only had one way to go: forward.

Both coaches chose to keep their starting elevens, as if stating that any adjustments that theirs side might need were minor. Paulo Bento had expressed his confidence in Postiga and explained how the role of a striker extends further than just goal stats, which eliminated any lingering doubts and hopes about the possibility of Nélson Oliveira starting the match. Morten Olsen, in turn, had no apparent reason to tweak a team that had frustrated the World vice-champions.

Even though both the Portuguese coach and players had said that they were happy about their display against Germany and the criticism was ill-founded, the fact is that Portugal heeded the call for a more proactive game. In fact, although the Portuguese defensive positioning wasn't criticised for being laid back, they stepped it up a notch and pressured the Danes near their box - it was clear that Bento had watched their previous match and wanted to keep Denmark from playing the ball out the back.

Portugal wasn't willing to allow Denmark to slow the game down.
Postiga forces the goalkeeper to make the pass, Nani pressures his man,
and Moutinho (yellow) and Meireles try to win the ball back.

Moutinho (yellow) chases one of Denmark's midfielderes
and Meireles (orange) offers coverage.

While it's true that Portugal was trying to win the ball back as soon as possible, Bento was also interested in keeping Denmark from slowing the game too much and dictating the tempo. That away, the Portuguese would always be proactive and on alert. However, Denmark managed to avert this pressure a few times, namely through their go-to play - the ball goes from one of the centre-backs to the wing, one of the midfielders gets it back in the centre and quickly plays it toward the weak side.

The ball comes from the wing to the central midfielders.
With a simple first-touch move, Denmark free themselves from the Portuguese shackles.

Unmarked, the midfielder passes it over the top.
Bendtner's (yellow) movement is critical, dragging Bruno Alves.
The winger (out of the picture) has lots of space to run into.

After the first 15 of intense attack down the right from the Danes, Portugal finally managed to stop the bleeding and started winning the ball back more and more. Not only were the interceptions further up, but Ronaldo was also better at linking up attack and defence, something Portugal lacked against Germany. In fact, Ronaldo was so dedicated to it that he virtually left his wing unattended (more on that later).

Looking at the dashboards, it's easy to see that Nani was more willing to track back.

The first Portuguese goal was not exactly surprising - even if the way it was scored was. The Selecção seemed to have finally found their rhythm and every player was clearly more confident on and off the ball. Nani and the three midfielders were tireless workers when Portugal did not have possession of the ball and were particularly good in picking up loose balls. Indeed, the second goal was a perfect example of it and it meant a boost in morale for Hélder Postiga, the scorer. The match seemed all but over, but a Danish cross from the right a few minutes before half-time led to Bendtner's goal and a sea of uncertainty.

Even though they weren't too successful, Denmark kept crossing from the right.

With Veloso keeping the playmaker Eriksen rather quiet, Portugal were able to control the game, even if they were not dominating. Attracting their opponent into the trap, Bento's men kept allowing Agger time on the ball and pounce as soon as he misdirected a pass or tried to take one player too many, which led to numerous counter-attacks, two of which were wasted by Ronaldo and would effectively have killed the game.

With no killer instinct and their usual profligacy, Portugal seemed to start to feel the pressure for a win and became nervous. Meireles and Moutinho both reverted to the quick-draw passing mode and the Danes were offered a way back into the game. It was by then that Ronaldo's instructions not to track back started making less and less sense, because while Olsen's men had tried to do it during the first minutes of the match, they had now no doubts about where to hit Portugal. Even though there's no need for a team to be symmetrical, it still needs to be balanced - which it clearly wasn't. Any (current and future) adversary of the Portuguese team will have chalked the hole on the left wing down in their playbook.

Even though the huge gape and Coentrão's suffering was plain for everyone to see, Bento surprisingly replaced Postiga with Nélson Oliveira. While it meant that Portugal was now able to hold the ball up a bit longer, it failed to address the problem on the left wing and the Danish goal seemed in the cards. When Bendtner scored his second goal, it was hardly surprising at all.

Varela somehow managed to score the goal that allowed Portugal to breathe a bit better for now, but this was a game that they should have won in a breeze, given Denmark's evident frailties in the organised attacking phase. In a tournament this competitive, not scoring when you have the chance means you probably won't be around for much longer.

Notice how much more defensively active the right wing is when compared to the left one.

If Portugal are to avoid crashing out immediately after progressing from the Group of Death, they must improve at dictating the tempo, score the opportunities that their good defending yields and, most importantly, address the huge gap that Ronaldo leaves on the left wing. If not, the Netherlands may just be the team to hurt them badly.

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