Portugal lose, but pave the way

Starting elevens

It is seldom easy to be content, let alone happy, after a defeat. Regardless of one's efforts, there is a distinct feeling that one was found wanting. On the other hand, Phil Jackson, the former NBA coach who led different teams to 11 titles, once said that there were defeats that clearly built a team - the ones where the players had given their all and surrendered their egos on behalf of something bigger than them. Tonight was one of those times for Portugal.

Both coaches chose their favourite eleven, with one change on either side - the striker. While Paulo Bento's was a forced one, due to Hélder Postiga's injury, Vicente Del Bosque surprised everyone by choosing Negredo ahead of Torres and Fàbregas. The first few minutes let us see that the Spanish coach was going for someone a bit quicker when trying to lose his marker, in an attempt to force the Portuguese defence backwards. It was clear Spain meant business and were not willing to take Portugal lightly.

Furthermore, Del Bosque maintained Xavi higher up than usual - just like he had done against France. With that move, Spain were trying to keep Veloso from having too much time on the ball and, from an attacking point of view, give Xabi Alonso the space to spray long balls and turn Xavi into a no. 10 of sorts.

Xavi (yellow) played higher up for most of the match, both while attacking and defending.

While Portugal did not pressure up high, they did try (and succeeded for the most part) to keep their opponents from calmly playing out from the back and make Xavi, Iniesta and Alonso play with their back towards Rui Patrício's goal. With Spain's usual lack of width - since Silva and Iniesta both drifted inward - and speed, there was not much danger of the back four being bypassed by balls over the top. Indeed, Bento's men often left Arbeloa to be marked directly by Coentrão, given that the Real Madrid full-back does not excel at bombing forward. It seemed as though Bento was setting the trap for the full-back to push forward, only to be caught in possession and vacate the space for Ronaldo.

Portugal did not just sit and wait. On the contrary, they tried to trouble the Spanish build-up.

Besides, Moutinho, Meireles and Nani were doing a great job on making sure they denied Spain their preferred passing options through the middle. By leaving Arbeloa to Coentrão, Meireles and Moutinho were able to focus their attention on their opponent's favourite route and provide an out-ball for Ronaldo's escapades.

Portugal's defensive approach neared perfection,
as much as possible against a side such as Spain.

As expected, the Portuguese transitions often had Hugo Almeida as their main focal point, usually on Piqué's side, trying to drag the Barcelona centre-back out of position and open up space for Ronaldo, who had a clear goal of working the channel between Piqué and Arbeloa. Even though many of those long balls went astray, it clearly showed how Spain can be troubled by aerial duels - not because of the aerial duels themselves, but because it disrupts their well-drilled defensive positioning.


Portugal were also very good at killing the Spanish transitions into attack. Moutinho was phenomenal in that particular regard, by always showing up to disturb the first pass and therefore preventing (usually) Xabi Alonso from picking the perfect pass to his team-mates. Even though there isn't actually any chalkboard that shows that, it is an invisible job that brought safety to Portugal's back four. With it, Portugal actually gave Spain a good run for their money and the possession stats at halftime clearly showed it: Portugal had 45% of time on the ball.


Even though there were not that many clear-cut chances, Portugal and Spain each had a few opportunities to finish off the game. In fact, as the match went on, it became ever clearer that whichever team scored first would most likely win it. Navas came on for Silva 60 minutes in to try to stretch the play and there were actually a few plays that seemed to show that that was the way to go - now Coentrão could not play tucked in and had to meet the Spanish winger on the outside, which opened up space between the left-back and Bruno Alves. However, the World champions were not too eager to take advantage of that.

In spite of all the intensity, this was not a game awash with scoring chances.

Despite taking the game to their opponents, Portugal clearly need to improve their finishing.

Spain dominated all of the extra-time and could have even achieved victory, were it not for a huge save from Rui Patrício. The Selecção looked too tired to keep running after the ball and Spain just kept racking up minutes on the ball. With Nani exhausted and Oliveira instead of Almeida, Portugal found it very hard to get the first pass after getting the ball back just right, which in turn resulted in more Spanish possession.

All in all, this was a very interesting contest, tactically and otherwise. Even in defeat, Portugal can take solace in knowing they were worthy opponents to this superb Spanish team and that playing Spain (almost) in the eye is not something that we see every day. Despite the loss, the Selecção have showed that Del Bosque's team are not an insurmountable obstacle and that Portugal will soon become a force to be reckoned with in their own right.

Chalkboards created via the Stats Zone app, available for free in the App Store.

This article will also be available at PortuGOAL.net.

3 reasons why Portugal will defeat Spain

The first of the semi-finals of Euro 2012 pits Portugal against Spain, a definitive regional clash of styles and longstanding grudges. Portugal replies to Spain's tiki-taka and smothering control of the tempo and ball with dogged defending and quick breakaways. In fact, if you are able and willing to overlook the previous contests between these two teams (which makes Spain look like virtual victors, with just one defeat in 7 official matches), you will see that, even taking Germany into account, the Selecção are probably the team best-equipped to beat the Spaniards. Let's find out why.

1. The tactical aspect. As France showed to perfection, many teams, including very good ones, opt to change their approach, dynamics, position and habits when they play Spain. It is indeed the best tribute one can pay to this team: the Spanish superiority is a given, perhaps like never before, and one must surely adapt to their style, rather than using its strengths.

This is the first issue where Paulo Bento's approach seems to pay off. Portugal will not be tempted to change a single player, for instance. The Portuguese have favoured sitting back and playing on the break from the tournament's get-go, which makes them naturally prepared for their opponent's pass-and-move game. That said, they have also showed (against Denmark, for instance) that they can pressure up front, if necessary. Moreover, despite the futility of the hype surrounding the 4-0 scoreline last time these teams met (in a friendly, lest we forget), it is still worth remembering that Paulo Bento's option back then was to play Spain at their own game (at the time): pressure up high, force Xavi and Xabi Alonso to get the ball with their backs to goal and avoid the penetrating passes.

In this regard, Portugal seem to be in luck, once again. Moutinho and Meireles are tireless workhorses, able to motor up and down the field and help their defenders, but they are also more than willing to let others shine and make the key passes that Ronaldo or Nani thrive on. Bento's men will obviously need all hands on deck, but the Portuguese coach will be comfortable knowing that his defence is getting better with every passing match and that Pepe's speed and game reading skills may just be the necessary answer to Spain's style.


2. Hugo Almeida. No, really. Even though he would most likely start on the bench, were it not for Postiga's injury, the hefty striker may just come in handy. Assuming that Portugal will cede possession and let Spain seize control of the game, the Selecção will need a quick out-ball. With all eyes on Ronaldo, Almeida may provide a useful focal point to keep Piqué and Sérgio Ramos busy and flick the ball over to either Ronaldo or Nani, taking advantage of Arbeloa or Jordi Alba's ventures upfield.


3. Ronaldo. There is no escaping the Portuguese captain. If Portugal are to defeat the World and European champions, Ronaldo will have to step up to the plate. While it is true that the rest of team will have to be at their best ever, the Real Madrid forward will most likely be in charge of providing the extra flare and instilling fear in the Spanish defence. With Hugo Almeida up front, Ronaldo will probably enjoy more space between the centre-backs and Busquets, which may just give him the necessary opportunity to score.

The solution for tiki-taka?

Starting elevens

Spain and Italy could not provide a better match for a football Sunday afternoon. Filled with great players, tactical nuances and good goals, this one was a treat for the eye. We were even presented with a seldom seen tactical battle - Spain with a false nine up against Italy with a three-man defense - that had many guessing if we were witnessing the birth of the answer to tiki-taka.

Italy's defensive positioning: three at the back (yellow), three in midfield (orange),
plus two wing-backs.
Spain opt for a striker-less system.

1. The Italian defense. With De Rossi sweeping up behind Chiellini and Bonucci, there was some curiosity about what the three centre-backs would do without the ball, since they would probably have no one to mark directly. Indeed, with Fàbregas often vacating the striker space for Silva and Iniesta's penetrations, it would seem three men at the back would be foolish. However, the Italian defense made a great case for themselves by doing three things:

• When the ball came from the wings into the middle and a through ball appeared possible, De Rossi would push up to try and avoid the key pass - his back covered by Chiellini and Bonucci (plus one of the wing-backs).
• By having a three-man defense, Italy weren't overly concerned with either passes over their heads or through balls (Spain's specialty and raison d'être).

Even with Navas (yellow) trying to stretch the play, the wing-back could protect the outside
and that side's centre-back could provide coverage without unbalancing the defense.

Giaccherini (the wing-back) follows the Spanish winger (yellow arrow).
Chiellini covers inside and  cuts the passing line (green arrow).

• When possession was lost in midfield, Italy could afford to have one of their centre-backs move high up the field to stop Spain's quick transitions.

2. The Spanish defense. Spain didn't seem their usual selves - either by strategy or due to fatigue. With a team split in half between Barcelona and Real Madrid players, the defensive side of their game seemed a bit confusing. Spain used to be good at winning the ball back quickly, resting in possession of the ball afterwards. The back four seemed a bit afraid of moving up and minimising the space between the lines and it was clear that Busquets, Xavi and Xabi Alonso didn't have the necessary energy to do it. Besides, Italy's 3x5x2 meant that their wing-backs were picked up by Spanish full-backs, rather than their wingers - suddenly, the three Spanish midfielders had to divide their attention.

Without quick forwards or wingers, Spain's transitions were always likely to be slowed down, especially because neither Xavi or Xabi Alonso have it in them to motor up and down the field. With no pressure high up, Spain became predictable after winning the ball back.

3. The Italian attack. There were numerous interesting aspects in the Italian attacking phase. For instance, Cesare Prandelli's system could make for a broken team, with the two forwards detached from the rest of the team. On the contrary, Maggio and Giaccherini (deputising as left wing-back) provided clear routes to come out from the back and had the freedom to run almost at will. More importantly, Balotelli and Cassano (especially the latter) were critical in linking up both phases of Italy's game by dropping back or running into the space behind Spain's full-backs (busy with Italy's wing-backs).

The other relevant issue was how Italy bypassed Spain. The apparently obvious answer would be Pirlo, in his deep-lying midfielder position. Instead, it was De Rossi (out of his sweeper position) who orchestrated most attacks, shifted the ball around and dictated the tempo of the game. He was the second Italian player with the most touches (68 to Pirlo's 49), the best and most frequent passer of the ball and provided the most long balls (13 to Pirlo's 9) - all of it with an 85% passing accuracy (all statistics from whoscored.com).

4. The Spanish attack. Spain kicked off these Euros much like the World Cup in 2010. By trying to make everyone as happy as possible and accommodate many of the midfielders (Silva, Iniesta, Fàbregas, Xavi Alonso and Xavi), Vicente Del Bosque made the same mistake as the first match in South Africa, against Switzerland. Once again Silva and Iniesta tended to drift inward and Fàbregas wasn't particularly effective on his false nine role, especially because there was no Messi or Aléxis Sánchez penetrating the space he had freed up.

Spain were missing an attacking reference.
Here there is only Iniesta trying to make the Italian defense uncomfortable.

Without Pedro Rodríguez, David Villa or Jesus Navas on the wings and without a striker to make short diagonals behind the defense, the midfield area was packed with Italian players and Buffon went almost untroubled, if it weren't for Spain's goal. 

Spain insisted on playing through the middle,
this time with no one making diagonal runs to meet Xavi or Alonso's key passes.

To make matters worse, Puyol's absence means that Sérgio Ramos plays as centre-back, not providing his usual surges upfield. Arbeloa is not that kind of player and Jordi Alba was quieter than expected, further worsening the Spanish woes. Fàbregas' goal was possibly the one time where Italy's defense were not quick enough to make the necessary adjustments - highlighting the importance of blind-side runs.

Iniesta (yellow) passes the ball to Silva and moves out wide, dragging his marker.
On the weak side, Fàbregas (blue) makes a run toward the box.
Giaccherini's positioning (orange) is poor, not tucking in to provide coverage. 

With De Rossi forced to meet Silva, Giaccherini's defensive coverage is already too late.

Torres ended up taking Fàbregas' place up front and, just like the World Cup, David Silva was once again sacrificed for width. Will Del Bosque make him go through the same and leave him out for next game? Will Torres (or Llorente) get the nod ahead of Xabi Alonso, for instance (Fàbregas' role is often understated, but his vertical movement from behind wreaks havoc for being unexpected)?

In conclusion, it was a wonderful match and one that left us yearning for the next installments of this tournament. Will the Euros set the stage for a tactical (mini-)revolution and will De Rossi revolutionise the sweeper position - following the footsteps of Beckenbauer or Matthäus? Is this the end of the road for tiki-taka?